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Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetically based neurodevelopmental disorder that 
holds the promise of uncovering the underlying mechanisms of atypical social behaviour. In 
recent years, great interest has been directed at the unique socio-behavioural phenotype, 
high sociability and empathy, found in individuals with WS, who eagerly, often impulsively, 
engage in social interaction, even with strangers. To date, the question of whether this 
hypersociability in WS actually goes along with intact social cognition remains, however, an 
enigma. This question, at the heart of the studies reported here, is of major interest as socio-
cognitive skills are mandatory for one to behave socially in an adapted fashion. 
The current thesis brings together findings of a series of studies on social cognition in WS. 
These studies aimed at investigating whether three main ingredients of social cognition – the 
ability 1) to process faces, 2) to decode emotions, and 3) to attribute intentions and beliefs to 
others – follow the atypical pattern of social behaviour in WS.  
Findings of these studies converge to show dissociated abilities when processing 
human vs. non-human faces (study 1), emotional vs. non-emotional contextual cues (study 
2), and verbal vs. visual mental-state cues (study 3) in individuals with WS relative to 
typically developing controls. Taken together these findings provide evidence for atypical 
social cognition in WS and question its relationship with atypical social behaviour 
characterizing the disorder. In addition, these findings challenge the initial notion of an 
intact social module in WS and provide support to a neuroconstructiviste approach of 
developmental disorders. Finally, the current thesis considers the advances emerging from 
these studies, as well as its theoretical implications for understanding the journey from genes 
to cognition and behaviour. 
 
Keywords: Williams syndrome, social cognition, face processing, emotion processing, 












 A great deal of our waking lives is spent navigating the social world with others, and 
many aspects of social cognition presumably evolved, in part, to facilitate social living 
(Dunbar, 1998). Although social skills are highly heritable and crucial for survival, questions 
remain as to the mechanisms underlying human social behaviour. Research has focused on a 
unique socio-behavioural phenotype, high sociability and empathy, found in individuals 
with Williams syndrome (WS), who eagerly, often impulsively, engage in social interaction, 
even with strangers.  
Fundamental developmental questions in the study of WS include the specificity of 
linkage between deleted genes and atypical social behaviour and cognitive development. 
Curiously, the first attempt to characterize WS already makes us suspect an atypical link 
between social behaviour and cognition by describing a dissociation between social skills 
and cognitive functioning in this disorder:  
 
“Although mentally retarded … they have sufficient understanding to have acquired normal social habits” 
Williams, Barret-Boyes, & Lowe, 1961, pp. 1311 
 
Yet, more than 40 years after, the question of whether (atypical) social behaviour and 
cognition in WS walk side-by-side remains empirically elusive. The studies that will be 
presented here attempted to provide an answer to this question. They will focus on three 
main ingredients of social cognition – the ability 1) to process faces, 2) to decode emotions, 
and 3) to attribute intentions and beliefs to others. Overall, they will determine whether 
these cognitive processes follow the atypical pattern of social behaviour in WS.  
This thesis is organized in three major sections. The Introduction section will provide 
a description of WS as a privileged model to investigate atypical social behaviour and 
cognition. This section will also review previous studies on face processing and theory of 
mind, two crucial domains of social cognition –– across typical development and WS. The 
Experimental section will include three studies conducted on social cognition in individuals 
with WS relative to typically developing controls – the first two focusing on face and 
emotion processing, respectively, and the third examining theory of mind abilities in WS. 
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Finally, the Discussion section will summarize key findings and consider theoretical 
implications as well as possible contributions for tailoring new clinical interventions. 
WILLIAMS SYNDROME 
WS is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by a combination of 
distinctive clinical, cognitive, behavioural, genetic and neuroanatomical features. WS was 
first described in the early 60s by two groups of cardiologists (Beuren, Apitz, & Harmjanz, 
1962; Williams et al., 1961) as a condition involving a constellation of cardiovascular 
abnormalities (e.g., supravalvular aortic stenosis), hypercalcemia (excessive blood calcium 
levels), peculiar facial features (“elfin” face characteristics such as wide mouths and pouting 
lips) and mental deficiency.  
Insights into the nature of WS culminated in the mid-1990s with the identification of 
the genetic deletion responsible for it. Since then, WS has been considered as a model 
condition for understanding brain mechanisms mediating between genetic variation and 
cognitive-behavioural phenotypes in humans and, thus, a neurobiological model of special 
interest to study gene-brain-behaviour relationships (for reviews see Bellugi, Lichtenberger, 
Mills, Galaburda, & Korenberg, 1999b; Meyer-Lindenberg, Mervis, & Berman, 2006b). But 
why’s WS so special? The following sections will highlight this question by describing 
several characteristic domains of the WS phenotype.  
Williams syndrome’s (odd) profile 
Clinical profile 
WS is a genetic disorder caused by a hemideletion on chromosome 7 (see further 
details below). Its estimated prevalence ranges from 1 in 20,000 (Morris, Demsey, Leonard, 
Dilts, & Blackburn, 1988) to 1 in 7,500 (Strømme, Bjørnstad, & Ramstad, 2002) live births, 
which means that WS could account for 6% of all cases of mental retardation of genetic 
origin (Strømme et al., 2002).  
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One of the most striking clinical features of WS is a specific craniofacial 
dismorphology characterized by broad brow, full cheeks, stellate iris, flat nasal bridge, full 
nasal tip, long filtrum, prominent lips and ear lobes, small, widely spaced teeth, and wide 
mouth (see Figure 1). Other clinical features of WS include various cardiovascular 
difficulties, such as supravalvular aortic stenosis (SVAS), a narrowing of the aorta, failure to 
thrive in infancy, delayed development of motor milestones, a variety of connective or soft 
tissue disorders, and premature aging (Korenberg, Dai, Bellugi, Järniven-Palsey, Mills et al., 
in press; Morris & Mervis, 2000). Other common somatic symptoms are endocrine (e.g., 
transient hypercalcemia and impaired glucose tolerance), gastrointestinal (e.g., constipation, 
prolapse and diverticula) and orthopaedic (e.g., scoliosis or joint contractures) problems 
(Morris, 2006). Neurological problems include coordination difficulties (e.g., trouble walking 
down a staircase), hyperreflexia, strabismus, nystagmus (Chapman, De Plessis, & Pober, 
1996; Morris, 2006), abnormal sensitivities to classes of sounds (hyperacusis) and 
sensorineural hearing loss (Cherniske, Carpenter, Klaiman, Young, Bregman, et al., 2004; 
Marler, Elfenbein, Ryals, Urban, & Netzloff, 2005). Of considerable interest, the WS deletion 
results in a cascade of cognitive and behavioural aberrations, which have attracted a great 
















To date, the WS behavioural profile remains little studied, though it is far from being 
uninteresting. Behaviour problems, such as pervasive, intense and persistent fears and 
anxieties, are often described in individuals with WS (e.g., Einfield, Tonge, & Florio, 1997). 
Such problems affect their ability to function, limiting their potential achievements. 
However, these are not considered as a major characteristic of the WS behavioural 
phenotype and can also be found in individuals with other disorders that result in mental 
retardation (e.g., VanLieshout, DeMeyer, Curfs, & Fryns, 1998). Also, the intensity of reaction 
varies significantly across individuals. Some WS individuals may be ‘on edge’, uneasy, or 
worried, whereas others may be beset with phobias and panic states (Scheiber, 2000). 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD, predominantly inattentive type or 
combined type) is also common (> 50%) in children and adolescents with WS (Leyfer, 
Woodruff-Borden, Klein-Tasman, Fricke, & Mervis, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the hallmark of WS behaviour is undoubtedly their high sociability. 
Most of the individuals with WS exhibit an intriguing mix of social attributes. From early 
development they are unusually friendly, interact easily and show no fear of strangers (e.g., 
Jones, Bellugi, Lai, Chiles, Reilly et al., 2000). They also appear highly empathetic (Klein-
Tasman & Mervis, 2003) and have been shown to exhibit enhanced emotional empathy 
compared to individuals with other developmental disabilities (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 
2000). Finally, they tend to be socially fearless and extremely outgoing to the point of being 
called hypersociable (e.g., Jones et al., 2000). For a long time, this notion of hypersociability 
and the idea of an “intact” social module in WS prevailed (e.g., Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 
1994; Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant & Baron-Cohen, 1995). This was believed to 
underlie strengths in specific domains such as face processing, language and theory of mind 
(e.g., Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). Yet, the panorama is not always that positive and clear, as 
the social-behavioural profile of WS also appears to have many paradoxes. For instance, 
individuals with WS show substantial problems in social adjustment (Gosch & Pankau, 1994) 
and poor social judgment (Einfield et al., 1997; Gosch & Pankau, 1997), and they tend to be 
socially isolated in the school environment (Udwin & Yule, 1991). In addition, their social 
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behaviour is often maladapted and characterized by overfriendliness, oversensivity and poor 
peer relations (e.g., Laing, Butterworth, Ansari, Gsodl, Longhi, et al., 2002). Although 
sociability, empathy and overfriendliness are integral features of WS, such contradictions 
challenge the assumption that sociability is a unitary trait entirely spared in WS.  
While the WS behavioural profile concerns overt behaviour, the WS cognitive profile 
concerns the cognitive processes underlying the overt behaviour. This distinction is 
important as different cognitive processes may underlie similar behavioural expressions 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). 
Cognitive profile 
WS presents an unique cognitive profile characterized by the striking co-existence of 
strengths and deficits both within and across domains. One of the most remarkable 
dissociations appears between verbal and visuo-spatial abilities. In the early 1990s, the 
prevailing view was that individuals with WS had normal language abilities despite severe 
visuospatial impairments and mental retardation (Bellugi, Sabo & Vaid, 1988; Bellugi et al., 
1994). Such a clear-cut profile has been contradicted by recent studies showing qualitatively 
different patterns of deficit observed within both language and visuospatial cognition (for a 
review see Brock, 2007; Farran & Jarrold, 2003).  
In the domain of language, the current and nowadays dominant view considers that 
language development in WS mostly follows a normal, but delayed path (for a review see 
Karmiloff-Smith, Brown, Grice, & Paterson, 2003). Indeed, language onset is severely 
delayed in early childhood (Masataka, 2001; Paterson, Brown, Gsoedl, Johnson, & Karmiloff-
Smith, 1999; Semel & Rosner, 2003; Singer-Harris, Bellugi, Bates, Jones, & Rossen, 1997), 
suggesting problems in mastering the basic skills involved in lexical acquisition. 
Nevertheless, the language of WS adults is generally grammatical and fluent, with relatively 
well-developed vocabulary (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000). 
Moreover, relative strengths in lexical development (Bello, Capirci, & Volterra, 2004), verbal 
working memory (Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998; Vicari, Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini, 
& Volterra, 1996; Wang & Bellugi, 1994), socially engaging use of prosody, discourse and 
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narrative skills (Karmiloff-Smith, et al., 1995; Reilly, Losh, Bellugi, & Wulfeck, 2004) may all 
have served to augment an overall illusion of linguistic strength in WS (for a critical review 
see Brock, 2007; Mervis, Robinson, Rowe, Becerra, & Klein-Tasman, 2003). 
Contrasting with this relatively spared domain, severe impairments in visuospatial 
cognition are a neuropsychological hallmark of WS. Yet, unevenness also exists in this 
domain, as WS individuals’ level of performance is not consistent across all visuospatial 
tasks (for a review see Farran & Jarrold, 2003). Arguably, the most impaired performance is 
observed on production tasks (see Figure 2), i.e., visuo-spatial construction (e.g., the block 
design task of the Wechsler scales, see below) and drawing tasks (Bellugi et al., 1988; Mervis, 
Morris, Bertrand, & Robinson, 1999). Performance on such tasks is characterized by a lack of 
global organisation: individual elements are not integrated accurately into the global form 
(Bellugi et al., 1988). By contrast, at the level of visuo-perception, the WS pattern of global 
and local processing resembles that of typically developing controls (Deruelle, Rondan, 
Mancini, & Livet, 2006; Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2001, 2003; Rondan, Santos, Mancini, 
Livet, & Deruelle, 2008). Surprisingly, weakness in visuo-constructive, visuo-motor and 
visuo-spatial working memory tasks (Atkinson, Anker, Braddick, Nokes, Mason, & 
Braddick, 2001; Bellugi et al., 2000; Farran et al., 2003) contrasts with near-normal abilities to 
identify objects and faces (e.g., Landau, Hoffman, & Kurz, 2006; Paul, Stiles, Passarotti, 
Bavar, & Bellugi, 2002; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, & Joseph, 2003; Wang, Doherty, 








Figure 2. Drawing of a bicycle by a 9-year old child with WS showing pronounced problems with 
visuospatial construction (taken from Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000). 
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Indeed, the ability to visually discriminate familiar and unfamiliar faces appears to be 
a relative cognitive strength in WS (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000). Several studies converge to 
show that when visual stimuli involves faces, WS individuals often perform as accurately as 
normal controls in visual perception, recognition and discrimination tasks (Bellugi, et al., 
1994; Deruelle, Rondan, Livet, & Mancini, 2003; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2003; Udwin, & Yule, 
1991). Finally, it is important to note that this behavioural proficiency on face processing, as 
is the case for language, appears to co-exist with mild to moderate mental retardation 
(Mervis, Robinson, Bertrand, Morris, Klein-Tasman, & Armstrong, 2000; Mervis, Robinson, 
Rowe, Becerra, & Klein-Tasman, 2003).  
Indeed, mental retardation is one of the most common features of individuals with 
WS. Their IQ levels, inferred from standardized measures of the Wechsler scales1 (WAIS-III - 
Wechsler, 1997 and WISC-III - Wechsler, 1996), usually fall in the range of mild to moderate 
retardation and are about two standard deviations below the general population mean (e.g., 
Udwin, Yule & Martin, 1987). However, mean scores at the verbal subtests consistently 
overtake scores at the performance subtest and this difference often reaches 14 points, which 
is highly significant (Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998; Udwin & Yule, 1991). Such disparity 
between the different components of IQ measure is also found in Searcy and colleagues’ 
(2004) study which recently put forward that performance IQ increased with age in WS, but 
that overall IQ remain stable across ages (Searcy, Lincoln, Rose, Klima, Bavar, & Korenberg, 
2004).  
Close observation of the IQ scores in WS suggest that it is not a unitary condition 
characterized by homogeneous slowness of cognitive development, but by a variety of 
                                                
1 The Wechsler intelligence scales are general tests of intelligence standardized for use with adults (Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS) or with children (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, WISC). They were 
designed to quantify Intelligence (IQ) as a global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think 
rationally, and to deal effectively with the environment.  The full-scale IQ is composed by 14 subtests, comprising 
the Verbal (Information, Comprehension, Arithmetic, Similarities, Vocabulary, Digit Span and Letter Number 
Sequencing) and the Performance scales (Picture Completion, Code, Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, Picture 
Arrangement, Symbol Search and Object Assembly). These provide 3 scores: verbal IQ; performance IQ and a 
composite, single full-scale IQ score based on the combined scores. The average full-scale IQ is 100, with a 
standard deviation of 15 (above and below the mean). This is the average IQ range where typically developing 
individuals would fall. 
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conditions in which some cognitive functions may be more disrupted than others (for a 
review see Santos, Milne, Rosset, & Deruelle, 2007a). Furthermore, the finding of an unusual 
profile of cognitive dissociations in WS, both within and across domains has sparked a 
modularity debate (see below). 
The point of view of genetics 
One of the main issues of this last decade was to discover the genetic basis of these 
peculiar cognitive and behavioural profiles. Research on the WS genotype created a major 
breakthrough in understanding the origins of WS. It is now widely accepted that WS is 
caused by the absence of one copy of some 25 contiguous genes on chromosome band 
7q11.23 (see Figure 3) on either paternal or maternal chromosome 7 (Donnai & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2000; Ewart, Morris, Atkinson, Jin, Sternes et al., 1993; Korenberg, Chen, Hirota, Lai, 
Bellugi et al., 2000). The WS deletion invariably includes the gene for elastin (ELN), which 
codes for an elastic protein in connective tissue that is particularly abundant in large blood 
















Discovery of this specific molecular profile serves as a genetic marker for WS, i.e., it is 
a definite way of establishing the diagnosis of WS in individuals who exhibit a wide range of 
physical, medical, and behavioural features included in the “clinical diagnosis” of WS. 
Positive diagnosis of WS is thus routinely determined by detecting the absence of the gene 
for ELN with the fluorescent in situ hybridization (FISH) test. The FISH is a cytogenetic 
method that detects complex and cryptic chromosomal rearrangements, and thus plays an 
important role in the investigation of unsolved cases of mental retardation and multiple 
anomalies (e.g., WS, Prader-Willi, DiGeorge syndrome; Sukarova-Angelovska, Piperkova, 
Sredovska, Ilieva, Kocova, 2007). 
The deletion is considered to be the result of unequal crossing over between 
chromosomes in the WS critical region during meiosis (meiotic mispairings; Korenberg, 
Bellugi, Saladanan, Mills, & Reiss, 2003). The size of the deletion, approximately 1.5-1.8 
megabases of genomic DNA on one chromosome 7 homologue, is very much the same in 
approximately 95% of the individuals studied (Lowery et al., 1995). Thus, nearly, all 
clinically identified individuals with WS lack precisely the same set of genes, with 
breakpoints at the same places. Importantly, however, the deletions are not identical. 
Predisposition to both genomic instability and hemideletion of this particular region (7q11.23 
band) of chromosome 7 is possibly related to the large number of repetitive sequences that 
surround the single copy of ELN on chromosome 7 (Korenberg et al., 2000). Occasionally 
individuals with WS are identified who have somewhat smaller deletions – such cases are 
potentially very meaningful as a way of providing clues to the roles of specific genes in the 
behavioural expression of the syndrome. Indeed, WS cases with nested proximal deletions 
and atypical cognitive-behavioural profile have helped generate genotype-phenotype 
correlations. For instance, a recent report describing a female child with an atypical WS 
deletion (affecting GTF21RD1 but sparing the GTF21 transcription) and whose visuo-spatial 
abilities were less severely impaired than those of full-deletion-carriers, providing evidence 
for the hemizygosity necessary (both GTF21RD1 and GTF21) to produce the severe visuo-
spatial deficits seen in carriers of the classic WS deletion (Tassabehji, Hammond, Karmiloff-
Smith, Thompson, Thorgeirsson et al., 2005). Furthermore, recent studies based on fine grain 
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analyses of specific areas of chromosome band 7q11.23 have suggested that the 
microdeletion in some of these genes may be responsible for many WS characteristics, such 
as mental retardation, neonatal hypercalcemia, cardiovascular and facial anomalies (e.g., 
Korenberg et al., 2000). For instance, the absence of the gene for ELN has been reliably linked 
to the cardiac abnormalities associated with WS (Tassabehji, Metcalfe, Karmiloff-Smith, 
Carette, Grant et al., 1999). Although no further absolute genotype-phenotype linkages have 
been established with single genes, LIMK1, CYLN2, GTF21 and GTF21RD1 have been linked 
to some non-verbal cognitive features of the syndrome, as well as to craniofacial dysmorphia 
(Botta, Novelli, Mari, Novelli, Sabani et al., 1999; Hirota, Matsuoka, Chen, Salandanan, 
Lincoln et al., 2003; Hoogenraad, Eussen, Langeveld, van Haperen, Winterberg et al., 1998; 
Meng, Zhang, Tregoubov, Janus, Cruz et al., 2002; Tassabehji et al., 2005; Zhao, Aviles, Abel, 
Almli, McQuillen, & Pleasure, 2005). The gene GTF21 has also been linked to the intellectual 
impairment (Morris, Mervis, Hobart, Gregg, Bertrand et al., 2003). Despite major advances in 
this domain, detailed maps establishing the impact of this genetic disorder on brain and 
behaviour are still sparse.  
Although hypersociability is considered a hallmark feature of WS, to date only one 
study has attempted to investigate its genetic underpinnings. Importantly, this study has 
found contrasting sociability profiles in children with the typical deletion for WS and a child 
with WS who had a smaller deletion (not including the most telomeric region, defined by the 
gene for GTF21, and possibly also GTF2iRD1 and CYLN2) and many physical features of WS, 
but who did not demonstrated hypersociability (Doyle, Bellugi, Korenberg, & Graham, 
2004). This intriguing finding suggests the involvement of a genetic predisposition in the 
expression of hypersociability and should be used to bolster research on genotoype-
phenotype relationships in WS.  
Because the genes involved in WS are known, and the dosage of at least some of these 
genes is clearly abnormal, the study of neural mechanisms in WS affords a privileged setting 
to understand genetic influences on complex brain functions in a “bottom-up” way. Indeed, 
as a complement to molecular studies, studies on the variation of brain structure and 
function have provided further understanding on the WS’ odd profile.  
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The point of view of brain sciences 
Several studies attempted to determine the neural markers of WS in relation to its 
odd profiles at the structural level. Neuroanatomical analysis show reduced brain size 
(Jernigan & Bellugi, 1990), Chiari malformations (e.g., Pober & Filiano, 1995), corpus 
callosum shape changes (e.g., Schmitt, Eliez, Warsofsky, Bellugi & Reiss, 2001a) and altered 
cell size and density in primary visual cortex (Galaburda, Holinger, Bellugi & Sherman, 
2002) in WS.  
Studies using structural MRI also found significant brain differences between WS and 
typically developing individuals. These include volumetric decreases in cerebral gray 
(approximately 11%) and white matters (approximately 18%), of the thalamus, occipital and 
parietal lobes (relative to frontal regions), along with an increase in the size of the amygdala 
and superior temporal and orbitofrontal gyri in WS relative to typical controls (Reiss, Eckert, 
Rose, Karchemskiy, Kesler et al., 2004; Thompson, Lee, Dutton, Geaga, Hayashi et al., 2005). 
These anatomical abnormalities are accompanied by relative preservations in the auditory 
cortex (Holinger, Bellugi, Mills, Korenberg, Reiss et al., 2005) and cerebellum (Jones, 
Hesselink, Courschene, Duncan, Matsuda et al., 2002). Recent findings indicate that WS is 
associated with atypical sulcal/gyral patterning (Eckert, Galaburda, Karchemskiy, Liang, 
Thompson et al., 2005; Jackowski, & Schultz, 2005). 
Cerebral shape analysis also revealed reduced overall curvature of the brain in WS 
(Schmitt et al., 2001a), as well as abnormally increased gyrification in parietal and occipital 
lobes (Schmitt, Watts, Eliez, Bellugi, Galaburda, & Reiss, 2002) and the temporoparietal zone 
(Thompson et al., 2005). Unusual brain shape has also been found in the hippocampus 
(Meyer-Lindenberg, Mervis, Sarpal, Koch, Steele et al., 2005b) and the corpus callosum 
(Schmitt et al., 2001b). These latest concern both the shape (less curved) and the volume 
(reduced), with anterior callosal sections being relatively spared, while the splenium and the 
isthmus were found reduced in size (Schmitt et al., 2001b).  
Taken together these studies reveal critical differences in brain mechanisms and may 
help clarify the atypical neural substrate and type of brain processing in WS. Interestingly, it 
has been suggested that some of these anatomical findings may concur with the behavioural 
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features of WS. For instance, Santos and colleagues (2007b) have found atypical development 
of callosal functions (interhemispheric communication and hemispheric asymmetry) in 
children and adults with WS, possibly related to structural callosal abnormalities (Santos, 
Rondan, Mancini, & Deruelle, 2007b). Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that the overall 
decrease in size of the isthmus and the splenium may account for the well-known 
visuospatial deficits in this condition (Schmitt et al., 2001a, 2001b; Tomaiuolo, Di Paola, 
Caravale, Vicari, Petrides, Caltagirone, 2002). However, anatomo-behavioural correlates are 
still few and in need of further investigation.  
At the functional level, previous studies have found abnormalities in the 
hippocampal formation (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005b), prefrontal regions crucial for 
amygdala regulation and social cognition (Meyer-Lindenberg, Hariri, Munoz, Morris, 
Mervis et al., 2005a), and the dorsal visual stream, notably the intraparietal sulcus (Sarpal, 
Buchsbaum, Kohn, Kippenhan, Mervis et al., 2008; Meyer-Lindenberg, Kohn, Mervis, 
Kippenham, Olsen et al., 2004). Interestingly, evidence for dysregulation of amygdala-
prefrontal system (involved in social and non-social fear signalling; e.g., Schultz, 2005) in WS 
is thought to underlie the hypersociable, gregarious behavioural profile, the lack of socially 
related fear, and the presence of non-social anxieties commonly reported in this condition 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005a). Further, during face viewing, marked hypoactivity has 
been observed in the anterior hippocampal formation  (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005b), a 
region important for integrating spatial and object information from both dorsal and ventral 
streams2 (Janzen & van Turennout, 2004). The hierarchical organization and cognitive 
specificity of the visual system, combined with the relatively isolated visuo-spatial 
construction in WS, led to the hypothesis that dorsal, but not ventral, stream function is 
compromised in WS. This hypothesis has been supported by functional neuroimaging 
studies showing no aberrant ventral activation during object-processing paradigms although 
hypoactivity in directly adjacent parietal regions during spatial localization and visuo-spatial 
                                                
2 Hierarchically organized and functionally specialized, the visual system is divided into two processing streams 
that emerge from the primary visual cortex: a dorsal stream extends into the parietal lobe and processes spatial 
information, whereas a ventral stream extends into the temporal lobe and subserves object processing 
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1992). 
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construction (dorsal stream dysfunction) in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004; see also 
Mobbs, Garrett, Menon, Rose, Bellugi, & Reiss, 2004). Interestingly, these studies are 
consistent with behavioural studies reporting relatively normal face (e.g., Tager-Flusberg et 
al., 2003) and object (e.g., Landau et al., 2006) recognition abilities, indicating a functionally 
intact ventral stream. 
Taken together, there is evidence for atypical brain structure and function in WS 
suggesting that brains of individuals with WS develop differently from the outset, which 
probably have subtle but widespread repercussions at the cognitive and behavioural levels. 
Summary 
The striking peak-valley profile of sparing and impairment found in WS, both across 
and within domains, provide important insights on the architecture of several cognitive 
systems and on the link between genes, brain and behaviour (for reviews see Bellugi et al., 
1999b; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006b). The mapping of fundamental molecular events in 
WS to specific neurobiological substrates and social phenotypic correlates may ultimately 
enable the identification of relationships between genetic etiology, cognitive processes and 
behavioural outcomes. It is indeed on the social-cognitive sphere that these outcomes are the 
most striking, with increased sociability contrasting with overall low cognitive functioning 
(e.g., Bellugi, Järvinen-Pasley, Doyle, Reilly, Reiss, & Korenberg, 2007). The social phenotype 
of WS is characterized by an unusual interest in social interaction (Gosh & Pankau, 1994; 
Jones et al., 2000), increased empathy (Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003; Mervis & Klein-
Tasman, 2000), positive interpersonal bias (Bellugi, Adolphs Cassadi, & Chiles, 1999a), social 
disinhibition and overfriendliness (Davies, Udwin, & Howlin, 1998; Greer, Brown, Pai, 
Choudry, & Klein, 1997). In addition, individuals with WS show a preference for viewing 
faces, relative strengths in processing faces and language features that increase the likelihood 
of social communication and interaction with others. Although atypical social behaviour is a 
much-noted hallmark of WS, to date little is known on whether it is accompanied by intact 
social-cognitive skills.   
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The studies reported here address the question of whether (atypical) social behaviour 
and cognition in WS walk side-by-side. In particular, these studies focus on three main 
ingredients of social cognition – face, emotion and TOM processing. Importantly, these 
abilities are crucial for understanding how humans perceive their own and others’ internal 
states, motives and behaviours, and how we act toward them (e.g., Frith & Frith, 1999; Frith 
& Frith, 2003). These abilities are thus required for one to behave socially and of major 
interest in cases showing unique increased sociability – WS. The following sections provide a 
theoretical background for the empirical studies reported here. The debate between modular 
and non-modular contributions to social cognition will first be considered, followed by a 
review of studies on face, emotion and TOM processing in typical development and in WS. 
SOCIAL COGNITION  
 A whole or some parts? The debate of modularity 
Over the past two decades, cognitive psychologists have proposed that humans 
possess a number of independent cognitive mechanisms rather than functioning as a 
“whole”. Interestingly, WS has been used to assert the existence of a neat juxtaposition of 
intact and impaired cognitive modules in the brain (see Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2003). For 
instance, language and face processing have been claimed to be preserved in WS (Bellugi et 
al., 1988; Rossen, Jones, Wang, & Klima, 1995; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2003). This purpoted 
intactness, which co-exists with mental retardation (Mervis et al., 2000), impaired spatial and 
numerical cognition (Bellugi et al., 1994), has been used to bolster claims about innately-
specified, independently-functioning modules, as if the atypically developing brain was a 
simple normal brain with parts intact and parts impaired. This modular view of WS has been 
feverishly challenged by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues (2003, 2006), who rather attribute a 
major role to the dynamics of development and consider that WS phenotypic outcome as the 
consequence of “a tiny impairment in the initial state”, which affects several brain regions 
and has cascading effects over time (Karmiloff-Smith, Ansari, Campbell, Scerif, & Thomas, 
2006; Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2003).  
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There has also been strong debate between modular and non-modular contributions 
on development in the literature on social cognition. Some theorists, particularly of a 
Piagetian or connectionist persuasion, have asserted that social-cognitive abilities derive 
solely from domain-general learning mechanisms applied to representations of socio-cultural 
input. Evidence for strict modularity was drawn primarily from extensive research (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) indicating that children 
with autism have impaired social cognition. In contrast, these children demonstrated 
relatively intact performance on matched cognitive control tasks that did not require an 
understanding of another’s mental states (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992). Here, it was 
assumed that social reasoning modules acted as domain-specific systems that operated in an 
automatic and rapid fashion, producing shallow output that must be processed further by 
higher-order systems. Such modules were said to be informationally encapsulated and 
impenetrable to the input of top–down processes (Fodor, 1983; Moscovitch, 1992; Moscovitch 
& Umiltà, 1990).  
In the early 90s, Brothers and Rings (1992) did suggested that socially-relevant 
representations are processed within a social module, which encodes and processes 
information relevant to other individuals, including face processing and theory of mind 
(TOM). Along with this hypothesis, in the first study on social cognition in WS, Karmiloff-
Smith and colleagues argued that both face processing and theory of mind are “islets of 
preserved ability in WS” (Karmiloff et al., 1995, pp. 203). Although this study provided an 
important theoretical contribution to the understanding of social cognition in WS, 
subsequent studies challenged such clear-cut pattern of intactness of social cognition in WS, 
in particular, and the strictly modular interpretation in general.  
While social cognition involves a multiplicity of processes, the following review will 
focus on the abilities of face, emotion and TOM processing in WS – key variables in study 
here.  
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Face processing in typical development 
Before turning back to WS, it is important to consider the role of face-processing skills 
in typical development. These are thought to be important evolutionary basic skills that have 
helped drive the development of our social behaviour. In line with this, the human face is 
undoubtedly a special site to convey social and emotional information and a crucial 
reference for social communication. Faces are also a means for inferring intentions and 
desires from others. Faces are special stimuli for humans from the earliest stages of 
development. Newborns tend to look longer and to orient preferentially their attention to 
faces compared to other objects (e.g., Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & Morton, 1991). This 
increased and early interest for faces is thought to bring about our extraordinary abilities for 
processing faces and facial emotions quickly and accurately (for a review see Bruce & Young, 
1986). These abilities can be assimilated to expertise phenomenon (e.g., Bukach, Gauthier & 
Tarr, 2006). According to several authors, expertise in face processing is closely linked to the 
ability to code configural properties (e.g., Rhodes, Tan, Brake & Taylor, 1989). This 
configural mode of processing refers to the analysis of the spatial interrelationships of facial 
features (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth, etc.) and is usually opposed to analytical or local mode of 
processing (for a review see Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Sensitivity to configural 
changes in face processing has been considered as evidence for face-exclusive mechanisms in 
normal development (e.g., Bukach et al., 2006). Curiously, this is not the case in some 
developmental disorders. The most striking example comes from studies in autism 
suggesting that the use of atypical perceptual strategies (local rather than configural 
processing strategies) prohibit the normal development of face processing competences (e.g., 
Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; for a review see Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006). With respect to WS, despite the prevailing view arguing for the 
intactness of face-processing skills, some studies show that people with WS rely on atypical 
strategies to do such processing (Deruelle, Mancini, Livet, Cassé-Perrot & de Schonen, 1999). 
The following sections will highlight the origin of this debate.  
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Face processing in Williams syndrome 
The first reports of face-processing skills in WS were based on standardized face-
processing tasks, such as the Benton Facial Recognition Test3 (BFRT) and the Rivermead Face 
Memory task4 (RFMT). Adults with WS were found to perform as accurately as 
chronological age-matched controls and even more accurately than IQ-matched individuals 
with Down syndrome on the BFRT (Bellugi, et al., 1994). Moreover, during experiments, 
researchers noticed WS infants tended to look the experimenter in the eyes insistently and 
spent significantly more time focusing on faces than on objects (Bellugi, et al., 2000; Mervis & 
Bertrand, 1997). This led to the suggestion that such an early interest for faces would result in 
adult expertise for face-processing skills (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000). Taken together these 
studies were a basis to claim “intact” face-processing skills in WS. However, such claims 
were challenged by subsequent studies showing both delay and deviance in WS face 
processing (Karmiloff-Smith, Thomas, Annaz, Humphreys, Ewing, Brace et al., 2004). Also, 
near-normal face-processing abilities in WS were found to rely nevertheless on the use of 
atypical featural perceptual strategies (Deruelle et al., 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1997; Mancini, 
Rondan, Livet, Chabrol & Deruelle, 2006). 
Configural vs. Featural: what strategies do Williams syndrome individuals 
use to process faces? 
This question of configural or featural face processing in WS has been at the centre of 
animated debates over the past decade. Within this context, Karmiloff-Smith, one of the 
pioneers on the study of face processing in WS, provided a major contribution. In a 
preliminary study, she showed that WS individuals were able to do featural analysis but 
were impaired when doing configural analysis, in comparison to chronological age-matched 
controls (Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). Although this study included only 10 participants with WS, 
                                                
3 The Benton Facial Recognition Test measures the ability to recognize the identity of neutral/nonemotional faces 
and requires the subject to select from a set of six aligned black and white photographs the face with the same 
identity as the reference face.  
4 The Rivermead Face Memory task is a subtest of the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test that measures 
recognition and recall of faces.  
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it had the merit of being the first to suggest that normal performance in WS might not 
necessarily reflect the use of normal processing strategies. Also, this study shifted attention 
from the debate of whether face-processing skills are intact or impaired, to whether its 
development occurs normally or atypically.  
Studies from our group provide support to the initial claims of Karmiloff-Smith 
(1997). Face processing skills of 12 children with Williams between the ages of 7 and 23 were 
compared to that of two groups of normally developing children (matched on chronological 
age and on mental age) across three different experiments (Deruelle et al., 1999). The first 
experiment focused on the ability to discriminate different aspects of faces, such as emotional 
expressions and gaze direction. The second experiment aimed at determining if participants 
used local or configural strategies to process faces. Finally, the third experiment assessed the 
ability to discriminate between local and configural transformations. Results revealed that 
while children with WS performed significantly lower than chronological age-matched 
controls, no such performance differences were found when compared to mental age-
matched controls. Most importantly, children with WS did not show the same performance 
pattern as typically developing individuals did, i.e., the use of a configural face-processing 
mode. When processing faces deprived of their usual configuration (inverted faces) WS 
failed to present the so-called inversion effect5 in contrast to control groups. In typically 
developing individuals this inversion effect is thought to sign configural face processing 
(e.g., Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001). Deruelle and colleagues (1999) interpreted 
these findings as evidence for a configural deficit in face processing in WS. More specifically, 
results of the third experiment described above support this interpretation by showing that 
individuals with WS discriminate local but not configural transformations as well as controls 
(see also, Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2003). Taken together these studies suggest that WS 
individuals do use atypical (featural) strategies to process faces while achieving near-normal 
                                                
5 The recognition of face pictures is disproportionately affected by a 180-degree rotation (inversion) in the image 
plane from the normal, upright viewing condition (Yin, 1969). This phenomenon is now commonly called the 
Face Inversion Effect. There is now agreement that the Face Inversion Effect arises from a greater difficulty to 
perceptually encode inverted face information (e.g. Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998).  
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levels of accuracy on face processing tasks6. This is nevertheless highly contradictory to the 
widespread idea that an efficient development of face processing depends on the use of 
configural analysis (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001). Moreover, in light of the 
evidence from earlier studies using standardized measures (Bellugi et al., 1994), face 
processing is shown to be a relative strength in WS (see also Bellugi et al., 2000; Jones, 
Hickok, & Lai, 1998; Wang et al., 1995). However, the idea that such proficiency depends on 
abnormal mechanisms (featural analysis) is controversial. The question of whether 
configural processing is really affected in WS remains thus in need of further investigation.  
Attempting to further clarify this contradictory issue, Deruelle and colleagues (2003) 
designed three new experiments tapping specifically on face processing perceptual 
strategies. The first two experiments contrasted the ability to match faces on the basis of high 
or low spatial frequency information (i.e., analysis based on local facial features versus on 
global configuration of faces, respectively). Surprisingly, results revealed that all groups of 
children, control (typically developing children matched on chronological age and on mental 
age) as well as WS (N=12) presented the same pattern of performance (i.e., they were more 
accurate when relying on low rather than on high spatial frequency). Finally, the authors 
tested whether children with WS differed from controls when they were to process faces on 
the basis of internal versus external parts of faces. Again, results suggested that children 
with WS, as controls, relied more on global shape (contour) than on featural components 
(internal). Taken together, these findings indicated that, similar to overall face processing 
skills (Bellugi et al., 1988), configural face encoding is preserved in WS (Deruelle et al., 2003). 
The discrepancy with previous findings (Deruelle et al., 1999 and Karmiloff-Smith, 1997) was 
interpreted as due to the nature of the task used. In other words the authors concluded that 
not all aspects of configural processing are affected in WS individuals, as they show intact 
abilities when the task requires a global analysis (i.e., such as the contour; Deruelle et al., 
2003), but are impaired when the task demands configural analysis (i.e., processing of spatial 
relationships between elements; Karmiloff-Smith, 1997; Deruelle et al., 1999).  
                                                
6 These findings also provide support to the idea that different cognitive processes may underlie similar behaviour 
outcomes in WS individuals relative to typically developing controls. 
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At this point it is important to note that configural information also plays an 
important role on facial-emotion recognition (e.g., Rosset, Rondan, Da Fonseca, Santos, 
Assouline, & Deruelle, 2007). For instance, Calder and colleagues (2000) observed a 
composite7/configural effect in emotion recognition similar to that previously reported in 
face recognition (Calder, Young, Kean, & Dean, 2000; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Here, 
when the top and bottom halves of a composite face depict different emotions, recognition of 
the emotion in either half is slower and less accurate than when the composite face is 
inverted or the two halves are offset laterally. Interestingly, these findings suggest that the 
ability to process configural properties of faces affects not only the ability to process faces but 
also the ability to process facial emotions. It seems thus plausible to hypothesize that, 
together with atypical configural abilities, individuals with WS show atypical facial-emotion 
processing. The following section will focus on this issue. 
Facial-emotion processing in Williams syndrome 
Studies on facial-emotion processing in WS are sparse and most aimed at 
determining whether this ability depends on the positive social bias characteristic of 
individuals with WS. Gagliardi and colleagues (2003) used a newly developed test of facial-
expression recognition (Animated Full Facial Expression Comprehension Test – AFFECT; 
Gagliardi, Frigerio, Burt, Cazzaniga, Perret & Borgatti, 2003). Performance of a WS group 
was compared to 2 groups of typically developing individuals. One original contribution of 
this study was the finding that despite performing at normal levels on the BFRT, individuals 
with WS were nevertheless poorer in their overall performance for recognizing facial 
expression than controls of the same age and indistinguishable from controls matched on 
intellectual level. As changes in the configuration of the face are an important part of 
expressions, these differences were interpreted as resulting from a lack of configural ability 
in WS. Finally, results showed no positive labelling bias in the WS group’s interpretation of 
facial expressions. Thus, this study failed to provide validation to the idea of a link between 
                                                
7 Composite facial expressions result from the alignment of the top half of one expression (e.g., anger) with the 
bottom half of another (e.g., happiness). 
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increased positive social bias in WS and the interpretation of proficiency in facial 
expressions.  
More recently, Plesa-Skwerer and colleagues (2006) conducted a study aimed at 
further investigating emotional expressions of perception in WS (Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, 
Schofield, Verballis & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). Contrary to previous studies, the authors 
hypothesized that the WS group would show impairments in emotion labelling relative to 
typically developing individuals. Moreover, it was predicted that, compared to individuals 
with learning/intellectual disabilities (matched on chronological and mental age), 
individuals with WS would not present more facilities to label emotions, despite their 
gregarious social behaviour. Results supported these two predictions suggesting that 
emotion recognition is neither an increased nor spared ability in WS. This is in contradiction 
to initial studies claiming that most social-cognitive abilities are generally impaired in this 
population (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). However, this hypothesis linking relative strengths 
in face processing and increased social interest cannot be refuted solely on the basis of two 
studies that tested facial emotion processing in WS.  
Further comparative studies have attempted to investigate this question. Here, a 
comparison between WS and autism is of special interest as pervasive problems in social 
interaction and reduced interest towards social stimuli may be related to the apparent 
difficulty with faces described in autism  (Grelotti, Gauthier & Schultz, 2002). Recently, Rose 
and colleagues (2007) asked individuals with WS, individuals with autism and typically 
developing individuals to perform a same-different face recognition task comprising three 
experimental conditions: upright faces with neutral expressions, upright faces with varying 
affective expressions (happy, sad, angry, surprised and afraid) and inverted faces with 
neutral expressions (Rose, Lincoln, Lai, Ene, Searcy, & Bellugi, 2007). The major hypothesis 
of this study focused on the impact of social information in face recognition abilities. It was 
predicted that if attention to social information does affect face recognition, the WS group 
would demonstrate preserved face recognition when faces vary by affective expression when 
compared to the autistic one, but show greater difficulty when faces were inverted. The 
results showed that all groups were more accurate when comparing neutral faces than when 
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comparing faces with expressed emotions. The presence of emotional indexes in faces 
seemed to increase the difficulty of the task. Most importantly, the WS group performed at 
the same level as controls under this condition. By contrast, the autistic group performed 
below the level of both control and WS groups, suggesting that emotional information has a 
negative impact on their ability to compare two faces (stimuli and target). The authors 
attempted to interpret these results by the well-known differences in social behaviour 
between individuals with WS and autism. In line with the idea that early social disinterest 
affects later face processing skills in autism (e.g., Sasson, 2006) the authors suggested that the 
opposite would happen. As individuals with WS “obtain normal to above-normal experience 
in viewing faces” early in development, this would result in “subsequent expertise in 
discrimination” (Rose et al., 2007, pp. 7). This interpretation is undoubtedly curious. Yet, 
rather than being experts, individuals with WS were found to perform at the same level as 
controls. This raises doubt as to weather the link between social interest and face processing 
skills is so clear-cut. However, these findings have to be interpreted with caution as this 
study suffered from major methodological limitations (for instance, participants in the WS 
group were significantly older and showed lower overall IQ-levels than those with autism).  
Summary  
Proficiency in face processing, together with strong social motivation, has led 
researchers to hypothesize that relative strengths in face processing are linked to 
hypersociable behaviour in WS (e.g., Pober & Dykens, 1996; Jones et al., 2000). However, to 
date this hypothesis has not yet been validated. As mentioned before, the first claims for 
intactness of face processing skills in WS were based on the idea of an intact social module, 
including not only increased face processing but also TOM abilities. We will now focus on 
TOM abilities, which are at the heart of the third study reported in this manuscript and are 
considered as a main ingredient for adapted social behaviour (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993, see 
also Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000).  
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THEORY OF MIND 
It is widely accepted nowadays that theory of mind (TOM, Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) - the ability to attribute independent mental states to self and others in order to explain 
and predict behaviour – is crucial for social cognition (for a review see Baron-Cohen et al., 
2000). TOM underlies the ability to comprehend and predict the behaviour of other people, 
and to interpret the actions of others as meaningful and intentional (Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, 
& Morris, 2001; Wellman & Wolley, 1990). Researchers generally agree that human social 
interaction gains much of its richness and complexity because we possess a TOM, i.e., an 
understanding of how others’ behaviours are motivated by their internal mental states (e.g., 
Wellman, 1990).  
Its empirical basis… 
The empirical basis of TOM comes mostly from studies using tests of (false) belief 
attribution (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; see also Flavell, 1999; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 for reviews of this literature). First order false-belief tests 
establish whether an individual can attribute a false belief to a story character (see Figure 4). 
For example, an individual might observe a character, Sally, moving a toy from its hiding 
place once a second character, Ann, has left the room. The individual completing this false-
belief task would display intact TOM ability if he predicted that Ann, upon re-entering the 
room, would look first for the toy in its original location, rather than in its new hiding place. 
In order to make this correct prediction, the individual must be able to inhibit his own 
knowledge of reality, and appreciate instead the false-belief held by another person 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Second order false-belief tests are more complex, and require an individual to 
attribute a false belief about a belief. For example, if unbeknownst to Sally (but known to the 
test taker) Ann peeked back into the room and observed Sally changing the hiding place of 
the toy, Sally would then falsely believe that Ann believes the toy is still hidden in its 
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original location. Sally would hold a false belief about Ann’s belief. Second order false-belief 
tasks assess the test taker’s ability to correctly attribute this second order false belief to Sally. 
 
 
Figure 4. Sally-Ann task. Schematic of the scenario that is shown to infants and children to assess TOM 
abilities, specifically the capacity to attribute false beliefs. Ann has a pram and Sally has a box. Ann puts a toy 
into her pram, and then she goes out for a walk. While she is outside, Sally takes the toy from the pram and puts 
it into her own box. When Ann comes back, where will she look for the toy? Normal children of four years of age 
and older answer that Ann will look inside her pram, because that is where she (falsely) believes the toy is (taken 
from Adolphs, 2003). 
 
Typical and atypical development of theory of mind 
In the last two decades, a large body of research has shown that in normal 
development TOM emerges in orderly steps (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004; see also Frith & 
Frith, 2003 for a review). First, children get to understand that people’s actions are guided by 
their (either true or false) beliefs only (around age 4), and then (between 5 and 6 years old) 
they come to realize that people’s emotions are also influenced by their beliefs (e.g., Pons, 
Harris, & de Rosnay, 2003). At present, issues surrounding aspects of children’s TOM 
development have come to guide research on children’s social-cognitive development 
(Taylor, 1996). Through this work, researchers have established links between TOM and 
executive functions (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Perner & Lang, 
1999), language development (e.g., Baldwin & Tomasello, 1998; Bloom, 2000; Sabbagh & 
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Baldwin, 2001), prosocial behaviour, and emotional functioning (e.g., Happé & Frith, 1996; 
see also Dunn, 1999 for a review).  
Indeed, in many tests of TOM, success involves inhibiting the potential choice of the 
real location of an object, and choosing instead the false location that would be represented 
in the mind of a person with a false-belief (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995; Perner & 
Lang, 1999). In addition, TOM reasoning has been seen to involve frontal lobe structures that 
are associated with executive functions (Shallice, 2001). 
Several studies have also pointed to language as a co-opted system that supports 
performance on TOM tasks. According to this view, language provides a structure that 
“scaffolds” propositional reasoning about mental states (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; 
Plaut & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). One specific claim is that syntax 
enables humans to entertain false beliefs and to reason out solutions to TOM tasks. For 
example, de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) have proposed that proficiency in syntax is crucial 
in supporting TOM reasoning, as the grammar of natural language provides a code through 
which a (false) proposition can be embedded within another, such as “Mary thought (falsely) 
that the cookies were in the cupboard”. The relationship between language and TOM may 
also be such that language mechanisms serve to configure TOM ability in early life. For 
example, linguistic experience might provide input to the TOM system that is essential to 
trigger its initial development and subsequent refinement. Indeed, previous studies 
suggested that success in TOM tasks is causally dependent on verbal ability (e.g., Frith & 
Happé, 1994; Happé, 1995).  
Current studies, however, indicate that TOM reasoning is not dependent on the 
possession of grammar, and that it is not wholly reducible to executive function capacities. 
As with others innate abilities that are dependent on early experience for their development, 
such as face processing (Le Grand et al., 2001), the environment must provide an adequate 
set of data to trigger the capacity for TOM reasoning. For instance, exposure to 
conversational opportunities that allow insight into mental states is central to socio-
emotional development (Peterson, 2000). Conversational experience serves as a gateway to 
others’ beliefs. It alerts children to the fact that speakers are epistemic subjects who store and 
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seek to provide information about the world and, in doing so, allow access to a world of 
referents and propositions about intangible objects, creating the potential for imagining past 
and future (Harris, 1996). With regard to TOM, such opportunities provide a powerful 
window on an accelerated maturational timetable, as TOM tasks can be solved by most 
typically developing 4 to 5-year-old children in all cultures studied so far (Avis & Harris, 
1991; Lee, Olson, & Torrance, 1999). Given the wide variation in conversational experience, 
these findings are consistent with the idea that minimal early access to knowledge of mental 
states triggers TOM reasoning. Yet, to date, the precise nature of this relationship remains a 
matter of debate and a central issue in current TOM research (for a review see Astington, 
2001). Interestingly, WS may offer a unique opportunity to address this issue, as for most 
individuals affected language appears as a relative strength (Mervis & Becerra, 2007). 
Finally, an important theoretical contribution on the mechanisms underlying TOM 
has been provided by Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000), who proposed a distinction 
between perceptual and cognitive components of social knowledge. According to this 
componential model, TOM includes a social-cognitive component entailing the conceptual 
understanding of the mind as a representational system, and a social-perceptual component 
that does not involve reasoning about behaviour, but rather includes the capacity to 
distinguish between people and objects and to make judgements about people’s mental state 
from their facial and body expressions. False-belief tasks are the prototypical measure of the 
social-cognitive aspect of TOM, while tasks involving online attribution of intentional, 
emotional or other person-related knowledge primarily on the basis of immediate perceptual 
information (e.g., facial or vocal expression, motion or actions) rather tap social-perceptual 
understanding (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  
Importantly, previous studies on WS have provided support to this componential 
view of TOM, by suggesting that social-perceptual components are spared, and dissociable 
from social-cognitive ones. This indicates that the interest of studying social cognition can go 
beyond the understanding of compromised social behaviour, as it has been the case for 
autism, and extent to (opposite) cases of individuals unusually friendly and outgoing. The 
study of WS presents here a major interest, as it is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder 
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characterized by a unique profile of increased social skills. However, to date, few studies 
have investigated TOM in WS and results are inconsistent. The following section portrays 
these studies.  
Theory of mind in Williams syndrome 
The first systematic study of TOM in individuals with WS was conducted by 
Karmiloff-Smith and collaborators (1995). These authors used a large battery of TOM tasks 
including first-order (understanding another’s belief about the world) and second-order 
false-belief tasks (understanding of another’s belief about yet another’s person belief about 
the world), as well as higher-order tasks involving attribution of intentions to linguistic 
utterances. Interestingly, the majority of WS participants were found to perform at similar 
levels relative to normal controls and significantly better than mental age-matched 
individuals with autism in first-order and even some second-order false-belief tasks and 
higher-order tasks (involving attribution of intentions to linguistic utterances). This led the 
authors to conclude that TOM is an “islet of relatively preserved ability” in WS (Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 1995, pp. 202).  
However, a methodological limitation of this study was that most of the TOM tasks 
were language-based (requiring the subjects to follow detailed narratives and to answer 
grammatically complex questions), raising doubt as to whether spared TOM accounted for 
good performance of WS participants or spared language (Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-
Cohen, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). In order to address this methodological 
concern, Tager-Flusberg and colleagues (1998) examined the ability to interpret mental states 
through a visual task – the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) - 
in adults with WS (Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998). Results revealed that individuals with WS 
outperformed adults with Prader-Willi syndrome1. However, around half of the WS 
individuals were found to perform at the level of age-matched typically developing controls, 
suggesting that TOM ability in adults with WS is not spared on the absolute sense, but only 
in comparison to other developmentally delayed individuals. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that WS participants in both Karmiloff-Smith et al.’s (1995) and Tager-Flusberg et al.’s 
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(1998) studies (adolescents and/or adults) were well beyond the age at which normal 
individuals generally pass first-order (around age 4) and second-order (between the ages of 4 
to 6) TOM tasks (e.g., Perner, 1991; Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchick, & Tager-
Flusberg, 1994).  
Findings of studies on TOM in children with WS do contrast with those found for 
adults. Children with WS are shown to perform no better than children with mental 
retardation (Prader-Willi or non-specific etiology) in first- or second-order TOM tasks 
(Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg, 1999; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  
As most of the studies on TOM abilities in WS have made cross-syndrome 
comparisons, it is unclear whether below-average TOM ability is a distinctive feature of the 
WS cognitive phenotype, or whether it is due to low cognitive functioning. Furthermore, 
although these studies provide support for a dissociation between perceptual and cognitive 
aspects of TOM (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000), in everyday life our capacity to make 
inferences about other people almost always involves both components and it is their 
integration with one another, as well with other cognitive affective, and linguistic capacities, 
that provides the hallmark of sophisticated social reasoning in humans. These studies thus 
left open the debate of whether TOM is impaired in individuals with WS, despite their 
increased sociability and motivation towards social stimuli.  
BRINGING BEHAVIOUR AND COGNITION TOGETHER 
In the last decades WS has captured the interest and the imagination of cognitive 
neuroscientists who have attempted to delineate the cognitive mechanisms underlying its 
atypical social phenotype. Yet, to date, several issues remain in need of further investigation. 
These include the questions of whether the abilities 1) to process faces, 2) to decode 
emotions, and 3) to attribute intentions and beliefs to others follow the atypical pattern of 
social behaviour in WS? The three studies reported in the Experimental section aimed at 
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After two decades of research, some striking features of Williams syndrome (WS) 
continue to puzzle the scientific community – these include increased social interest and face 
processing skills. Although a link between these two features has been suggested, the nature 
of such relationship remains unclear. This study aims at determining the impact of social 
relevance on face processing skills in WS. Twenty-nine individuals with WS were asked to 
categorize facial emotion expressions in real, human cartoon and non-human cartoon faces 
presented upright and inverted. When compared to both chronological and mental age-
matched controls, participants with WS were able to categorize emotions from human, but 
not from non-human faces. The use of different perceptual strategies to process human and 
non-human faces could not explain this dissociation. Rather, the findings suggest an 
increased sensitivity to social cues, such as human-related facial features, possibly related to 
















Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder due to hemideletion 
of approximately 28 genes on chromosome 7 (Bayes, Magano, Rivera, Flores, & Perez-Jurado, 
2003; Korenberg et al., 2000). It is characterized by a peak-valley cognitive profile with severe 
visuospatial deficits contrasting with relatively spared verbal abilities (Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle, 
& Sabo, 1988; Mervis et al., 2000; Mervis, Morris, Bertrand, & Robinson, 1999). One of the 
most striking features of WS individuals is undoubtedly their hypersociability (Jones et al., 
2000). From early age they are described as friendly, socially fearless and particularly 
interested in people’s faces (for a review see Jones et al., 2000). Although individuals with 
WS have also difficulties in triadic social interaction (Laing et al., 2002) and poor social 
judgement (e.g., Dykens & Rosner, 1999), it is generally accepted that social skills are a 
prominent peak in the WS profile, with face processing abilities illustrating it quite well (e.g., 
Bellugi et al., 1988; Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Accordingly, several studies have shown that WS individuals perform at normal or near-
normal levels in tasks tapping face recognition and discrimination (Bellugi, Wang, & 
Jernigan, 1994; Deruelle, Rondan, Mancini, & Livet, 2003; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa-Skwerer, 
Faja, & Joseph, 2003; Udwin, & Yule, 1991). This proficiency in face processing, together with 
strong social motivation, has led researchers to hypothesize that relative strengths in face 
processing are linked to hypersociable behaviour in WS (e.g., Pober, & Dykens, 1996). 
Although this relationship has been the topic of much discussion, it remains, to date, a 
hypothesis needing confirmation. Subsequent studies have indeed shown both delay and 
deviance in WS face processing (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). Evidence for the use of 
atypical strategies to process faces in WS (Deruelle, Mancini, Livet, Cassé-Perrot, & de 
Schonen, 1999) has also spiced this debate by suggesting that social-cognitive mechanisms 
per se may not account for overall face-processing abilities in WS. 
This study aimed at determining whether the ability to process faces in WS relates to 
increased interest in social stimuli or depends rather on more general mechanisms, not 
exclusively social in origin, such as visual perceptual strategies. In order to extend face-
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processing assessment beyond identity processing, participants were asked to perform a 
facial-emotion processing task. Previous studies in this domain have suggested that facial 
emotion processing is neither an increased nor spared ability in WS, as individuals with WS 
perform worse than chronological age- (CA) matched controls on tasks tapping on emotion 
recognition (e.g., the AFFECT or the face subtest of the DANVA2; Deruelle et al., 1999; 
Gagliardi, Frigerio, Burt, Cazzaniga, Perret, & Borgatti, 2003; Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, Schofield, 
Verballis, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). However, the assumption of poor facial-emotion 
processing in WS was based real faces processing only. The present study goes further into 
the examination of facial-emotion processing abilities in WS by including three different 
types of faces, varying in terms of human-related features: photographs of real faces, human 
cartoon faces and non-human cartoon faces. These different types of faces were presented in 
two different orientations (upright and inverted). Increased motivation towards social 
stimuli in WS led to the hypothesis that a face’s human status would have greater impact on 
performance than a face’s orientation in individuals with WS compared to typically 





Twenty-nine individuals with WS (20 female and 9 male) aged 7 to 27 years (M = 
14.7; SD = 4.6) participated in this study. Seventeen of these individuals were children (M = 
11.7; SD = 2.4; rang: 7-15 years) and twelve were adults (M = 18.9; SD = 3.6; rang: 16-27 
years). WS diagnosis was based on both clinical evaluation and a FISH test (fluorescent in 
situ hybridization) for microdeletion on one copy of the gene for elastin on chromosome 7. 
All participants fulfilled the Preus (1984) criteria for WS (e.g., characteristic facial 
appearance, low average birth weight, feeding difficulties, musculoskeletal problems, etc.) 
and were positive to the FISH test. Mental age (MA), inferred from IQ measures (WAIS-III 
(Wechsler, 1997) and WISC-III (Wechsler, 1996), according to the subject’s age), ranged from 
4 to 17 years (M = 8.3; SD = 2.9). IQ profile (M = 57.8; SD = 12.3; range: 40-93) was 
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characterized by a significant dissociation between verbal (M = 64.1; SD = 14.5; range: 45-101) 
and performance IQ scores (M = 57.7; SD = 10.4; range: 46-87; t (1, 28) = 3.63, p = .001), 
consistent with previous studies on WS (e.g., Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998). Participants 
were recruited via the Department of Pediatric Neurology at the local hospital (La Timone, 
Marseille, France) and via Regional Williams Syndrome Associations. At the time of testing, 
they all attended schools or specialized centers for individuals with developmental delay. 
This study also included two groups of typically developing individuals. The first 
group comprised 29 individuals, aged 4 to 17 years (M = 8.4; SD = 3.0), individually matched 
to WS participants on gender and MA. In order to verify if face processing in WS is 
independent from intellectual functioning, and to control for the effects of life experience 
with faces, WS participants were also individually matched to controls on the basis of their 
chronological age (CA) and gender. This latest group included 29 individuals, aged 7 to 27 
years (M = 14.6; SD = 4.7). Children were recruited via local schools and day-care centres and 
they all attended normal classes corresponding to their age level. Teachers were asked to 
select these children on the average level of the class thus avoiding inclusion of advanced or 
delayed children relative to their age. Adults were recruited via local universities and 
activities centres. None of the participants had overt physical handicap or known 
neurological/psychiatric deficits. 
All participants were native French speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
audition and vision. Informed consent was obtained for all subjects and the experimental 
procedure was approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Experimental design 
The ability to categorize facial emotions was assessed through a visual task 
previously validated in typically developing individuals and in children with autism 
(Rosset, Rondan, Da Fonseca, Santos, Assouline, & Deruelle, 2007). This task included three 
types of faces varying in terms of its human-related features: photographs of human faces, 
human cartoon faces and non-human cartoon faces. Faces were presented in two different 
orientations (upright and inverted) in order to have an index of the strategies used to process 
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faces (configural vs. local). Each face was displayed in three emotional expressions: 









Figure 1. Illustration of the stimuli used in the facial-emotion categorization task. Participants were 
presented with three types of faces - photographs of real faces, human cartoon faces and non-human cartoon 
faces – and were asked to judge if faces expressed sadness, anger or happiness. All faces were displayed upright 
and inverted. 
 
Stimuli comprised 18 black and white pictures of faces (9 female, 9 male) chosen by 
two independent researchers. Photographs of human faces were taken from the AR Face 
Database (Martinez & Benavente, 1998). Human and non-human cartoon faces were inspired 
from foreign cartoon movies8 to assure that all subjects were presented with the stimuli for 
the first time. All three types of faces respected a standard face template (e.g., center inner 
parts (one mouth, beneath a nose, beneath 2 eyes), outer contour, hair). In order to verify that 
emotions displayed in all three types of faces were judged consistently, a pilot study was 
conducted on 16 typically developing individuals (not included in the control groups). Only 
stimuli with reliable judgments were included. All faces were cropped at the neckline and 
presented full face. Pictures subtended approximately 14° x 11° of the visual angle when 
viewed at 60 cm. Stimuli were displayed using Microsoft Power Point Presentation software 
in a 14 inch computer screen.  
 
 
                                                
8 der kleine Eisbar, Wickie und die Starken Manner, Samurai Deeper Kyo, Monster and Company, Tabaluga, Sakura 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated in a quiet room and placed at a distance of 60 cm in front of 
a computer screen. They were told that faces were going to be presented on the center of the 
screen and that they were to determine whether the presented faces were happy, sad or 
angry (3 forced-choice task). In order to ensure these instructions were understood, 
participants were presented with 12 training trials (2 upright and 2 inverted for each type of 
face). Feedback was provided after each training trial.  Following this, all participants were 
presented with 3 blocks of 36 trials. Each block comprised 18 upright and 18 inverted faces, 
each containing 6 human faces, 6 faces of human cartoons and 6 faces of non-human 
cartoons. The order of block and response options (happy, sad or angry) presentation was 
randomized across subjects. Stimuli remained displayed on the screen until the subject 
responded. In cases when participants did not responded spontaneously, the experimenter 
repeated the question “Is he/she happy, sad or angry?” to encourage responses. Thus, all 
participants responded to all trials. Verbal responses were recorded by the experimenter and 
scored 1 if correct or 0 if incorrect. 
 
Data analysis 
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs on the number of errors for each participant in each 
condition) were used for all statistical tests and Tukey tests were used for all post-hoc 
comparisons. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.  
Because of the wide age range of participants included in the WS group, analyses 
were first conducted comparing children and adults with WS, in order to determine whether 
these two sub-groups performed at similar levels. These analyses were conducted using a 
three-way ANOVA including Group (children with WS vs. adults with WS) as between-
subject factor and Face (Human Photographs vs. Human Cartoons vs. Non-Human 
Cartoons) and Orientation (Upright vs. Inverted) as within-subject factors. Further analyses 
were also conducted comparing the performance of the WS group to that of MA- and CA-
matched controls. To investigate the influence of perceptual mechanisms in emotion 
processing the number of errors was analyzed using a three-way ANOVA including Group 
 44 
(WS vs. MA vs. CA controls) as between-subject factor and Face (Human Photographs vs. 
Human Cartoons vs. Non-Human Cartoons) and Orientation (Upright vs. Inverted) as 
within-subject factors.  
A series of correlation analyses using Pearson’s r test were conducted to determine 
the influence of CA and MA on WS performance. Similar analyses were conducted between 
age and performance for controls. In these latest, data for MA- and CA-matched controls 
were plotted together (N = 58), since both groups included typically developing individuals.  




Children versus adults with WS 
Results of the analyses comparing the performance of children and adults with WS 
revealed a significant main effect of Face (F [2, 54] = 82.86, p < .001) and Orientation (F [2, 54] 
= 259.35, p < .001). Post-hoc analysis showed that participants with WS produced more 
errors when they were to categorize emotions on non-human cartoons faces (M = 6.01; SD = 
.45) than on human-cartoon (M = 4.77; SD = .39, p < .001) and human-photograph faces (M = 
2.44; SD = .43, p < .001). Also, they produced more errors when faces were displayed 
inverted (M = 6.64; SD = .47) than upright (M = 6.01; SD = .52, p < .001). Most importantly, no 
significant main effect of Group (F [1, 27] = .001, p > .05), nor Group x Face, Group x 
Orientation or Group x Face x Orientation interactions (all ps > .05) were found. Further 
analyses were thus conducted by plotting data for children and adults with WS together (N 
= 29). 
 
Individuals with WS versus typically developing individuals 
Results of the analyses comparing the performance of individuals with WS to that of 
MA-and CA-matched controls revealed a significant main effect of Group (F [2, 84] = 47.27, p 
< .001), with WS producing overall more errors (M = 4.40; SD = .19) than MA-matched (M = 
2.71; SD = .20, p < .001) and CA-matched controls (M = 1.75; SD = .19, p = .002). The main 
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effect of Face (F [2, 168] = 165.30, p < .001) and the Group x Face interaction (F [4, 168] = 9.23, 
p < .001) were also found significant. Results of Tukey tests showed that all groups, controls 
as well as WS, were more accurate when they were to categorize emotions on photographs of 
real faces than on both human (WS: 2.44 vs. 4.72, p < .001; MA: 1.31 vs. 3.46, p < .001; CA: .60 
vs. 2.36, p < .001) and non-human (WS: 2.44 vs. 6.03, p < .001; MA: 1.31 vs. 3.36, p < .001; CA: 
.60 vs. 2.29, p < .001) cartoon faces. However, performances did not differ between human 
and non-human cartoon presentations for both MA (Human cartoons: 3.46 vs. Non-human 
cartoons: 3.36, p > .05) and CA (Human cartoons: 2.36 vs. Non-human cartoons: 2.29, p > .05) 
control groups. By contrast, for the WS group the lack of the human character in cartoons 
had a significant negative impact on performances (Human cartoons: 4.72 vs. Non-human 
cartoons: 6.03, p < .001). Moreover, the WS group performed significantly lower than both 
MA- and CA-matched controls only when categorizing emotions on non-human cartoon 
faces (WS: 6.03 vs. MA: 3.36, p < .001; WS: 6.03 vs. CA: 2.29, p < .001). Importantly, no such 
group differences were found for photographs of real faces (WS: 2.44 vs. MA: 1.31, p > .05; 
WS: 2.44 vs. CA: .60, p > .05) or for human-cartoon faces (WS: 4.72 vs. MA: 3.46, p > .05; WS: 
4.72 vs. CA: 2.36, p > .05). Furthermore, the main effect of Orientation (F [1, 84] = 518.46, p < 
.001) also reached significance, with performances decreasing under inverted presentations 
(Upright: M = 1.34; SD = .21 vs. Inverted: M = 4.56; SD = .25). It is important to note that this 
inversion effect was found for all groups (WS: Upright = 2.11 vs. Inverted = 6.69, p < .001; 
MA: Upright = 1.21 vs. Inverted = 4.22, p < .001; CA: Upright = .72 vs. Inverted = 2.78, p = 
.03). Finally, the Group x Face x Orientation interaction was not significant (F [4, 168] = .64, p 
= .63), suggesting that the orientation of the stimuli does not explain the group differences 
found across face types. Taken together, these findings support the idea that individuals 
with WS process non-human faces atypically.  
Finally, results of correlation analyses conducted for control groups showed a 
significant negative correlation between age and the number of errors for all conditions 
(Photographs of real faces: r = -.42, p = .001; Human cartoon faces: r = -.46, p < .001; Non-
human cartoon faces: r = -.38, p = .003), with accuracy increasing with age. By contrast, 
results for WS group revealed that CA did not influenced performance levels (Photographs 
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of real faces: r = -.05, p > .79; Human cartoon faces: r = .12, p > .50; Non-human cartoon faces: 
r = -.19, p > .31), suggesting atypical development of face -processing skills in WS. Note that 
this idea is consistent with the absence of performance differences between children and 
adults with WS (see above). Analyses including MA and performance also revealed no 
significant correlations (Photographs of real faces: r = -.25, p > .19; Human cartoon faces: r = -














Figure 2. Response patterns observed for each group (WS, MA-, and CA-matched controls). The number 
of errors in average for each condition – photographs of real faces (real); human-cartoon faces (human) and non-





This study aimed at determining whether face-processing abilities in WS rely more 
on social than perceptual mechanisms. Findings of this study revealed a significant 
dissociation between human (photographs of real faces and human cartoon faces) and non-
human face processing in WS, absent for both groups of typically developing individuals. In 
fact, for non-human cartoon faces individuals with WS showed greater difficulties than both 
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MA- and CA-matched controls, suggesting that they do have, to some extent, impairments in 
recognizing facial emotions. Yet, these impairments seem to be selective to non-human faces, 
rather than generalized to all face types, and to be unrelated to below-average cognitive 
functioning in WS. Despite limited intellectual functioning (mean IQ = 57), participants with 
WS were able to perform at similar levels as typically developing individuals, even of that 
with higher IQ (CA-matched controls). In line with recent studies, this indicates that 
individuals with WS can categorize emotions expressed in faces sharing human features at a 
higher level than that expected from their intellectual level (Santos, Milne, Rosset, & 
Deruelle, 2007).  
But what can explain the striking dissociation between human and non-human faces 
processing found for the WS group? 
One may argue that stimuli complexity accounts for this dissociation. However, two 
reasons render this hypothesis unlikely. First, no difference between human and non-human 
face processing was found for both MA- and CA-matched control groups. Second, if stimuli 
complexity was to impair performance in WS, this should be observed for human faces, 
rather than for non-human faces, as the former were certainly more complex. In addition, it 
is important to note that non-human cartoon faces conformed to a standard face template (as 
did human-cartoon and real faces).  
Another possibility is that differences in human and non-human cartoon-face 
processing are due to the well-known visuo-spatial impairments characterizing WS. It is 
nevertheless worth noting that the task used in the present study was not particularly 
demanding in visual perceptual analysis, as it is the case, for instance, in same/different 
face-processing tasks. Rather, participants were asked to categorize the emotion expressed 
on the different types of faces within a 3 forced-choice task (“Is he/she happy, sad or 
angry?”). It seems unlikely that facial-emotion processing involved more spatial or 
geometrical processes when displayed in non-human than in human cartoon faces since both 
of them contain identifiable local facial features. If visuo-spatial deficits were at the origin of 
the WS performance pattern, it should manifest across both human and non-human 
conditions. Moreover, the early hypothesis that individuals with WS have a global 
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impairment across most areas of visual-cognition (Bellugi, Sabo, & Vaid, 1988) has been 
recently challenged by studies showing that they do not significantly differ from mental age-
matched controls when asked to compare or identify visual stimuli (Deruelle, Rondan, 
Mancini & Livet, 2006; Farran, Jarrold & Gathercole, 2003). Finally, there is also a growing 
body of evidence establishing that WS visuo-spatial deficits are limited to the visuo-
constructive domain and do not seem to affect the visuo-perceptive domain (e.g., Farran & 
Jarrold, 2003). Given that perceptual (not constructive) visual skills were implicated in the 
task used in this study, there is no plausible reason for visual-spatial impairments to account 
for the WS performance pattern.  
Based on previous studies on face-processing, the use of different perceptual 
strategies to process human and non-human faces could also be proposed as an explanation 
for the performance discrepancy found between these conditions in WS. There is little doubt 
that typically developing individuals use configural strategies to process faces (e.g., Bukach, 
Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006). However, it has been shown that this mechanism breaks down when 
faces are presented in inverted orientation, as inversion disrupts a face’s usual configuration 
(e.g., Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993). In order to assure that the face processing 
performances obtained in the present study relied on the use of typical (configural) 
perceptual strategies, all our face stimuli were presented both upright and inverted (see 
Figure 1). Previous studies using similar paradigms suggested that individuals with WS 
process faces in a local rather than configural manner (Deruelle et al., 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1997; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). The results of this study did not show such an atypical 
processing style. Rather, these results show that all groups, including WS, present the so-
called face-inversion effect, as their performances significantly decrease under disrupted 
(inverted) presentations (see Figure 2). This is in agreement with recent studies showing that 
individuals with WS, like normal controls, rely on holistic mechanisms to encode and 
recognize faces (Rose, Lincoln, Lai, Ene, Searcy, & Bellugi, 2007; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2003). 
Moreover, it rules out the use of aberrant perceptual strategies as a possible explanation for 
group differences as well as for the differences found between human and non-human face 
processing in the WS group.  
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Instead, social relevance may constitute a reliable account for these differences. The 
human face and particularly facial expressions are powerful sources of social information 
and a crucial reference for social communication. From early age humans pay increased 
attention to faces compared to other objects (Johnson, & Morton, 1991). This increased and 
early interest for human faces is thought to bring about later extraordinary abilities for 
processing faces and facial emotions quickly and accurately (e.g., Gauthier & Nelson, 2001). 
The results of this study show that, compared to typically developing individuals with the 
same level of general intelligence (MA-matched controls) and even with the same age (CA-
matched controls), WS participants are able to process human faces and to decode the 
emotions expressed. Yet, this ability depends on the presence of human facial traits. When 
faces lack human traits, the performance of the WS group decreased significantly to become 
inferior even to those of the MA-control group. This suggests that a face’s social relevance 
may have an increased impact in face processing abilities in WS compared to typically 
developing individuals. Also, it suggests that WS individuals are particularly sensitive to the 
human features of faces, features that may be responsible for a face’s social value. If this is 
the case, the relative strength in processing human faces in WS may be accounted for by the 
hallmark feature – hypersociability. Individuals with WS are observed clinically as 
overfriendly, especially during their infancy, and they tend to overuse social engagement 
devices such as eye contact.  Furthermore, WS infants tend to look at people’s faces longer 
and more often than typically developing infants (Bellugi, Lichtenberg, Jones, Lai, & St. 
George, 2000). It might be that this tenacious impulse towards social interaction leads to 
greater experience with social cues, such as human-related facial features, and in turn a 
hypersensitivity to such cues. This hypersensitivity may explain why WS participants were 
impaired relative to controls in extracting emotional information when faces lost their 
human traits.  
Findings of a recent study using the same methodology on children with ASD 
(usually described as socially avoidant) provide some support to this idea (Rosset et al., 
2007). Interestingly, this study found an opposite pattern of performance to that found here 
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for WS in children with autistic spectrum disorders that showed typical emotion processing 
for cartoon but not for real faces (Rosset et al., 2007).  
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that human faces may have something 
special for WS individuals because these (photographs of real faces and cartoon human 
faces) were treated differently than non-human faces by them (but not by MA- and CA-
controls), and even at higher levels than that expected for their MA (i.e., at the level expected 
for their CA). However, their overall ability to process facial-emotion seems to follow an 
atypical developmental trajectory, since no performance differences were found between 
children and adults with WS, contrasting with a significant performance increase with age 
for typically developing controls. This finding is consistent with previous studies showing 
that individuals with WS reach the level expected for their MA but not for their CA on tasks 
focusing on facial emotion recognition (Deruelle et al., 1999; Gagliardi et al., 2003; Plesa-
Skwerer et al., 2006). 
Taken together, findings of this study suggest an atypical hypersensitivity to social 
cues (e.g., human-related facial features) in individuals with WS, possibly as a consequence 
of their increased motivation towards social stimuli. It is this hypersensitivity that may 
explain proficiency in decoding emotional expressions from human faces, despite poor 
performance at processing non-human faces. Nevertheless, our findings do not tell us if and 
how putative increased sensitivity to social cues in WS may manifest in real social contexts. 
Further research into the impact of hypersociability on perceptual and cognitive functioning 
in WS may provide support to the hypothesis put forward here. However, at present, the 
fact that no objective and systematic measure of social behaviour adapted to this disorder 
exists (to our knowledge) considerably impedes further research in this direction. 
Finally, findings of the current study may provide the framework for investigating 
the constraints under which normal development of cognitive functions occurs (Karmiloff-
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The aim of the present study was to determine whether individuals with Williams syndrome 
(WS) are able to recognize facial expressions of emotion and objects missing on the basis of 
contextual cues. Sixteen individuals with WS were compared to typically developing 
individuals matched on chronological and mental age. WS group performed significantly 
lower than both control groups in object recognition. By contrast, no such group differences 
were found in facial expression recognition, suggesting that individuals with WS do have the 
ability to process contextual cues. However, this ability seems to be boosted when they are to 
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Williams syndrome (WS) is characterized by unique cognitive, behavioural and 
neurobiological features (for a review see, Meyer-Linderberg, Mervis, & Berman, 2006) that 
stem from a hemideletion of approximately 28 genes on chromosome 7 (Bayes, Magano, 
Rivera, Flores, & Perez-Jurado, 2003; Korenberg, Chen, Hirota, Lai, Bellugi et al., 2000). Most 
individuals with WS have mild to moderate mental retardation and are often described as 
socially fearless and highly sociable (Jones, Bellugi, Lai, Chiles, Reilly, et al., 2000; Klein-
Tasman & Mervis, 2003). Of central interest to research is their uneven cognitive profile with 
poor visuo-spatial skills contrasting with relative strengths in verbal short-term memory and 
language (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000; Mervis, Robinson, Bertrand, 
Morris, Klein-Tasman et al., 2000). This unique pattern of spatial deficit and linguistic 
strengths sets individuals with WS apart from other groups with genetically-determined 
developmental disorders (e.g., Mervis, Morris, Bertrand, & Robinson, 1999).  
A severe visuo-spatial construction deficit is a fundamental stable phenotype in WS 
(e.g., Mervis et al., 2000), as performance on visuo-spatial constructive tasks is consistently 
found to be impaired in this disorder (Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994; Bertrand, Mervis & 
Eisenberg, 1997; Georgopoulos, Georgopoulos, Kurz, & Landau, 2004; Rondan, Mancini, 
Livet, & Deruelle, 2003). Besides visuo-constructive impairments, other visual abilities such 
as visuo-spatial working memory, selective attention, and visual search are also affected in 
WS (Atkinson, Anker, Braddick, Nokes, Mason et al., 2001; Bellugi et al., 2000; Farran, 
Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2003; Scerif, Cornish, Wilding, Driver, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2004). Yet, 
even within the broad domain of visual-based cognition there is unevenness in WS. For 
instance, at the perceptual level, individuals with WS show local and global processing 
patterns similar to that of typically developing controls (e.g., Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 
2001, 2003; Rondan, Santos, Mancini, Livet, & Deruelle, 2007). In addition, the ability to 
identify objects and faces appears to be a relative cognitive strength in WS (e.g., Bellugi, 
Sabo, & Vaid, 1988; Landau, Hoffman, & Kurz, 2005; Paul, Stiles, Passarotti, Bavar, & Bellugi, 
2002; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, & Joseph, 2003; Wang, Doherty, Rourke, & 
 60 
Bellugi, 1995). This stands in stark contrast with the remaining defective aspects within the 
visuo-spatial domain in WS and challenges the early assumption of overall poor visual 
cognition in this disorder. However, to date, the hypothesis of intact visuo-perceptual skills 
in WS remains elusive and in need of further investigation. 
Literature on typically developing populations has considered visual context as a 
strong candidate to further understand the mechanisms underlying visual perception (for a 
review see Bar, 2004; de Gelder, Meeren, Righart, van den Stock, van de Riet et al., 2006). 
Visual context is, indeed, “a factor that is present in almost all acts of everyday perception” 
(Chun, 2000, pp. 170). It has been convincingly demonstrated that visual context facilitates 
the recognition of objects within a scene (e.g., Bar, 2004). For instance, when subjects are 
presented with a scene of a familiar context (e.g., a kitchen), objects that are consistent with 
that context (e.g., a breadbox) are recognized more easily than objects that would not be 
expected in that context (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Palmer, 1975). There 
is also evidence that some cues provided by the context in which a face appears (e.g., 
congruent emotional scenes, body and voice contexts) improve facial expression recognition 
(for a review see de Gelder et al., 2006).  
 Indeed, in everyday life, visual elements (e.g., faces and objects) are rarely 
encountered in isolation, but appear within a rich, structured context of visual information. It 
is thus surprising that the literature on visual perception in WS has neglected the issue of 
context, typically considering visual stimuli in isolation (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1988; Landau et 
al., 2005) rather than as parts of visual scenes. The aim of this study was to investigate visual 
context processing abilities in WS. Since our visual environment consists of contextually 
bound scenes, research in this direction seems ecologically most valid.  
In this study, a group of individuals with WS was presented with visual scenes in 
which a facial expression of emotion (for brevity we will refer to them as facial expressions) 
or an object was missing. Their ability to use contextual cues to recognize either the facial 
expression or the object missing in each scene was compared to that of typically developing 






Sixteen individuals with WS (12 female and 4 male) aged 11 to 26 years (M = 17.2; SD 
= 4.5) took part in this study. They were recruited via the Department of Pediatric Neurology 
at the local hospital (La Timone, Marseille) and via regional WS associations. At the time of 
testing, they all attended schools or specialized centres. 
All participants fulfilled the Preus (1984) criteria for WS (e.g., characteristic facial 
appearance, musculoskeletal problems) and were positive to the FISH (fluorescent in situ 
hybridization) test for microdeletion on one copy of the elastin gene on chromosome 7. 
Mental age (MA), inferred from IQ standardized measures (WAIS-III or WISC-III (Wechsler 
1997, 1996, respectively), according to the subject’s age), ranged from 6 to 20 years (M = 9.6; 
SD = 3.4). IQ profile (M = 56.5; SD = 12.3; range: 40-81) was characterized by a dissociation 
between verbal (M = 62.2; SD = 14.5; range: 46-91) and performance IQ scores (M = 54.6; SD = 
9.3; range: 46-80; t (1,15) = 3.27, p = .005), consistent with previous studies on WS (Jarrold, 
Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998).  
 In order to control for the effects of age and overall intellectual functioning, 
participants with WS were compared to typically developing individuals, individually 
matched either on chronological age (CA) or MA, using a 3-month window. Participants 
included in the CA-matched and MA-matched groups (N = 16 each) were aged 11 to 26 years 
(M = 17.2; SD = 4.6) and 6 to 20 years (M = 9.7; SD = 3.3), respectively, and were also 
individually matched to participants with WS on sex and handedness. They had no overt 
physical handicap or known neurological deficit. They were recruited via local schools and 
day-care centres and they all attended normal classes corresponding to their age level. 
Teachers were asked to select these children on the average level of the class thus avoiding 
inclusion of advanced or delayed children relative to their age.  
All participants were native French speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
audition and vision. Parental informed consent was obtained for all subjects and the 
experimental procedure was approved by the local ethics committee. 
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 Stimuli and procedure 
Stimuli comprised 60 coloured photographs taken from popular French media 
magazines (e.g., VSD, Nouvel Observateur) and chosen by two independent researchers. All 
photographs subtended 15° x 15° of visual angle. These photographs were scanned and were 
used as visual scenes. In each scene, either a facial expression or an object was masked by a 
white circle (2 cm of diameter). Note that we used the same masking procedure for target 
facial expressions and target objects. Also, visual scenes in which a facial expression or an 
object was missing were carefully matched in terms of complexity and the number of 
characters and objects contained in the scene. In order to verify that target facial expressions 
and target objects were judged consistently, a pilot study was conducted on 16 typically 
developing individuals (not included in the control groups). Results of this study revealed 
no significant performance differences between the facial-expression and the object 
conditions (p > .05).  
Only visual scenes with reliable judgements of the target facial expressions and 
objects were included. Missing facial expressions displayed 4 basic emotions: fear, sadness, 
anger, and happiness (N = 10 for each emotion). Missing objects corresponded to familiar 
objects belonging to one of the following four categories: tools (e.g., screwdriver), toys (e.g., 
soccer ball), daily objects (e.g., toothbrush) and food (e.g., icecream). Note that previous 
studies using pictures of objects have shown that at age 4 French children can accurately 
(more than 75% response accuracy) name similar objects to those presented here (Cannard, 
Blaye, Scheuner & Bonthoux, 2005). 
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room at the INCM (CNRS, Marseille, 
France) or at their home. They were seated in front of a computer screen placed at a distance 
of 60 cm and were told that photographs were going to be presented on the screen. 
Moreover, they were informed that in each photograph there would be either a facial 
expression or an object missing and that they were to recognize it among three options, i.e., 
among either three facial expressions or three objects. Participants were asked to choose the 
missing facial expression or object (within the three response options) as quickly and as 
accurately as possible.  
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Stimuli were presented for 750 ms in the center of a computer screen and were 
followed by three response options. In both tasks, response options corresponded to one 
correct response and two distracters. In the facial expression recognition task, response-
options consisted of three emotional icon faces (“emoticons”, taken from Atwood, 1998), one 
expressing the same emotion as the target, one distracter expressing either fear, sadness, 
anger, or happiness; and one distracter expressing an intruder emotion, i.e., not included as a 
target in the other trials (e.g., surprise, disgust, boredom). In the object recognition task, 
response-options consisted of three objects, one representing the target object (e.g., basket 
ball), one representing an object used as a target in other trials (e.g. soccer ball) and one 
representing an object of the same category but not included as a target in the other trials 
(e.g., air ball). Each response-option was associated with a number (1, 2 or 3) corresponding 
to coloured response-keys (1 = “A”, 2 = “Y” and 3 = “P” keys of a French keyboard). 
To ensure these instructions were understood, all participants were presented with 8 
training trials (4 trials for facial expressions (one for each emotion) and 4 trials for objects). 
Participants were asked to respond, by pressing one of the three response-keys, which of the 
three response-options corresponded to the missing facial expression or object. Feedback 
was provided after each training trial. 
Following this, participants were presented with 60 experimental trials (40 trials 
requiring facial expression recognition and 20 trials requiring object recognition) presented 
in a randomized order and randomly assigned across subjects. Although it may have been 
more favourable to have the same number of trials in each task, it is important to note that 
people with WS have a short concentration span (e.g., Carrasco, Castillo, Aravena, 
Rothhammer & Aboitiz, 2005), and the choice of using long experimental designs when 
studying these individuals may thus result in performance decrease. In order to control for 
this factor we limited the number of trials (60) presented to participants. For the sake of 
reliability, 4 representative variances of emotion were included on the facial emotion 
recognition task, resulting in 40 trials (10 trials for each variance). As a consequence of this 
trade-off, fewer trials were presented in the object recognition. Note that in this case no 
performance decrease was found for participants with WS or controls in this experiment.   
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The experimental session began once participants knew the meaning of the icons and 
were at ease with the task procedure. Position of the target was counterbalanced across trials. 
The percentage of errors was recorded for each subject in each task. In order to normalize the 
distribution of the percentage of errors, modified error rates were calculated [2 x (ASIN 





Preliminary analyses on the error rates for the facial expression recognition task only 
(using two-way ANOVA including Group (WS, MA, CA) as a between-subjects factor and 
Emotion (Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear) as a within-subjects factor) showed no Group by 
Emotion interaction (p > .71). Thus, error rates for the four types of Emotion were plotted 
together in the following analyses. 
Error rates were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA including Group (WS vs. MA vs. 
CA controls) as a between-subjects factor and Task (facial expression vs. object recognition) 
as a within-subjects factor. Results revealed that the main effects of Group (F [2, 45] = 15.46, 
p < .001) and Task (F [1, 45] = 5.12, p = .03) were significant. Most importantly, the Group x 
Task interaction (F [2, 45] = 7.56, p = .001) was also significant. Post-hoc analyses using 
Tukey tests revealed that individuals with WS exhibited significantly lower performances 
than both MA and CA-matched controls on object recognition (both ps < .001). By contrast, 
no group-differences were found for facial expression recognition, with individuals with WS 
performing as accurately as MA (p > .79) and CA (p > .29) controls (see Figure 1). Moreover, 
the WS group produced more errors on object (M = .97; S.D. = .09) than facial expression (M 
= .63; S.D. = .03, p < .001) recognition (see Figure 1), whereas no such between-task 
differences were found for control groups (ps > .99). No group differences were found 
between MA and CA controls on either object (p > .29) or facial expression (p > .95) 
recognition.  
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In order to determine whether WS group’s performance was related to general factors 
such as developmental delay, low mental ability or visuo-spatial impairments, a series of 
correlation analyses (Pearson’s r test) were performed between average performance for each 
participant with WS in each task (facial expression and object recognition) and their CA, MA, 
and IQ (verbal and performance IQ scores). Results showed that none of these factors was 




Figure 1. Error rates over task (Facial emotion and object recognition) and group (WS = Williams syndrome; 





The aim of the present study was to determine whether individuals with WS are able 
to recognize facial expressions and objects on the basis of contextual cues of a visual scene. 
To this aim, individuals with WS were presented visual scenes in which either a facial 
expression or an object was missing, and their performance on both tasks (facial expression 
and object recognition) was compared to that of two groups of typically developing 
 66 
individuals, matched on CA and MA. The inclusion of two control groups enables one to 
compare performance of individuals with WS performance to that expected by their overall 
cognitive ability and to that expected by their CA.  
Individuals with WS performed significantly lower than both control groups when 
they were to recognize the object missing in a visual scene (see Figure 1). Their level of 
ability in this condition was thus below that expected of their CA and even of their MA. This 
result may suggest that performance of individuals with WS on object recognition requiring 
context processing reflects overall low cognitive functioning or delayed development. 
However, this idea is inconsistent with the finding that advancement in CA, MA and IQ did 
not correlate with performance levels. Rather, this result seems to suggest that individuals 
with WS present difficulties in using contextual cues to extract information needed to 
recognize the missing object in a typical visual context. But, what can explain these 
difficulties?  
Starting by object processing abilities per se, one may hypothesize that difficulties 
found for WS group on the object recognition task are the consequence of impaired basic 
mechanisms of object recognition in WS, rather than due to specific context-processing 
deficits. However, previous studies on single-object recognition in WS do not support this 
assumption. There is evidence that children with WS can recognize a wide range of familiar 
objects (Landau et al., 2005), even under impoverished representations (Deruelle, Rondan, 
Mancini, & Livet, 2006), suggesting that “fundamental mechanisms of object recognition are 
a distinct strength in WS” and can develop without impairment even while other aspects of 
spatial cognition are severely impaired (Landau et al., 2005, pp. 21).  
Alternatively, one may argue that object categorization difficulties underlie WS poor 
performance in the object recognition task. Yet, evidence that even before age 6 children with 
WS can efficiently use visual cues to categorize unfamiliar objects (Nazzi & Karmiloff-Smith, 
2002; see also Mervis et al., 1999 for a review of congruent findings on perceptual 
categorization by children with WS) renders this possibility unlikely. 
Considering now the nature of the stimuli used in this study – clearly visuo-spatial – 
it is somehow not surprising to find that both control groups outperformed individuals with 
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WS on object recognition. Several studies have provided robust evidence for deficits in 
several domains of visual cognition in WS (for a review see Farran & Jarrold, 2003). For 
instance, individuals with WS show poor global organisation in block construction (e.g., 
Bellugi et al., 1988; Hoffman, Landau, & Pagani, 2003) and drawing tasks (e.g., Bihrle, 
Bellugi, Delis, & Marks, 1989; Rondan et al., 2007) and perform reliably worse than MA 
controls in multiple object tracking (O’Hearn, Landau, & Hoffman, 2005). Reports have also 
shown that these individuals perceive the local and global aspects of visuo-spatial 
information in a manner that deviates from typical development (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1988; 
Bihrle, et al., 1989). In particular, it has been shown that individuals with WS are biased 
towards processing the local elements of an image (Bellugi et al., 1988; Birhle et al., 1989; 
Deruelle et al., 2006; Rossen, Klima, Bellugi, Birhle, & Jones, 1996), in contrast to typically 
developing children (e.g., Kimchi, 1990) and adults (e.g., Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Navon, 
1977) who perceive information at the global level faster than at the local level. Indeed, to 
process visual context one needs to integrate separate pieces of information (individual 
elements of a picture) into meaningful wholes (coherent visual scenes). In this case, an 
overall tendency to favour processing of local stimulus properties could result in context 
processing deficits in WS. Yet, some studies using visuo-perceptual tasks suggested that 
individuals with WS respond to the global stimulus level with similar efficiency as controls 
(Farran et al., 2001, 2003; Rondan et al., 2003; Rondan et al., 2007). These findings imply that 
individuals with WS may not necessarily show a deficiency in global processing, but could 
instead have a local bias on visuo-constructive tasks, with global processing being unaffected 
on perceptual tasks. In line with this assumption, and given that the task used here was 
visuo-perceptual (not visuo-constructive), it seems unlikely that compromised global context 
processing accounts for the pattern of performance found for the WS group on object 
recognition.   
At this point, it seems crucial to discuss the results found for WS group in the 
condition of facial expression recognition to further interpret overall context-processing 
abilities in WS. In contrast to the differences found between groups on the object recognition 
task, individuals with WS showed the same level of accuracy as MA- and CA-matched 
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controls for facial expression recognition (see Figure 1). This finding is somehow surprising 
as previous studies have shown that individuals with WS are specifically impaired to decode 
facial emotions, when these are presented unmasked and out of a context (Gagliardi, 
Frigerio, Burt, Cazzaniga, Perret et al., 2003; Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, Schofield, Verballis, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2006). Also, given the complexity of the experimental paradigm and delayed 
general development in WS, this finding, and in particular the absence of difference between 
WS and CA groups, is striking. In the facial expression, like in the object recognition task, 
participants had 1) to process visual scenes as a whole, 2) to attend to critical elements 
(contextual cues) of the scene, and 3) to recognize, within three related stimuli (objects or 
emotions) and on the basis of their contextual knowledge only, the most plausibly missing 
(masked) part of the scene. It implies not only perceptual, but also higher level cognitive 
abilities (e.g., memory and executive abilities). Proficiency found in WS group for facial 
expression recognition, suggests that individuals with WS do have the ability to process 
contextual cues displayed in a complex visual scene. Yet, the use of this ability seems to 
depend on the social relevance of the task. When participants were presented with a context 
in which a facial expression was missing, they had to rely on more socially-relevant 
contextual cues to determine the emotion displayed by the character as a function of the 
context. Thus, relative to the object recognition task, this task required additional knowledge 
of social contexts. Curiously, it seems that this additional social-knowledge demand boosted 
context-processing abilities of individuals with WS to normal levels. But, what can explain 
such disparity between processing non-socially and more socially-relevant contextual cues in 
WS but not in typically developing controls? 
In both tasks, participants were presented with closely-matched visual scenes and 
had to use their contextual knowledge of the visual world to predict the element missing in 
the scene. In this case, it seems unlikely that visuo-spatial deficits, local processing bias, or 
impairments on visual context processing account for both the deficits (object recognition) 
and the relative strengths (facial emotion recognition) found for the WS group in this study. 
Instead, the finding of spared ability to extract social meaning out of visual scenes may be 
related to outstanding social skills in WS (e.g., Jones et al., 2000). More precisely, one may 
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hypothesize that hypersociability, i.e., tenacious impulse towards social interaction in 
individuals with WS, results in greater exposure to social contexts and, in turn, leads to 
increased social- (relative to non-social) contextual knowledge. Findings of a similar study 
conducted on individuals with poor social functioning provide support to this idea (Da 
Fonseca, Rondan, Santos, Poinso, & Deruelle, unpublished data). Interestingly, individuals 
with autism showed the opposite pattern of performance to that found here for WS, 
performing as accurately as typically developing controls on object but not on facial 
expression recognition. This suggests that performance on this latest task may be influenced 
by individuals’ social ease.  
In conclusion, results of this study showed a peak-valley profile on context processing 
in WS, with increased facial expression recognition relative to impaired object recognition. 
These findings suggest that social relevance impacts on context processing abilities in 
individuals with WS and support the idea of increased sensitivity to social in opposition to 
non-social cues, possibly due their remarkable social interest. Nevertheless, our findings do 
not tells us if and how putative strengths in social cues processing in WS manifests in real 
social contexts. Even if individual with WS seem to be able to infer facial expressions of 
emotion on the basis of contextual cues, it does not necessarily mean that they are capable of 
using this ability properly in real social interaction contexts. Research into the impact of 
hypersociability on perceptual and cognitive functioning in WS may help clarify uneven 
patterns of performance often reported in the literature. However, to do so, the use of 
objective and systematic measures of social behaviour in this disorder (which, to our 
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Research on theory of mind (TOM) has provided a major contribution to the understanding 
of developmental disorders characterized by atypical social behaviour. Although Williams 
syndrome (WS) is characterized by unique hypersociability, to date, there is little consensus 
relative to TOM abilities in this genetic disorder. This study used both visual and verbal 
tasks to investigate TOM - false-belief reasoning and attribution of intentions in children and 
adults with WS relative to typically developing controls. This allowed us to control for the 
influence of WS uneven cognitive profile – increased verbal relative to visual abilities – on 
TOM processing. Results showed that individuals with WS perform as accurately as MA-
matched controls on TOM verbal but not on TOM visual tasks. Such modality differences 
did not affect WS group’s performance on a control condition not requiring TOM, nor were 
found for controls. Also, increased verbal relative to visual TOM performance in individuals 
with WS was found to be unrelated to their overall verbal skills. Taken together, the findings 
of this study suggest the existence of a verbal peak relative to a visual valley in TOM abilities 
in WS.  
 






Social cognition encompasses a wide range of abilities including interpretation of social cues, 
social attribution, communication, interaction and social inferencing (e.g., Beer & Ochsner, 
2006). It is undoubtedly a main ingredient for adapted social behaviour, as it is crucial for 
understanding how humans perceive their own and others’ internal states, motives and 
behaviours and how do they act toward these states (e.g., Frith & Frith, 1999; Frith & Frith, 
2003).  
In the last decades, research on social cognition has provided an important contribution to 
the understanding of atypical social behaviour in biologically based developmental 
disorders. The most prominent example comes from studies showing a link between 
deficient social cognition and poor reciprocal social interactions (e.g., autism, for a review see 
Baron-Cohen, 2000a; schizophrenia - Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 
2006). Yet, the interest of studying social cognition can go beyond the understanding of 
compromised social behaviour and extent to opposite cases of individuals unusually friendly 
and outgoing, as can be observed in Williams syndrome (WS). 
WS does present a major interest within this framework, as it is a rare neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterized by remarkable social skills. WS combines distinctive medical (e.g., 
supravalvular aortic stenosis - Williams, Barrat-Boyes & Lowe, 1961) and genetic features 
(hemideletion of approximately 28 genes on chromosome 7 - Bayes, Magano, Rivera, Flores, 
& Perez-Jurado, 2003; Korenberg, Chen, Hirota, Lai, Bellugi et al., 2000). Individuals with WS 
also show an unusual cognitive profile, with relatively spared verbal abilities (for a review 
see Mervis & Becerra, 2007) contrasting with impairments in visuo-spatial cognition (e.g., 
Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000) and coexisting with mild to moderate 
mental retardation (e.g., Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998; Mervis, Robinson, Bertrand, 
Morris, Klein-Tasman et al., 2000). Yet, it is probably at the behavioural level that one can 
find the most puzzling feature of WS – hypersociability. From early development, 
individuals with WS are overfriendly, interact easily, and show no fear of strangers and a 
strong empathy for the others (e.g., Jones, Bellugi, Lai, Chiles, Reilly et al., 2000). They tend 
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to be extremely outgoing to the point of being called “hypersociable” (e.g., Jones et al., 2000). 
Yet, the panorama is not always that positive and clear. In fact, social behaviour in WS may 
also be maladapted and characterized by overfriendliness, oversensitivity, poor social 
decision-making (Fidler, Hepburn, Most, Philofsky, & Rogers, 2007) and poor-peer relations 
(e.g., Laing, Butterworth, Ansari, Gsodl, Longhi et al., 2002).  Knowledge of the mechanisms 
implicated in this unusual social behaviour of WS suggests far more complexity than was 
originally envisioned. Indeed, to date the question of whether hypersociability in WS 
actually goes along with intact social cognition remains an enigma.  
It is widely accepted nowadays that theory of mind (TOM, Premack & Woodruff, 1978) - the 
ability to attribute independent mental states to self and others in order to explain and 
predict behaviour – is crucial for social cognition (for a review see Baron-Cohen, Tager-
Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000). In the last two decades, a large body of research has shown that 
TOM emerges in orderly steps during normal development (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004, see 
also Frith & Frith, 2003 for a review). First, children get to understand that people’s actions 
are guided by their (either true or false) beliefs only (around age 4), and then (between 5 and 
6 years old) they come to realize that people’s emotions are also influenced by their beliefs 
(e.g., Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2003). The empirical basis of TOM comes from studies using 
tests of (false) belief attribution. Impairment on these tasks has been consistently reported in 
individuals with autism, leading to the hypothesis that TOM deficits could account for 
socialization and communication impairments in autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000a; Yirmiya, Erel, 
Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).  
Despite increasing interest on the mechanisms underlying TOM in normal and atypical 
social development, few studies have investigated TOM in WS and the results are 
inconsistent. The first systematic study of TOM in individuals with WS was conducted by 
Karmiloff-Smith and collaborators (1995). These authors used a large battery of TOM tasks 
including first-order (understanding another’s belief about the world) and second-order 
false-belief tasks (understanding of another’s belief about yet another’s person belief about 
the world), as well as higher-order tasks involving attribution of intentions to linguistic 
utterances. Interestingly, the majority of WS participants were found to perform at similar 
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levels relative to normal controls and significantly better than mental age-matched 
individuals with autism in first-order and even some second-order false-belief tasks and 
higher-order tasks (involving attribution of intentions to linguistic utterances). This led the 
authors to conclude that TOM is an “islet of relatively preserved ability” in WS (Karmiloff, 
Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-Cohen, 1995, pp. 202). However, a methodological limitation 
of this study was that most of the TOM tasks were language-based (requiring the subjects to 
follow detailed narratives and to answer grammatically complex questions), raising doubt as 
to whether spared TOM accounted for good performance of WS participants or spared 
language (see Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 
2000). In order to address this methodological concern, Tager-Flusberg and colleagues (1998) 
examined the ability to interpret mental states through a visual task – the Eyes task (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) - in adults with WS (Tager-Flusberg et al., 
1998). Results revealed that individuals with WS outperformed adults with Prader-Willi 
syndrome1. However, around half of the WS individuals  were found to perform at the level 
of age-matched typically developing controls, suggesting that TOM ability in adults with WS 
is not spared on the absolute sense, but only in comparison to other developmentally 
delayed individuals. Furthermore, it is important to note that WS participants in both 
Karmiloff-Smith et al.’s (1995) and Tager-Flusberg et al.’s (1998) studies (adolescents and/or 
adults) were well beyond the age at which normal individuals generally pass first-order 
(around age 4) and second-order (between the ages of 4 to 6) TOM tasks (e.g., Perner, 1991; 
Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchick, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994).  
Findings of studies on TOM in children with WS do contrast with that found for adults. 
Children with WS are shown to perform no better than children with mental retardation 
(Prader-Willi or non-specific etiology) in first- or second-order TOM tasks (Sullivan & Tager-
Flusberg, 1999; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  
As most of the studies on TOM abilities in WS have made cross-syndrome comparisons, it is 
unclear whether below-average TOM ability is a distinctive feature of the WS cognitive 
phenotype, or whether it is due to low cognitive functioning. These studies thus leave open 
the debate of whether TOM is impaired in individuals with WS, despite their 
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hypersociability and unusual increased motivation towards social stimuli. To date, this 
question remains in need of further investigation. 
The present study aims at investigating the attribution of false-beliefs and the attribution of 
intentions in children and adults with WS relative to typically developing individuals across 
wide age range. While most of the studies on TOM in WS have typically used verbal tasks 
(e.g., tapping the use of mental-state language; Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg, 1999; Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000), in the current study TOM will be assessed through both visual 
and verbal tasks, designed to be as equivalent as possible. Given language is a strength 
relative to visuo-spatial skills for most individuals with WS (for a review see Mervis & 
Becerra, 2007), using only visual (e.g., Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998) or only verbal TOM tasks 
(e.g., Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg, 1999) may constitute a methodological limitation (e.g., 
Shaked & Yirmiya, 2004) in previous studies and thus may have contributed to contradictory 
findings.  
In this study we will initially compare performance of a WS group to that of a mental age-
matched group. However, since WS is a developmental disorder we will also adopt a 
developmental approach aimed at determining whether TOM abilities in individuals with 
WS follow a typical development trajectory.  
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Nineteen individuals with WS (14 female and 5 male) aged 7 to 26 years (M = 14.4; SD = 4.8) 
participated in this study. WS diagnosis was based on both clinical evaluation and a FISH 
(fluorescent in situ hybridization) test for microdeletion on one copy of the elastin gene on 
chromosome 7. All participants fulfilled the Preus (1984) criteria for WS (e.g., characteristic 
facial appearance, musculoskeletal problems, etc.) and were positive to the FISH test. Mental 
age (MA), inferred from IQ standardized measures (WAIS-III or WISC-III (Wechsler 1997, 
1996, respectively), according to the subject’s age), ranged from 4 to 17 years (M = 8.3; SD = 
3.5). Note that CA and MA selection criteria were not restricted because previous studies 
suggest that imposing such restrictions may substantially influence results on TOM 
measures (e.g., Shaked & Yrmiya, 2004). Full-scale IQ scores ranged from 40 to 81 (M = 57.5; 
SD = 11.0), with verbal IQ (VIQ) scores ranging from 46 to 91 (M = 65.5; SD = 14.3) and 
performance IQ (PIQ) scores ranging from 46 to 80 (M = 55.4; SD = 9.0). IQ profile was 
characterized by a significant dissociation between verbal and performance abilities (t (1,18) 
= 4.64, p < .001), consistent with several previous studies on WS (e.g., Jarrold, Baddeley, & 
Hewes, 1998).  
Nineteen typically developing individuals (14 female and 5 male) aged 4 to 17 years (M = 8.2; 
SD = 4.8) also participated in this study. They were individually matched to WS subjects on 
MA2 (using a 6-months window), sex and handedness, constituting a MA-control group. 
These individuals were part of a larger group of sixty-two typically developing individuals 
(35 female and 27 male) aged 4 to 25 years (M = 9.8; SD = 5.2). Data for this group were 
analysed using each participant’s chronological age (CA) to build task-specific 
developmental trajectories. This group included 11 children aged 4 to 5.5 years (M = 4.9, SD 
= .5), 12 children aged 5.7 to 7 years (M = 6.3; SD = .6), 12 children aged 7.2 to 8.9 years (M = 
8.1; SD = .6), 9 children aged 9.3 to 10.9 years (M = 9.9; SD = .6), 8 children aged 11.3 to 13.6 
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years (M = 12.1; SD = .9), 5 adolescents aged 14 to 17 years (M= 15.2; SD = 1.4) and 5 adults 
aged 23 to 25 years (M = 23.9; SD = .7). This age range enabled us to build a trajectory of 
typical developmental changes on the tasks used in this study. Note that there was a higher 
number of younger participants because previous developmental studies have shown that 
the ability to attribute false-beliefs to others emerges between 5 and 6 years old. 
Participants with WS were recruited via the Department of Pediatric Neurology at the local 
hospital (La Timone, Marseille) and via regional WS associations. At the time of testing all 
participants attended schools or specialized centres. Typically developing children were 
recruited via local schools and day-care centres, all attending normal classes corresponding 
to their age level. Teachers were asked to select children on the average level of the class, 
thus avoiding the inclusion of children either particularly advanced or delayed relative to 
matching age. Adult controls were recruited from local universities and leisure associations. 
All participants were native French speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
had no overt-physical handicap or known-neurological deficit. Parental informed consent 
was obtained for all children and WS participants. The experimental procedure was 
approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Experimental design 
All subjects were presented with one task commonly used to examine mental-state 
reasoning. This task, inspired from a typical TOM task (“Sally-Ann”) extensively used with 
both normal children and those with autism (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1985), requires the ability to interpret the false beliefs (FB) of others. Participants 
were presented with a visual (see Figure 1) and a verbal version of this task (see Appendix 
1), both depicting a brief story and requiring acknowledgment that others can have false 
beliefs. We used first-order FB stories (in the form of “A thinks that …”) generally passed by 
typically developing 4 to 5 year-old children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1986). Visual and verbal versions of the task were designed to be as equivalent as 
possible, differing only in terms of the modality of stimuli presentation and in terms of 
response. Stories were composed of three scenes (sentences or pictures) in both versions: the 
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first scene presented two actors (A and B) and an object (belonging to actor A) placed in a 
given location (e.g., L1). In the second scene, actor A leaves the room (the object remains in 
L1). In the third scene, while actor A is away, actor B moves the object to L2. This task 
requires participants to differentiate between the mental representation he/she has of the 
actual location of the object and the mental representation that actor A has of the object (in its 
original location, L1), and to predict that actor A’s behaviour will be based on his/her false-
belief and not on the object’s present location (L2).  
In the verbal version of the task, stories were composed of three sentences each presented 
orally by the experimenter. To control for failures caused by lack of comprehension or 
forgetting, participants were then asked two control questions about the original location 
(Memory question: “Where did actor A put his/her object in the beginning?”) and the current 
location of the object (Reality question: “Where is the object now?”). Following this, 
participants were asked the TOM question: “When actor A returns, where will he/she first look 
for his/her object?”. Three response-options were then presented orally by the experimenter. 
In order to facilitate the understanding that these were independent options, each answer 
was associated to one finger (first option = thumb; second option = index; third option = 
middle finger). Responses were noted by the experimenter. In the visual version of the task, 
stories were composed of comic strips presented on a computer screen in scenarios of three 
pictures. Participants were asked to pay attention to the scenarios displayed on the screen. 
They were then asked the same questions (memory, reality and TOM) as in the verbal 
version of the task (see above). Then, three response-options were added in the lower half of 
the screen and participants were asked to choose the correct response to the TOM question 
(“When actor A returns, where will he/she first look for his/her object?”) by pressing one of the 
three response-buttons corresponding to their choice. Each response-option was associated 
to a number (1, 2 or 3) corresponding to their position on the screen from left to right. 
Response buttons were displayed in the same order, i.e., number 1 on the left, 2 on the 
middle and 3 on the right and corresponded to the “A”, “Y” and “P” keys of a French 
keyboard, respectively. To answer correctly, participants must infer that actor A thinks that 
the object is still in L1 (original location where he/she left it). Note that previous studies have 
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shown that normal children around age 4 children answer this correctly, while at age 3 they 
judge incorrectly that actor A will look in L2 (i.e., they answer from their own knowledge and 
not the perspective of the other person; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, 1986; Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987).  
Both visual and verbal versions of this task were previously validated by a pilot study 
conducted on 13 typically developing children showing that at age 6 (M = 6.4; SD = .06 years) 
these children understood the instructions and perform the task accurately (72% and 80% 











Figure 1. Example of a false-belief (FB) comic strip used on the visual task of Experiment 1. The top three pictures 
depict a story. The bottom three pictures are response options (picture 1 is the correct response, while pictures 2 
and 3 are distracters). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in a quiet room at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience of the 
Mediterranean (INCM – CNRS, Marseille, France) or at their home. For the visual version of 
the task, participants were seated in front of a 17-inch computer screen (controlled by a 
Macintosh PC computer) at a viewing distance of 60 cm. They were told that they were going 
to be presented with comic strips depicting a brief story and that they were going to be asked 
by the experimenter three questions about it. They were then told that, for the last question 
(TOM) they would have to choose their response within three response-options (one correct 
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and two distracters) and that they were to press the button corresponding to their choice. 
Stimuli remained displayed on the screen until the subject responded. For the verbal version, 
participants were told they were going to hear some brief stories followed by three 
questions. For the last question (TOM question) they were to choose one of three response-
options (one correct and two distracters) proposed by the experimenter. To ensure these 
instructions were understood participants were presented with one training trial followed by 
three test trials for each version. The order of presentation of the versions (verbal and visual) 
and trials (1, 2 and 3), and the position of response-options were randomized across subjects. 
Each story was scored 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. To pass a story (i.e., score 1), participants 




Performance of the WS group was first compared to that of the MA control group. The 
number of errors was analyzed using a two-way ANOVA including Group (WS vs. MA) as 
between-subjects factor and Modality (Visual vs. Verbal) as within-subjects factor. Results 
revealed a significant main effect of Group (F (1,36) = 36.38, p < .001) and Task (F (1,36) = 
9.23, p = .004). Interestingly, the Group x Modality interaction (F (1,36) = 15.98, p < .001) was 
also significant. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey tests showed that the WS group performed 
lower on the visual (M = 2.31; SD = 1.00) than on the verbal modality (M = 1.16; SD = .83, p < 
.001). By contrast, no such modality differences were found for controls (p > .90). Moreover, 
a significant difference between groups was found for the visual modality (p < .001), with 
less accuracy for WS group (M = 2.31; SD = 1.00) than for MA controls (M = .37; SD = .68). By 
contrast, no group differences were found for the verbal modality (p > .17). These results are 






















Figure 2. Mean number of errors found on the false-belief task (Experiment 1) for each group (WS and 




Results of this experiment revealed that the overall performance of the WS group was lower 
than that of the MA group. This finding is, to some extent, in line with previous studies 
showing that individuals with intellectual disability perform poorly than typically 
developing individuals in false belief (FB) tasks (for a meta-analyses see Yirmiya et al., 1998). 
However, as groups were matched on mental age, lower performance in WS group relative 
to controls cannot be explained in terms of differences on intellectual ability.  
When presented on the verbal modality, individuals with WS performed the task as 
accurately as MA-matched controls, suggesting that they do have relative abilities to 
attribute FB to others. However, when the task was presented on the visual modality, 
individuals with WS showed a performance level lower than that expected to their MA. 
Although both versions of the task were designed to be as equivalent as possible, some 
modality-dependent differences may, nevertheless, account for WS group’s performance 
patterns. Indeed, the verbal task implicated a substantial demand on working memory, 
relative to the visual task. In this case, and based on the idea that individuals with WS might 
be particularly sensitive to increased cognitive demands (e.g., Carrasco, Castillo, Aravena, 
 87 
Rothhammer & Aboitiz, 2005; Greer, Borwn, Pai, Choudry, & Klein, 1997), one might expect 
this group to have greater difficulties on the verbal than on the visual task. Interestingly, the 
opposite pattern of performance was found for WS group, i.e., more accuracy on the verbal 
than on the visual task.  
It is possible that group differences may be related to task demands for the WS group. For 
instance, resisting interference from knowledge of reality is an inhibitory demand thought to 
be a key problem in false-belief (FB) reasoning (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). In fact, the 
FB task used in the present experiment, as for belief-reasoning tasks in general, required 
participants both to reason about false-belief (that actor A thinks that the object is still in L1) 
and to resist interference from their own knowledge (that the object is now in L2). In this 
case, one may hypothesize that this demand upon executive function increased group 
differences by weakening WS group’s performance in particular. It is possible that the visual 
task imposed greater executive functioning demands than the verbal task, because in the 
visual task the participants could see the object’s current location when having to decide 
where the naïve actor would look for the object (response options were added below the 
comic strip). Thus WS participants may have experienced greater interference from their 
own knowledge of the object’s current location in this task than in the verbal one (in which 
response options were given after the oral narrative). Although the finding that controls 
performed as accurately in visual and verbal tasks renders this hypothesis unlikely, it cannot 
be completely be ruled out. Furthermore, the findings of this experiment may have limited 
reliability despite being based on a task used widely in the literature. It is hard to provide 
consistent interpretations of findings based on only 3 trials per task. In addition, 
performance for controls may suffer from ceiling effects, possibly because their mean age 
was higher than the age at which typically developing children usually pass FB tasks (4-5 
years old; e.g., Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). Finally, because this task does not 
generally include control trials (i.e., implicating similar cognitive demands but not TOM 
abilities), our findings do not tell us whether failure to perform the FB visual task found for 
WS group is related to the nature of the task or rather to a specific FB-reasoning impairment. 
In order to further elucidate this question we conducted a second experiment including a 
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higher number of trials (24), not only in a TOM condition but also on a control condition 
allowing us to increase reliability and to exclude possible task-related bias.  
 
 




Participants and experimental design 
This experiment included the same participants as Experiment 1 (see above) and employed a 
task focusing on the ability to attribute intentions to others. This task was adapted to 
children, although inspired from previous studies investigating TOM abilities in adults (e.g., 
Brunet, Sarfati, & Hardy-Bayle, 2003a; Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, & Decety, 2003b). Both 
visual (see Figure 3 and 4) and verbal versions (see Appendix 2 and 3) of this task were 
composed of scenarios depicting characters performing actions closely matched to that used 
in Experiment 1 (e.g., stories and drawings of similar design and complexity) but comprising 
two conditions, one requiring attribution of intention to others (AI, see Figure 3 and 
Appendix 2) and one control condition relying on the comprehension of physical causality 
(PhC, see Figure 4 and Appendix 3). While in the AI condition the stories were designed to 
depict simple first-order intentional behaviour, in the PhC condition the subjects had to use 
their knowledge of the physical properties (e.g., weight, position etc.) of objects or human 
bodies. Both versions of the task comprised the same number of stories (12 AI and 12 PhC) of 
similar complexity. The verbal version PhC stories (see Appendix 3) were in a propositional 
form to match the AI stories (see Appendix 2) in terms of syntax.  
As for Experiment 1, visual and verbal versions of the task were designed to be as equivalent 
as possible, differing only in terms of the modality of stimuli presentation. In both versions, 
stories were composed of three scenes (sentences or pictures) depicting a simple story. In the 
verbal version of the task, stories were composed of three sentences each presented orally by 
the experimenter. In the visual version of the task, stories were composed of comic strips 
 89 
presented on a computer screen in scenarios of three pictures. Participants were asked to pay 
attention to the scenarios presented (either orally or on the screen). In both versions of the 
task, participants were then asked orally by the experimenter “What happens then?”. 
Following this, they were presented with three response-options (one correct and two 
distracters) and were asked to choose the correct response to the question. As in Experiment 
1, response-options were either presented orally by the experimenter and associated to one 
finger (verbal version) or added in the lower half of the screen and associated to a number 
patched on the keyboard (visual task). Subjects were not instructed that there were two 
conditions in each task and that their responses could be based on attribution of intentions or 
on physical causality. 
Preliminary findings using both visual and verbal versions of this task have shown that by 
age 6 typically developing children can understand the instructions and perform the task 













Figure 3. Example of an attribution of intentions (AI) comic strip used on the visual task of Experiment 2. The 

















Figure 4. Example of a physical causality (PhC) comic strip used on the visual task of Experiment 2. The correct 
response corresponds to picture 2 on the bottom. 
 
Procedure 
As for Experiment 1, participants were tested in a quiet room at the Institute of Cognitive 
Neuroscience of the Mediterranean (INCM – CNRS, Marseille, France) or at their home. For 
the visual version, participants were sited in front of a computer screen at a viewing distance 
of 60 cm. They were told that they were going to be presented with comic strips depicting a 
brief story and that they were to be asked by the experimenter one question about it. They 
were then told that they were to choose their response within three response-options and 
that they were to press the button corresponding to their choice. Response-options remained 
on the screen until the subject responded. For the verbal version, participants were told they 
were going to hear some brief stories followed by one question and again that they were to 
choose one of three response-options proposed by the experimenter. Participants were 
presented with 2 training trials to ensure these instructions were understood before starting 
followed by 24 test trials for each version of the task. The order of presentation of the tasks 
(verbal and visual), trials, as well as the position of the correct response were all randomized 
across subjects. Each trial was scored 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. The order of presentation 




The results of this experiment are illustrated in Figure 5. Performance of the WS group was 
first compared to that of the MA control group. The number of errors was analyzed using a 
three-way ANOVA including Group (WS vs. MA controls) as between-subjects factor, and 
Modality (Visual vs. Verbal) and Condition (AI vs. PhC) as within-subjects factors. Results 
revealed a significant main effect of Group (F (1,38) = 15.31, p < .001) and Task (F (1,38) = 
26.26, p < .001). However, the Group x Modality interaction was also significant (F (1,38) = 
7.06, p = .01). Results of Tukey tests showed that while individuals with WS produced more 
errors on the visual than on the verbal modality (4.60 vs. 2.55; p < .001), no such modality-
related differences were found for MA controls (p = .31). Most importantly, results revealed 
a significant Group x Modality x Condition interaction (F (1,38) = 5.07, p = .03). Further post-
hoc analyses demonstrated that WS group only differed from MA controls in AI condition 
on the visual modality (5.05 vs. 2.25, p = .05). Moreover, significant Modality x Condition 
interactions were found for the WS group only. While no modality-related differences were 
found in the PhC condition, in the AI condition participants with WS were significantly less 
accurate on the visual (M = 5.05; S.D. = .45) than on the verbal modality (M = 1.90; S.D. = .38, 
p < .001). In addition, on the verbal modality, performance of WS group was significantly 
higher on AI (M = 1.90; S.D. = .38) than on PhC (M = 3.2; S.D. = .35, p = .01). Note that such 
differences were not found for MA controls. 
These results are in agreement with that found in Experiment 1. In order to further 
determine whether tasks used in this experiment tapped on similar processes than that used 
on Experiment 1 we computed correlation analyses for each group separately using 
Pearson’s r test. Results for WS showed a significant correlation of performance across the 
experiments but not across modalities (AIvisual and FBvisual, r = .50, p = .03; AIverbal and FBverbal, r 
= .41, p = .07), suggesting that visual and verbal tasks did not implicate the same processes in 
this population. By contrast, for controls there was a significant positive correlation between 
visual and verbal tasks both within and between experiments (all ps < .001), suggesting that 













Figure 5. Mean number of errors found on the attribution of intentions (graph on the left) and the physical 
causality (graph on the right) tasks (Experiment 2) for each group (WS and MA-matched controls) in each 




This experiment puts forward several interesting results. In line with Experiment 1, WS 
group performed more accurately when tasks were presented in the verbal than in the visual 
modality. Based on the hallmark cognitive feature of WS – increased verbal relative to visuo-
spatial skills – it is somehow not surprising to find performance differences in visual tasks 
for WS group but not for controls. However, it is striking to notice that modality differences 
did not affect performance across all experimental conditions, but only that requiring TOM. 
In fact, individuals with WS performed lower than MA-matched controls only when they 
were to attribute intentions to others based on visual cues. By contrast, they exhibited the 
performance level expected to their MA in the AI verbal condition, as well as in both visual 
and verbal PhC conditions. These findings suggest that the impact of modality on WS group 
influences TOM ability, as it interferes with attribution of intentions (as well as with mental-
state reasoning, see Discussion of Experiment 1) but not with the ability to infer physical 
causality. Furthermore, controls showed similar levels of performance in AI and PhC 
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conditions in both verbal and visual modalities, excluding different task-complexity 
differences as an underlying bias. By contrast, individuals with WS presented more ability 
performing AI than PhC on the verbal modality only. 
Importantly, this experiment investigated whether individuals with WS show a primary 
TOM deficit, or a deficit that was a consequence of impairment in more general resources 
such as working memory or executive functioning. First, the task used in this experiment 
included comparison trials that did not require TOM abilities, but that made similar 
cognitive demands (corresponding to specific incidental demands of the TOM trials). If 
individuals with WS showed poor performance because they struggled to meet the 
incidental processing demands of the task, then similar levels of performance should have 
been observed in AI and PhC trials within each modality. This would have suggested that an 
overall cognitive deficit accounted for at least some of their TOM difficulties. Another 
possibility could be that the same cognitive resources that were necessary for handling the 
incidental processing demands of the task were also necessary for AI itself. If this was the 
case, we would have observed greater impairment on AI than on PhC trials, but this 
impairment should be in proportion to the level of impairment on PhC trials. Finally, if 
individuals with WS had performed better when the trials did not require TOM abilities (i.e., 
more accuracy on PhC than AI trials) in both visual and verbal modalities then this would 
have been evidence of a primary deficit in TOM that was not merely related to the task 
modality itself nor the affect of a cognitive impairment. Rather, findings of the present 
experiment suggest that individuals with WS are impaired in TOM visual processing. Most 
importantly, these findings reinforce the idea, put forward in Experiment 1, of an unusual 
link between verbal and TOM abilities in individuals with WS, with verbal cues favouring 
comprehension of other’s mental states in this population in particular. There remains, 
however, the question of whether TOM verbal ability follows a typical development 





TRACKING TOM ABILITY IN WS 
 
Results found for Experiment 1 and 2 were clearly in agreement by showing that individuals 
with WS have difficulties extracting mental-state information out of visual cues, but perform 
as well as controls on verbal TOM tasks. These findings result from analyses comparing 
individuals with WS to MA individually matched controls and do not allow us to determine 
the influence of important factors such as CA and verbal ability on WS pattern of 
performance. It is also important to note that a dissociation between (relatively spared) 
verbal and (impaired) visual abilities is a consistent characteristic of WS cognitive profile. 
Therefore, to show a selective preservation of TOM verbal abilities, it is not enough to 
demonstrate that individuals with WS perform higher on TOM verbal relative to TOM visual 
tasks. Rather, it must be shown that their performance in TOM verbal tasks is unrelated to 
their level of verbal skills. 
In addition, according to Karmiloff-Smith and collaborators (2004), to determine whether a 
given ability develops normally or atypically in WS, one must relate performance to age and 
compare it to that of control samples (Karmiloff-Smith, Thomas, Annaz, Humphreys, Ewing 
et al., 2004). This is possible by building developmental trajectories linking performance with 
age. In line with this approach, the wide age and performance range of control and WS 
participants was exploited to generate developmental trajectories on both visual and verbal 
FB (Experiment 1) and AI (Experiment 2) conditions. Linear regression analyses were 
conducted to establish the relationship between performance and increasing age for each 
group separately. The developmental trajectory for controls was constructed by plotting 
performance against CA for all 62 typically developing participants. Direct comparisons 
between the two groups were not conducted because the samples had differing variability 
and were non-overlapping in terms of CA (see Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004 for similar 
procedure). In order to normalize the distribution of the number of errors, modified error 
rates were calculated [2 x (ASIN (RACINE (%errors/100))] for each subject and computed for 
both FB (Experiment 1) and AI (Experiment 2) conditions in each modality (visual and 
verbal). A log-log transform was employed to linearise CA distribution (see Karmiloff-Smith 
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et al., 2004 for further details). The typical developmental trajectory revealed a significant 
relationship between CA and error rates on both visual and verbal FB (visual: R2 = .26, F 
(1,60) = 21.55, p < .001; verbal: R2 = .21, F (1,60) = 15.79, p < .001) and AI (visual: R2 = .49, F 
(1,60) = 59.74, p < .001; verbal: R2 = .29, F (1,60) = 24.46, p < .001). By contrast, WS group’s 
developmental trajectory revealed that CA predicted performance on verbal (FB: R2 = .25, F 
(1,17) = 5.81, p = .02; AI: R2 = .44, F (1,60) = 13.43, p = .002) but not on the visual modality (FB: 
R2 = .001, F (1,17) = .03, p > .86; AI: R2 = .10, F (1,60) = 1.96, p > .17). This suggests that for WS 
group only TOM verbal abilities followed a typical developmental pathway. In order to 
verify whether these abilities were related to overall verbal competence we conducted 
additional regression analyses. Performance (error rates) was compared against the log of 
verbal IQ (VIQ) scores. Interestingly, VIQ did not predict performance on verbal FB (R2 = .01, 
F (1,17) = .19, p > .66) nor verbal AI (R2 = .01, F (1,17) = .26, p > .61). This suggests that the WS 
group’s relative proficiency on verbal tasks was not a consequence of a possible 
overestimation of their verbal level. 
Further analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted to confirm that modality 
differences found for the WS group were exclusively dependent on the nature of the task 
(visual vs. verbal) and not on VIQ. Again, results showed no significant relationship between 
VIQ and the pattern of performance found for WS on both FB (F (1,35) = 2.95, p >.10) and AI 
(F (1,35) = .99, p > .33). 
 
To summarize, plotting WS data with respect to their CA brought forth a developmental 
profile that was not detectible in MA-matched comparisons alone. Results of linear 
regression analyses suggest that TOM verbal (but not TOM visual) ability develops normally 
in WS as, like controls, the ability to attribute FB and intentions was found to increase with 
age. This may be interpreted as an index of an emerging specialisation for TOM verbal 
processing in individuals with WS. In terms of relating WS performance to their overall 
verbal level, increasing VIQ scores did not predict performance on verbal tasks nor increased 





This study aimed at investigating TOM abilities in WS through conducting two experiments 
– one focusing on false-belief reasoning (Experiment 1) and the other on the ability to 
attribute intentions to others (Experiment 2) – presented in both the visual and the verbal 
modality. Children and adults with WS were first compared to a group of MA-matched 
controls. TOM development in WS was then examined by comparing the WS developmental 
trajectory to 62 typically developing individuals across a wide age range.  
MA-matched comparisons between WS and typically developing individuals revealed 
consistent findings across experiments. In both experiments, when the TOM task was 
presented on the verbal modality, the WS group performed as accurately as controls while 
being impaired on TOM visual tasks. This finding suggests that individuals with WS do 
have relatively spared (MA-appropriate) abilities for attributing both FB and intentions to 
others dependant on the presence of verbal cues, although we cannot conclude about sparing 
in an absolute sense (because CA-matched comparisons were not conducted). Interestingly, 
this assumption is supported by findings on TOM (FB and AI) development in WS, revealing 
that WS performance on TOM verbal (but not TOM visual) tasks stem from a typical 
developmental trajectory.  
Focusing on performance on visual tasks, findings of this study indicate that individuals 
with WS have a selective impairment when infering mental states based on visual cues. This 
contrasts with previous studies that have shown adults with WS to be relatively proficient at 
reading mental state information from the eyes region, i.e., at attributing mental states to 
others based on visual cues (Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995, 
Experiment 1). However, several methodological reasons may underlie this discrepancy. In 
the present study the WS sample included younger participants (mean age: 14 years, ranging 
from 7 to 26 years) than that of Tager-Flusberg et al. (1998; mean age: 27 years, ranging from 
17 to 37 years). The WS group was also compared to MA-matched typically developing 
individuals and not to MA-matched individuals with mental retardation. Finally the 
discrepancy may be task-related. Indeed, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) have proposed 
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that a distinction should be made between social perceptual skills (such as reading facial 
expressions that involve immediate online judgements of mental states) and social cognitive 
skills that involve social reasoning (such as attributing false beliefs and intentions). Based on 
this, it may be that individuals with WS are able to use visual cues for reading facial 
expressions but not the attributing false beliefs. 
The findings of this study are in line with those of a recent study using a TOM visual task 
and showing impaired understanding of FB, but MA-appropriate performance on social 
script and mechanical stories, in a subgroup of individuals with WS (Porter, Coltheart, & 
Langdon, 2007).  
The finding of relative spared TOM abilities in WS individuals for verbal tasks is in line with 
previous studies using verbal materials to assess TOM. Such studies show that adults with 
WS succeed false-belief attribution (verbal) tasks and some are even able to do higher-order 
TOM tasks requiring attribution of intentions to linguistic utterances (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 
1995, Experiment 6).  
The finding of increased verbal relative to visual TOM abilities in WS is to some extent 
surprising considering the cognitive demands of the tasks. On the visual tasks the attention 
and memory demands were kept as low as possible by presenting participants with the 
whole comic strip until he/she answered (see Brunet et al., 2003a for similar procedure). By 
contrast, verbal tasks were presented orally by the experimenter and participants had thus to 
keep track of and integrate a narrative sequence of events in order to provide the correct 
response. Given WS difficulties in attention, short concentration span and distractibility (e.g., 
Carrasco et al., 2005; Greer et al., 1997), one might rather expect WS participants to perform 
poorly on verbal rather visual tasks. Alternatively, it might be argued that, unwillingly, 
presenting stories the experimenter exerted some influence on performance on verbal tasks. 
However, it is important to note that, despite TOM and control conditions (Experiment 2) 
being closely matched, the impact of modality on WS performance was found to affect TOM 
conditions only (FB and AI), while sparing the ability to infer physical causality (PhC 
condition). Furthermore, when based on verbal (but not on visual) cues individuals with WS 
showed higher performance on attribution of intentions than physical causality trials 
 98 
(Experiment 2). Interestingly, this finding provides support to the idea put forward by 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000, pp. 76) of a “potential difference between psychological 
and physical reasoning in WS”. This idea was based on the finding that children with WS 
tend to perform better (although not reaching statistical significance) on verbal TOM3 than 
verbal control (non-mentalistic) stories, contrary to children with other causes of mental 
retardation (children with Prader-Willi and with non-specific mental retardation). It might 
be that this difference becomes more salient with increasing age, becoming significant in 
older individuals with WS (as those included in the present study). Interestingly, previous 
studies have found the opposite for individuals with autism, as they show impaired intuitive 
psychology (reasoning about mental states), whilst superior understanding of intuitive 
physics (reasoning about physical phenomena; see Baron-Cohen, 2000b for a review; see also 
Binnie & Williams, 2003 for data on children with autism). This dissociation, and TOM 
deficits in particular, are thought to be related to impairments in social and communicative 
development in autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2000a, 2000b). 
Since the mid-1990’s, autism and WS are often contrasted, even to the extent of proposing an 
impaired social module in autism and a selectively intact one in WS (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith et 
al., 1995). There is little doubt that the most striking difference between autistic and WS 
individuals is their social behaviour, with the former being socially avoidant, whereas the 
latter are rather gregarious, strongly interested in people and affective on their 
communicative style (e.g., Lincoln, Searcy, Jones, & Lord, 2007). “Side-by-side, these 
syndromes appear to be mirror images of one another, suggesting that what is impaired in 
autism may be specifically spared in WS” (Tager-Flusberg, Plesa Skwerer, & Joseph, 2006, 
pp. 1). Although we are sceptical about such a sharp contrast between the two syndromes, it 
might be that stark differences in social skills between autistic and WS individuals account 
for opposite patterns of performance found in these two populations. In other words, it 
might be that TOM strengths (relative to reasoning about physical causality) are related to 
hypersociability in WS, as TOM impairments are related to hyposociabiliy in autism (for a 
review see Baron-Cohen, 2000a)? Indeed, fluent mentalising has far-reaching consequences 
for social insight and is a core mechanism underlying a balanced social life. Though this 
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hypothesis is tempting, it is important to bear in mind that, despite social behaviour that is 
warm, engaging, empathic and friendly, individuals with WS also have some social 
difficulties (e.g., Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003). For instance, they have difficulties in triadic 
social interaction (Laing et al., 2002) and in making and sustaining friendships particularly 
with their peers (Gosch & Pankau, 1994; Udwin, Yule, & Martin, 1987). Moreover, they have 
poor social judgement (e.g., Dykens & Rosner, 1999) and often lack of social inhibition (Jones 
et al., 2000; Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2006). Together, this evidence indicates that WS 
social phenotype is certainly not as clear-cut as it appears to be in contrast to autism as it was 
initially thought. Furthermore, the finding of distinctive TOM abilities in WS as a function of 
the modality is difficult to interpret in terms of a link between TOM and social behaviour 
only.  
At this point, is worth noting that results for controls revealed no modality nor condition 
(Experiment 2) differences, allowing us to rule out possible task-related bias as responsible 
for the performance dissociation found between verbal and visual tasks in the WS group. 
Rather, findings of this study converge to suggest that verbal cues help WS individuals 
interpret other’s mental states.  
One tempting explanation of our findings may be the fact that language is a relative strength 
for most individuals with WS (for a review see Mervis & Becerra, 2007). Indeed, previous 
studies suggested that success in TOM tasks is causally dependent on verbal ability (e.g., 
Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé, 1995). However, in the present study the WS pattern of 
performance was found to be unrelated to overall verbal ability (VIQ scores). Putatively, the 
verbal measures used (standard IQ verbal subtests from Wechsler Intelligence Scales) may 
not have captured verbal skills closely connected to the development of TOM (e.g., 
knowledge of sentential complements, for a review see de Villiers, 2000 and Tager-Flusberg, 
2000). Despite findings of this study having limited interpretation in light of the so-widely 
debated link between language and TOM, they do nonetheless show a verbal peak (relative to 
a visual valley) in TOM abilities for WS. Importantly, these may contribute to tailoring 
specific clinical and educational interventions on social cognition and behaviour in WS. For 
instance, the finding that the understanding of others’ mental states in WS is dependent on 
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the modality through which the situation is presented has important implications for the 
development of TOM-intervention programs targeting areas of specific strengths and 
weaknesses. Finally, the role of verbal cues on the acquisition of cognitive competences 
needs further investigation, as it may extend from TOM to other cognitive domains. If 
demonstrated, it will certainly contribute to the design of new educational environments 
adapted to the needs of individuals with WS and provide them with greater opportunities 
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1 Individuals with Prader-Willi syndrome are often compared to individuals with WS 
because of their similar IQ distribution, despite more balanced cognitive profile (e.g., Dykens 
& Rosner, 1999). 
 
2 The matching procedure used on studies comparing individuals with WS and typically 
developing individuals is often a matter of controversy as individuals with WS present 
uneven cognitive abilities, with increased verbal relative to visuo-spatial abilities. Because 
matching procedures based on either verbal or visuo-spatial ability result in non-equivalent 
groups and because we used both visual and verbal tasks, the most reliable trade-off was to 
proceed to an individual MA-matching between WS and control participants.   
 
3 Stories designed to elicit children’s explanations of a person’s action using desire, emotion 




1. False belief 
Jenny and Rob are playing cards at the table. 
Jenny goes outside. 
Rob picks the cards up and puts them in the box. 
When Jenny comes back, where will she look for the cards? 
1. Outside 
2. In the box 
3. On the table * 
 
2. Attribution of Intention 
The baby is crying. 
His mum goes to the kitchen. 
She heats up some milk. 
And what happens then? 
1. She drinks a cup of milk 
2. She prepares a feeding-bottle * 
3. She washes the dishes 
 
3. Physical causality 
Jenny puts her books in her schoolbag. 
She forgets to close it. 
She runs to get to school on time. 
And what happens then? 
1. The books fall out of the bag * 
2. Jenny arrives late to school 













WS is a developmental disorder characterized by unique unevenness at the cognitive 
and the behavioural levels. For the past two decades, cognitive neuroscientists have 
considered WS as a promising model to investigate the link between social behaviour and 
cognition. In this thesis we report three studies investigating social cognition in WS, with 
specific focus on face, emotion and TOM processing. These three studies all served a 
common aim, that of examining whether social cognitive skills in WS follow the atypical 
pattern of social behaviour described in WS. 
STUDY 1 
The first study reported here examined face-processing skills in WS. The remarkable 
ease with which people can instantly recognize a face has been argued to depend on 
perceptual processes, as evident, for instance, in our superior ability to recognize faces in 
upright rather than inverted orientation (e.g., Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995). Interestingly, 
early studies on face processing in WS failed to show such an inversion effect in individuals 
with WS, although their overall scores were found similar to that of normal controls 
(Deruelle et al., 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). This evidence launched the spiced debate of 
whether face-processing skills in WS relies (or not) on the use of atypical (local rather 
configural) perceptual strategies. One of the reasons for why this issue has been debated for 
several years is that previous studies have focused mainly on the perceptual mechanisms 
underlying face processing and have often neglected the possibility that more social 
mechanisms could also interfere with face-processing skills in WS. Given the unusual and 
striking social profile characterizing WS, these latest mechanisms should certainly be 
systematically taken into account. Based on this concern, our first study investigated 
whether the ability to process faces in WS relates to increased interest in social stimuli or 
alternatively whether it depends on more general mechanisms, not exclusively social in 
origin, such as visual perceptual strategies.  A facial-expression task rather than an identity 
face-processing task was used because one of the greatest reasons for which faces are 
considered as a special social stimulus is that they can express a wide range of emotional 
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states. Yet, the originality of this study comes from the fact that it used not only photographs 
of real faces (as it was the case for previous studies in the literature), but also human and 
non-human cartoon faces. Importantly, this allowed a control for the effect of social 
relevance (real faces are certainly more socially-relevant than cartoon faces) on face-
processing performance patterns in WS. In addition, these three types of faces were 
presented either upright or inverted, which allowed a control for the use of typical 
configural face-processing perceptual strategies. 
Results of this study revealed that a face’s social relevance has an increased impact in 
WS individuals relative to typically developing controls, which cannot be explained by a 
reliance on atypical perceptual abilities. More precisely, we found that individuals with WS 
process facial expressions of emotion at the level expected to their MA and even to their CA, 
but only when these are displayed in human faces (both photographs of real faces and 
human cartoon faces). This was not the case in non-human faces.  
STUDY 2 
The second study reported here aimed at determining whether individuals with WS 
were able to use contextual cues to extract emotional information. Contextual cues are 
important for discriminating simple emotions and complex mental states from facial 
expressions (Ellis & Young, 1989), and indeed, some facial expressions may simply represent 
conventions for social communication rather than expressions of emotion per se (Fernandez-
Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995; Fernandez-Dols, Carrera, & Russell, 2002). Based on the idea that 
the context in which a face appears influences facial-emotion processing (de Gelder, Meeren, 
Righart, van den Stock, van de Riet, & Tamietto, 2006), individuals with WS were presented 
with visual scenes where a facial expression of emotion (socially relevant task) or an object 
(non-socially relevant task) were missing. Here their ability to use contextual cues to 
recognize the missing information was compared to that of typically developing individuals. 
Although both the facial-expression and the object recognition tasks were closely 
matched, individuals with WS showed a different pattern of performance as a function of the 
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task. More precisely, individuals with WS performed at similar levels to MA- and even CA-
matched controls on the facial-expression, but not on the object recognition task, suggesting 
that their ability to use contextual cues depends on the social relevance of the task. In other 
words, findings of this study indicate that social relevance boosts context processing in WS, 
to the point of overcoming MA- and reaching CA-expected levels of performance. 
STUDY 3 
The third study reported here investigated TOM abilities in WS. At the origin of this 
study was the idea that TOM is a main ingredient for adapted social behaviour (e.g., Frith & 
Frith, 2003). While several studies have shown a link between TOM impairments and 
atypical social functioning in several neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g., autism, for a 
review see Baron-Cohen, 2000; schizophrenia - Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & 
Veznedaroglu, 2006), no such link has yet been established in WS. Indeed, to date few 
studies have addressed this question, and results are, for the most part, contradictory. An 
important methodological limitation may have contributed to this lack of consensus. 
Previous studies examining TOM in WS used either visual or verbal tasks (e.g., Sullivan & 
Tager-Flusberg, 1999; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998), thus neglecting the unbalanced cognitive 
profile characterizing the disorder. The study reported here offers a first step towards 
addressing this concern by including two TOM tasks – intentions and false-beliefs attribution 
– in both the visual and the verbal modalities.  
Results of this study revealed a relative sparing (MA-corresponding) of TOM verbal 
but not of TOM visual abilities in WS. Importantly, no such dissociation was found on a 
closely matched-control task (not requiring TOM), nor for controls. Another major finding of 
this study was that TOM verbal, but not TOM visual, abilities develop normally in WS. It is 
also important to note that the study reported here is the first study of TOM in WS, firstly to 
include closely matched tasks on the verbal and the visual modalities and thus avoiding bias 
related to increased verbal relative to visuospatial skills in WS, and secondly to link 
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performance with age and thus allowing to examine whether TOM skills in WS develop 
normally (i.e., follows a typical developmental trajectory) or atypically.  
Before turning to the interpretation of the findings of the three studies reported here, we will 
portray some methodological limitations, which are, for the most part, inherent to the study 
of WS.  
LIMITATIONS 
  First, these studies included participants with WS of a wide range of CA, with few 
subjects representing each age range. Given that WS is a rare genetic disorder, recruitment of 
20 participants per study is often long and difficult. This raises a trade-off between reducing 
sample sizes (and, consequently, reliability of results) to increase age homogeneity and 
including a significant number of participants of a wide age range. The CA of the WS sample 
was not restricted because CA is rarely found to affect WS performance (see, for instance, 
Rondan et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2007a; Santos et al., 2007b) and previous studies suggest 
that CA restrictions may substantially influence results on social cognition measures (e.g., 
Shaked & Yirmiya, 2004)  
Second, none of the three studies included IQ measures for controls. As IQ scores 
form the basis for the MA-matching of the participants, this results in an approximation and 
certainly constitutes a methodological limitation. However, IQ testing of typically 
developing children is a heavy procedure (at least one hour extra of testing), substantially 
demanding for the children and not always accepted by their parents. In an attempt to 
compensate for this limitation, typically developing children attending normal classes 
corresponding to their age level were systematically recruited. Teachers were asked to select 
children on the average level of the class, thus avoiding the inclusion of children either 
particularly advanced or delayed relative to matching age. In the next series of experiments 
an abbreviated version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) to assess IQ 
on controls will be used, which is not yet available in French. The WASI consists of four 
subtests (vocabulary, block design, similarities and matrix reasoning) and yields the 
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traditional verbal, performance and full-scale IQ scores. The major advantage of using the 
WASI in future studies is that it meets the demands for a short (from 15 to 30 minutes) and 
reliable measure of intelligence and thus facilitates assessment of typically developing 
controls.  
Third, MA-matching procedure was based on full-scale IQ scores, which camouflage 
the WS uneven IQ profile (with significantly higher verbal IQ than performance IQ scores; 
e.g., Howlin et al., 1998).  Indeed, the MA-matching procedure is a widely debated issue in 
the literature on WS, with some arguing for either verbal IQ or performance IQ-based MA-
matching. However, both these alternatives have limited reliability, as the former results in 
mismatched groups at the visuo-spatial level and the latest results in mismatched groups at 
the verbal level. In an attempt to balance these concerns, most of the studies thus choose to 
base MA-matching on full-scale IQ scores. Importantly, in our three studies these scores 
were obtained using the Wechsler Intelligence scales (WISC and WAIS, according to the 
subject’s CA), which are widely accepted as one of the most comprehensive and reliable 
standardized IQ measures (Wechsler, 1996, 1997). 
Finally, we used one-to-one MA- or CA-matching procedures, which, although 
certainly more reliable than group-matching procedures (not considering individual 
variability within each group), also present some limitations. For instance, comparing a WS 
sample to individually MA- or CA-matched controls discards the relation of performance to 
age once participants are selected and results in static comparisons that do not elucidate the 
trajectory by which participants reach their performance scores. Consequently, the issue of 
whether the ability measured develops normally or atypically in WS cannot be addressed. 
One way to overcome this limitation is to build developmental trajectories for each task and 
each group.  This type of analyses, linking performance with age, was conducted in our third 
study for the WS group and for a group of 62 typically developing controls of a wide age 
range to evaluate whether TOM visual and verbal abilities of our WS group fitted on the 
typical developmental trajectory and to learn more with respect to the way in which TOM 
development in WS may have proceeded over time in a deviant fashion. 
 114 
INTERPRETATION 
Findings of the three studies reported here converge to show dissociated abilities in 
processing 1) human vs. non-human faces, 2) socially relevant vs. non-socially relevant 
contextual cues, and 3) verbal vs. visual mental-state cues, for individuals with WS.  
Based on the theoretical framework of adult neuropsychology, this evidence for 
double dissociations within-syndrome and within-domains could be interpreted in terms of 
impaired versus intact cognitive modules. In this case, we could consider the uneven 
performance pattern found in the WS group as the result of a dissociation between 
independently functioning modules of social cognition, one responsible for processing of 
socially relevant features, such as human facial traits and emotional social cues (spared) and 
another responsible for the processing of non-social stimuli, such as non-human facial 
features and objects (impaired). Within this framework, WS was seen for a long time as a 
promising model to bolster innate modularity claims (for a critical review see Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 2003), i.e., to demonstrate the existence of genetically determined, innate and 
independently functioning modules, some of which being intact (e.g., language and face 
processing) and others impaired (e.g., visuo-spatial cognition). Taking the example of face 
processing, many researchers claimed that these abilities were preserved and functionally 
independent of other cognitive systems in WS (Bellugi, Bihrle, Jernigan, Trauner, & Doherty, 
1990; Rossen et al., 1995). Relative to overall cognitive functioning, face-processing 
performance of individuals with WS is certainly impressive. However, findings of Study 1, 
for instance, challenge the notion of clear-cut intactness of face-processing skills in WS, by 
showing a selective sparing of human facial-expression processing, rather than overall 
sparing across all face types. Similarly, findings of Study 2 and 3, suggest that the ability to 
use contextual cues and to attribute intentions and beliefs to others is not uniform in WS and 
can thus hardly be interpreted on the basis of a modular view of cognition. This position is 
certainly in agreement with that taken in several WS studies from domains for which the 
notion of an intact/impaired module was also initially claimed (e.g., Deruelle et al., 1999; 
Jordan, Reiss, Hoffman, & Landau, 2002; Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, Berthoud, Davis, Howlin, 
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& Udwin, 1997; Landau et al., 2006). One noteworthy example comes from studies on visual 
cognition providing evidence for a dissociation between visuo-constructive (impaired) and 
visuo-perceptive (spared) abilities in WS (e.g., Rondan et al., 2008; Farran & Jarrold, 2003), 
rather than a whole impaired module (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1988). 
From the viewpoint of the alternative neuroconstructivist approach, cognitive 
“peaks” in WS, such as those found here to 1) process human facial expressions, 2) emotional 
contextual cues, and 3) verbal mental-states cues, should be regarded as the outcome of 
altered neurocomputational constraints (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1998), rather than stemming 
from an intact or typically developed social-cognitive module. In line with this idea is the 
fact that, despite these cognitive peaks, WS patterns of performance were systematically 
found deviant relative to that of controls. This indicates that the development of social-
cognitive skills in WS is not delayed as in this case one would have rather found similar, even 
possibly below average, patterns of performance for WS and typically developing groups. In 
children and adults with WS the neurocomputational constraints are altered since the time of 
conception and atypical patterns of performance at the cognitive level may rather be the 
outcome of atypical development rather than solely a reflection of intact and impaired 
modules since the initial state (for a review see Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2003). This 
assumption is founded on the notion that brain development and cognitive functioning are 
considerably less dependent on genetic determinism than previously thought (e.g., Posner, 
Rothbart, Farah, & Bruer, 2001). Even if WS is a relatively homogeneous disorder, its 
phenotypic expression is probably not exclusively an expression of the genetic deletion, but 
rather the individual’s entire genetic endowment and its dynamic interplay with the 
environment (e.g., Plomin & Rende, 1991). It seems very unlikely that a genetic 
predisposition per se accounts for the whole social phenotypic outcome in WS or typical 
development.  
Fundamental developmental questions in the study of WS need to include the 
specificity of linkage between deleted genes to atypical neural development, and whether 
atypical development of one neural system has consequences for the development of other 
functionally associated systems (cascading developmental effects). Within this framework, it 
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has been argued that genes included in the WS deletion could affect neural systems that 
support socio-emotional functions. For instance, Meyer-Lindenberg and colleagues (2005a) 
have reported abnormal activations and interactions of prefrontal regions linked to 
amygdala, especially orbitofrontal cortex, in individuals with WS, suggesting a genetically 
controlled neural circuitry for regulating human social behaviour.  
The social-cognitive abilities studied here are crucial for effective social interaction 
and for gathering information about the environment, and are thus requisites of adapted 
social behaviour (e.g., for a review see Frith & Frith, 2003; Siegal & Varley, 2002). The three 
studies provide consistent evidence for atypical (not impaired) social cognition in WS, 
characterized by increased sensitivity 1) to human facial traits, 2) to emotional contextual 
cues, and 3) to verbalization of mental-states. By focusing on the WS social-behavioural 
phenotype, one may find some crucial features that to some extent account for this atypical 
social-cognitive profile. At first glance, one may imagine, for instance, that findings of these 
studies are related to early and increased interest in people’s faces, unusual drive towards 
social stimuli, and increased motivation towards social interaction, respectively, yet not 
exclusively. Noticeably, these are all characteristic facets of hypersociability in WS. Since the 
earliest developmental stages, individuals with WS show heightened sociability, a profound 
attraction to other people, a special interest in people’s faces and a strong preference for 
social over non-social stimuli (Doyle et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2000). Furthermore, they show 
overfriendliness, eagerness to please others, drive to greet and interact with strangers and an 
empathy with the emotions of others (e.g., Bellugi et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2000). 
Observational studies, for instance, show that, even before language acquisition, children 
with WS stare intently into the faces of strangers (unusually intense-looking behaviours; 
Mervis et al., 2003), present a “friendly and overly positive nature” and tend to socially 
engage, by smiling or otherwise initiating social interaction with adults including strangers 
(Jones et al., 2000, pp. 39). Interestingly, Jones and colleagues (2000) suggested that this 
“strong attraction to social interaction … may interfere with their (children with WS) focus 
on cognitively driven tasks” (Jones et al., 2000, pp. 40). Based on this report, one may suspect 
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that such gregarious social interest may, to some extent, interfere with later social-cognitive 
abilities, and in particular with those assessed here via cognitive tasks.  
It might be that along development, the mix of increased drive towards social stimuli 
and social interaction results in increased social exposure and, in turn, in a certain 
hypersensitivity to the social relevance of cognitive tasks. In other words, the 
hypersociability in WS may have cascading effects over development, resulting in greater 
sensitivity to social relative to non- (or less) social cues. This may thus explain why WS 
participants reached normal levels when processing human faces (Study 1) and when 
extracting emotional information out of contextual cues (Study 2), but were impaired to 
when processing non-human faces and non-social contextual cues. Findings of distinctive 
TOM abilities in WS as a function of modality (Study 3) are harder to be interpreted solely in 
terms of a link between TOM and social behaviour. Based on the idea that success in TOM is 
causally dependent on verbal ability (e.g., Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé, 1995), one may 
rather interpret the finding of increased verbal (in contrast to impaired visual) TOM abilities 
in WS, as a consequence of linguistic relative strengths in most individuals with WS (for a 
review see Mervis & Becerra, 2007). An assessment of verbal skills closely connected to the 
development of TOM (e.g., knowledge of sentential complements, for a review see de 
Villiers, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 2000) is required before any strong conclusions can be drawn. 
Nevertheless, these findings still reveal that individuals with WS process mental-states in an 
atypical fashion relative to controls, which is clearly consistent with the findings of Study 1 
and Study 2.  
To summarize, findings of the three studies reported here converge to show atypical 
social cognition in WS. In line with the neuroconstructivist approach, these findings are 
likely to be the outcome of an atypical combination of genetic and environmental factors 
over development, rather than from the innate juxtaposition of impaired and intact 
functions. Together with recent similar findings in the domain of language (for a review see, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Ansari, Campbell, Scerif, & Thomas, 2006), these findings also contribute to 
reject the misleading notion of an intact social module in WS. Finally, these findings 
challenge the idea that a genetic deletion may per se account for the whole phenotypic 
 118 
profile of WS, especially in the domain of social cognition, and provide support to Karmiloff-
Smith’s (1998) claims for the need of considering development as the key to understand 
developmental disorders. 
Yet, the central question of these studies remains unanswered – that of a link between 
atypical social cognition and behaviour in WS. 
DO SOCIAL COGNITION AND BEHAVIOUR WALK SIDE-BY-SIDE IN WS? 
The three studies reported here provide intriguing cues to a link between atypical 
sociability and social cognition in WS. Our findings of atypical social cognition in WS 
certainly question the relationship with atypical social behaviour characterizing the disorder. 
Although an incontrovertible demonstration of this relationship cannot be drawn here, 
studies on other developmental disorders provide support to this position. Since the mid-
1990s, autism and WS have been often contrasted, even to the extent of proposing an 
impaired social module in autism and a selectively intact one in WS (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith et 
al., 1995). There is little doubt that the most striking difference between individuals with WS 
and autism is their social behaviour (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, Plesa Skwerer, & Joseph, 2006). 
Individuals with autism show profound impairments in social functioning (e.g., difficulties 
interacting with other and attending to people) and emotional reciprocity, whereas WS 
individuals show a quite opposite profile, i.e., unusually strong impulse towards social 
interaction, including with strangers. Such contrast in social behaviour – hyposociable vs. 
hypersociable – is at the origin of the recent assumption that “Side-by-side, these syndromes 
appear to be mirror images of one another, suggesting that what is impaired in ASD may be 
specifically spared in WS” (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006, pp. 175). Although we are sceptical 
about such a sharp contrast between the two syndromes, it can be hypothesized that 
differences in WS’ and autism’s social behaviour might engender different patterns of social-
cognitive performance in these populations.  
Two studies conducted in our own group confirmed this hypothesis (Da Fonseca, 
Santos, Rosset, Rondan, Poinso, & Deruelle, 2008; Rosset, Rondan, Da Fonseca, Santos, 
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Assouline, & Deruelle, 2007). We examined face and emotion processing in children with 
autism using the same methodology as that used in Study 1 and Study 2, respectively (see 
Appendix 1 and 2). Relative to face-processing abilities, perceptual mechanisms (orientation 
of the faces) were found to account for the performance of children with autism than more 
socially related mechanisms (human status of faces), as it was found in the WS’ study (Study 
1). More precisely, results revealed that, unlike children with WS, children with autism 
achieved similar levels of performance as controls across all face types, yet through resorting 
to atypical perceptual strategies (local) when processing human faces (see Appendix 1).  
In autism the opposite pattern of performance than that found for WS (Study 2) was found 
for extracting emotion out of contextual cues. Results showed that children with autism 
performed significantly poorer than controls on emotion, but not on object recognition (see 
Appendix 2). Finally, a great amount of studies in the literature have provided consistent 
evidence for impaired TOM processing in autism, which has been considered to be related to 
poor sociability in this disorder (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995). Taken together, these studies 
suggest that hyposociability may underlie atypical face, emotion and TOM processing in 
autism9 (see also, Celani, Battachi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & 
Cohen, 2002; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998). Based on this, why should we 
not conclude that “what is impaired in autism may be specifically spared in WS” (Tager-
Flusberg et al., 2006, pp. 175)?  
First, findings of the studies reported here point to atypical rather spared social-
cognitive abilities in WS. Indeed, individuals with WS were found to perform at CA-
expected levels on human-face and emotional contextual cues processing, and at MA-
expected levels on TOM verbal processing. However, their overall patterns of performance 
across the three studies were not found to be marked by within-domain dissociations and 
not uniformly similar to that of controls, suggesting, at least some deviance on the 
development of social-cognitive abilities in WS.  
                                                
9 Such link between poor social functioning and social cognitive impairments has also been demonstrated in other 
neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by atypical social behaviour, such as schizophrenia (Abdi & 
Sharma, 2004; Archer, Hay, & Young, 1994; Corcoran, 2001; Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003). 
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Second, although the comparison between autism and WS may offer unique 
perspectives on the relationship between atypical social behaviour and cognition, it is 
unlikely that the contrast between these disorders is that straightforward. It has been found, 
for instance, that though characterized by contrasting hyposociability and hypersociability, 
both disorders show impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours, including eye-
to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction, and 
making errors in judging facial expressions (Frigerio, Burt, Gagliardi, Cioffi, Martelli et al., 
2006; Pelphrey, Adolphs, & Morris, 2004). In addition, the two disorders coexist in up to 4.7% 
of individuals (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006b).    
Finally, it is important to consider that the notion of hypersociability in WS is, to 
some extent, misleading, since not all aspects of sociability are increased in WS. Despite 
being warm, engaging, empathic and friendly, individuals with WS also have noteworthy 
social difficulties (e.g., Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003). For instance, they have problems in 
social adjustment, including difficulties in making and sustaining friendships particularly 
with their peers (Gosch & Pankau, 1994; Udwin et al., 1987) and in triadic social interaction 
(Laing et al., 2002). Moreover, they have poor social judgement (e.g., Dykens & Rosner, 1999) 
and often lack of social inhibition (Jones et al., 2000; Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2006). 
Despite their social fearlessness, they also show significant anxiety, especially in new 
situations (Dykens, 2003; Leyfer et al., 2006). Together, this evidence indicates that WS social 
phenotype is haunted by many paradoxes, and is certainly far more complex than initially 
thought: 
 
“Unlike their serious deficits in number, spatial cognition, and problem solving,  
WS subjects show a third islet of relatively preserved ability – together with language and face processing – that of theory of mind” 
 
Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995, pp. 202 
 
The studies reported here investigated the question of whether atypical social 
behaviour and cognition walk side-by-side in WS. Based on the findings for dissociated 
abilities to process 1) human vs. non-human faces, 2) socially relevant vs. non-socially 
relevant contextual cues, and 3) verbal vs. visual mental-state cues in individuals with WS, 
the answer to this question is: Yes, social cognition in WS is atypical and thus walks side-by-
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side with atypical social behaviour in this disorder. Although this statement may seem trivial 
or unsurprising, it has nevertheless not been reliably demonstrated before.  
In need of further investigation remains the direction of this relationship between 
social cognition and behaviour in WS. A central question for future research in this domain 
might be that of whether it is atypical social cognition that leads to the inability to behave 
socially in adapted fashion or rather that it is WS’ early hypersociability that leads to an 
atypical way of perceiving social stimuli, favouring more socially-relevant ones (e.g., human 
faces, emotional contextual cues or verbal indexes of TOM) in detriment of those with fewer 
social value (e.g., non-human faces, objects or visual indexes of TOM). One must agree that 
this question is far from being easy-to-answer and will putatively remain at the heart of 
heated debates for at least a little while. This has been the case for autism, for instance, which 
(unlike WS) counts with an astonishing (and increasing) number of studies on the link 
between social cognition and behaviour, yet with no clear-cut conclusions on “what comes 
first – atypical social cognition or atypical behaviour?” 
PERSPECTIVES 
The studies on WS reported here addressed three aspects of social cognition: face, 
emotion and TOM processing. A more complex account of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the unusual social phenotype of WS needs to address processing of many other 
types of social stimuli, including eye-gaze, biological motion and auditory cues, and how 
effectively these aspects of perception are integrated with one another as well as with explicit 
social knowledge.  
Moreover, to investigate the link between social atypical cognition and behaviour in 
WS, further research must consider the inclusion of measures of social behaviour. Although 
some of these measures exist, to our knowledge, none provides an objective, reliable and 
adapted assessment of social behaviour in WS. Efforts are being done in our group to 
overcome this need of a reliable and wide-covering measure of social behaviour, considering 
its expression on a continuum, with middle positions corresponding to typical/adapted 
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social behaviour (as found in normal development) and extreme positions corresponding to 
either decreased or increased social ease. To this aim we are now designing a parental 
sociability questionnaire compiling key items from three previously validated 
questionnaires: the Childhood Asperger Syndrome Test (CAST – Scott, Baron-Cohen, Bolton, 
& Brayne, 2002), the Salk Institute Sociability Questionnaire (SISQ – Jones et al., 2000), and 
the Children’s Social Behaviour Questionnaire (CSBQ – Luteijn, Jackson, Volkmar, & 
Minderaa, 1998). The CAST is a brief parental questionnaire designed to screen for social and 
communication difficulties in mainstream children aged 4-11 years. It is based on a variety of 
behavioural descriptions of the ICD-10 and DSM-IV core features of the autism spectrum 
(social impairments, communication impairments and repetitive or stereotyped behaviours). 
The SISQ is a parental questionnaire specifically developed to measure various aspects of 
sociability commonly reported among people with WS (global sociability, social-emotional 
behaviour, tendency to approach familiars and tendency to approach strangers). Finally, the 
CSBQ aims to measure problems in subtle social skills in children with milder forms of 
pervasive developmental disorders and include 6 scales: “Not tuned” (limitations with 
adapting behaviour to the social situation), “Tendency to withdraw” (problems in social 
interaction), “Orientation problems” (problems in automatic orientation in time, place, 
person and activity), “Not understanding” (not understanding the point in conversation, 
jokes and problems in processing social information), “Stereotyped behaviour” (stereotyped 
movements and preoccupation with objects and sensory information), and “Fear of changes” 
(fear of and resistance to change). Though validated and widely used in the assessment of 
developmental psychiatric disorders, taken separately these previous questionnaires suffer 
from being too specific to one syndrome and from covering only a limited number of 
expressions of atypical social behaviour (e.g., the SISQ was specifically developed for the 
assessment of hypersociability in WS and thus does not allow to examine whether the WS 
social profile includes autistic traits for instance). This certainly constitutes a methodological 
limitation when studying atypical social behaviour and may result in a significant bias 
towards a side of the social behaviour spectrum. The compilation of these three 
questionnaires, by covering a wide range of social behaviours, will allow a clear 
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characterization of atypical social behaviour in WS (as well as in other disorders marked by 
deviances in social adjustment), with good levels of specificity, sensitivity and positive 
predictive value. Hopefully, this will soon allow further advances on the study of the link 
between atypical social cognition and behaviour.  
A further important requirement is to investigate the time course of emergence and 
development of atypical social cognition. Both neuroscientific and recent psychological 
evidence shows that WS emerges from a complex interplay of altered systems that needs to 
be viewed from a developmental perspective and is not generally consistent with cognitive 
or neural modularity. Future research on WS, but also on other neurodevelopmental 
disorders, must thus take into consideration age-related changes at both behavioural and 
neurobiological levels. It is by focusing studies of developmental disorders at their roots in 
early infancy that we will ultimately be able to chart longitudinally the varying 
developmental pathways that progressively lead to different phenotypical outcomes (e.g., 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). Fine-grained analyses of within syndrome variation, including the 
study of atypical participants (e.g., individuals with small deletions in the WS region), will 
also facilitate the search for links between genes, brain and social behaviour.  
Indeed, the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the striking social 
phenotype of WS has been shown to be far more complex than originally envisioned. Results 
of the three studies on WS reported here provide a springboard for future research, which 
needs to move towards a detailed and mechanistic inquiry into specific neural and genetic 
mechanisms for atypical social cognition. Attempting to explore the genetic, cognitive and 
neural pathways of atypical social behaviour mandates the development of a new field of 
research integrating multi-levels of investigation and a multi-method approach. Within this 
framework, the comparison between WS and autism may be of special interest, as these 
genetically based neurodevelopmental disorders have been presented as mirror images of 
one another in terms of atypical social behaviour (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006). 
Elucidating the neurobiological mechanisms for social dysfunction in autism and WS 
will certainly be of major interest for future research, as this aspect of the disorders is 
incompletely understood and currently inaccessible to therapy. Considerable attention has 
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been focused on structures involved in social cognition such as the amygdala. In autism, 
there is evidence for amygdalar hypofunction (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Weelwright, Bullmore, 
Brammer et al., 1999; Critchley, Daly, Bullmore, Williams, van Amelsvoort et al., 2000), as 
well as hypofunction in other regions playing key roles in face processing and social function 
(Pelphrey et al., 2004), including the fusiform gyrus (Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce, Muller, 
Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Schultz, Gauthier, Klin, Fulbright, Anderson et al., 
2000). By contrast, in WS, hypersociability has been associated with decreased amygdala 
responsivity to socially relevant stimuli in the context of impaired regulation by prefrontal 
cortex, especially orbitofrontal cortex (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005a), that may lead to 
impaired extinction of conditional fearful stimuli (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006a). It is likely 
that the neurobiology of atypical social cognition in WS and autism involves system-level 
dysregulation, is context-dependent, and is best understood when viewed developmentally. 
In this case, it would be interesting to advance the knowledge on the neural basis of social 
cognitive dysfunction through a direct comparison of WS and autistic groups with 
comparable IQ, but markedly different social dysfunction. It might be that rather than being 
“mirror images of one another”, as suggested in the literature, autism and WS do share islets 
of social disability, which have an identifiable common neural substrate.  
Another tempting query worthy of future investigation is that of whether autism and 
WS share genetic defects, which may underlie the atypical social phenotype of these 
disorders. One possibility is that the basis of atypical social phenotype flank within the WS 
critical region. Indeed, atypical social profile is a consistent phenotypic feature of WS, and 
the 7q11.23 deletion is the only genetic factor shared between affected individuals. 
Furthermore, a recent study has proposed that some genes both flanking and within the WS 
deletion interval (HIP1 and YWHAG) could be candidate genes for autism susceptibility 
(Edelmann, Prosnitz, Pardo, Bhatt, Cohen et al., 2007), and thus suggesting a potential 
genetic predisposition in the expression of atypical sociability. Although many genes and 
proteins have been implicated as causes of autism, too little is known about their role in 
brain development to generate a parsimonious hypothesis about the brain dysfunctions that 
underlie atypical social behaviour in this population. By contrast, research into the molecular 
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pathology of WS, caused by a 7q11.23 hemizygous deletion, has clarified 
genotype/phenotype relationships (for a review see Tassabehji, 2003). Variability in 
deletions and in cognitive profiles is essential to determine the relationships between genes 
and behaviours. For instance, isolated cases with single-based mutations in the tropoelastin 
(ELN) gene, whose deletion in WS is responsible for supravalvar aortic stenosis (Tassabehji, 
Metcalfe, Donnai, Hurst, Reardon et al., 1997), can cause a lack of some physical 
characteristic features in WS like the facial dysmorphia and the hoarse voice, suggesting that 
deletion of ELN is not responsible for these physical aspects of WS (e.g., Tassabehji, Metcalfe, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Carette, Grant et al., 1999). Following these previous encouraging findings, 
our group is now attempting to combine behavioural and molecular data into phenotypic 
maps to allow the association of genes with changes in social skills. In the long-term this may 
lead to the development of diagnostic tools based on genetic materials, which could provide 
an earlier and more reliable assessment of the risk of developing atypical social behaviours 
than classical cognitive measures. 
In summary, the potential research and clinical relevance of work on the social-
cognitive profile of WS holds the promise of advancing our understanding of the 
neurobiological basis of atypical social behaviour and to extend this far beyond 
developmental disorders to inform developmental theory. Such studies may also provide the 
theoretical background for the development of specific clinical and educational interventions 
providing an increasing number of socially impaired children with greater opportunities for 
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Typical Emotion Processing for Cartoon but not for Real Faces in
Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders
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Abstract This study evaluated whether atypical face
processing in autism extends from human to cartoon faces
for which they show a greater interest. Twenty children
with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) were compared to
two groups of typically developing children, matched on
chronological and mental age. They processed the emo-
tional expressions of real faces, human cartoon and non-
human cartoon faces. Children with ASD were as capable
as controls in processing emotional expressions, but strat-
egies differed according to the type of face. Controls relied
on a configural strategy with all faces. By contrast, ASD
children exploited this typical configural strategy with
cartoons but used a local strategy with real faces. This
atypical visual processing style is discussed in the context
of face expertise.
Keywords Autism  Face  Emotional expressions 
Cartoon  Children  Inversion effect
The human face is an important source of social informa-
tion. It is thus not surprising that humans show a specific
interest for this stimulus. Our ability to quickly and
accurately identify and recognize facial expressions is
believed to depend on this tendency to pay attention to faces.
Curiously, in some neurodevelopmental disorders, faces
do not appear to have such a special status. The most
striking example comes from studies in autism. For
instance, it has been found that, contrary to typically
developing children, those with autistic spectrum disorder
(ASD) do not show distinctive patterns of brain activity
(measured with the event-related potential (ERP) method)
for familiar and unfamiliar faces, but do for familiar and
unfamiliar objects (e.g., Dawson et al. 2002). These data
suggest that individuals with ASD do not consider faces as
more interesting stimuli than other objects. Moreover,
children with autism fail to show the typical speed
advantage for faces compared to non-face stimuli (Dawson
et al. 2005; Webb et al. 2006). There is also evidence that
they remember non-face stimuli as well as faces, in con-
trast to typically developing children who remember faces
better than other stimuli (Serra et al. 2003). Similarly,
several studies have shown atypical facial-emotion pro-
cessing in individuals with ASD, suggesting that facial
expressions may have a decreased impact in ASD relative
to typically developing controls (Ashwin et al. 2006;
Teunisse and De Gelder 2001). In line with this idea,
Pelphrey and colleagues (2002) have shown that adults
with ASD present disorganized scanpaths relative to con-
trols when asked to identify facial expressions of emotion.
More recently, Dawson and colleagues (2004) recorded
brain activity using event-related potentials (ERPs) in 3–
4 year-old children with autism during passive observation
of neutral or fearful faces. Results revealed an atypical
ERP pattern, with children with ASD failing to present
differences between neutral and fearful faces. Neuroim-
aging studies also show that the brain areas usually
involved in face processing (Fusiform Face Area—FFA)
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are hypoactivated in participants with ASD (Critchley et al.
2000; Hubl et al. 2003; Pierce et al. 2001; Schultz et al.
2000; Schultz 2005).
Taken together these data suggest that deficits in face
processing in autism (for a review see Grelotti et al. 2002)
may extend to face-related features, such as facial
expression processing. Several authors argue that these
deficits are related to the social impairment at the core of
autism (e.g., Sigman et al. 2004). However, the question of
whether diminished interest in faces or rather the use of
atypical perceptual strategies underlies differences in pro-
cessing face and facial-feature in autism remains elusive.
It is widely accepted that typically developing individ-
uals use configural strategies to process faces (e.g., Bukach
et al. 2006). This however, does not seem to be the case for
people with ASD. A number of studies suggest that indi-
viduals with ASD attend to faces in a local rather than a
configural manner (Behrmann et al. 2006; Lahaie et al.
2006; Sasson 2006). Consistent with this, Deruelle and
collaborators demonstrated that children with ASD were
more accurate at identifying faces on the basis of high than
low spatial frequencies, whereas controls showed the
reverse pattern of performance (Deruelle et al. 2004). Note
that it is widely accepted that high-spatial frequency pro-
cessing is linked to local face-processing strategies,
whereas low spatial frequency processing is related to
configural face-processing strategies (e.g., Goffaux et al.
2005). Moreover, studies using upside-down face presen-
tations showed that, contrary to typically developing
controls, individuals with ASD did not present the so-called
‘‘inversion-effect’’ (Hobson et al. 1988a; Langdell 1978).
Surprisingly, in the inverted-face condition, children with
ASD performed more accurately than controls in sorting
expressions and identity (Hobson et al. 1988b) and label-
ling emotional expressions (Tantam et al. 1989). Moreover,
individuals with autism did not show longer latencies on
negative early ERPs components (N170) to inverted com-
pared to upright faces, as it is generally the case for controls
(Mc Partland et al. 2004). Because upside down presenta-
tions disrupt configural face properties (e.g., Leder et al.
2001), this pattern of results—i.e. better performance for
upside down than upright face presentations together with
similar ERP patterns for upright and inverted presenta-
tions—suggests that individuals with ASD are less sensitive
to the so-called inversion effect, possibly because they do
not rely on the use of typical configural strategies to process
faces. Yet, this seems to be due to less efficient rather than
fully impaired configural processing (for a review see
Mottron et al. 2006). The mechanisms underlying this
atypical processing style remain, however, a debated issue.
Interestingly, for our purpose, increasing evidence sug-
gests that, in contrast to atypical real-face processing,
individuals with ASD do not differ from typically
developing controls in cartoon-face processing. For
instance, when presented with cartoon scenes, individuals
with ASD tend to fixate longer and more often on cartoon
characters than objects (Van der Geest et al. 2002). More-
over, training studies have suggested that children with
autism show greater improvements in emotion recognition
when programs include cartoons rather than photographs of
real faces (Silver and Oakes 2001). Note that clinical and
parental reports also state that children with ASD spend long
periods of time looking at cartoons (Miyahara et al. 2007).
Parents and professionals often report that ‘‘autistic children
know more about cartoons than about people’’ or that they
even ‘‘knew all the names of Pokemon and Digimon, but
they did not know my name (experimenter’s name) after
three days’’ (Grelotti’s personnal interview, Yaledaily-
news.com, 2005). The idea that children with ASD show
increased interest for cartoon faces relative to real faces has
also been supported by recent neuroimaging case study
(Grelotti et al. 2005). Interestingly, the authors found no
FFA activation for human faces but activation for cartoon
faces in an autistic boy particularly attentive to cartoons.
While there is converging evidence for increased inter-
est for cartoon faces relative to real faces in ASD, little is
known about the strategies underlying this difference. This
study aims at determining if typical face processing may
emerge for stimuli that are not particularly avoided by
children with ASD (e.g., cartoons). We used three different
types of faces—photographs of human faces, human car-
toon faces and non-human cartoon faces1—believed to
differ in terms of the interest they present for ASD chil-
dren. We hypothesized that the use of a typical configural
(rather than local) strategy to process faces would vary as a
function of the face type. More precisely, based on the idea
that cartoon faces may have a special status in children
with ASD, we hypothesized that they would use typical
strategies to process cartoon but not real faces. In order to
focus on the cognitive characteristics of the autistic popu-
lation, configural processing was assessed through an
upright/inverted facial-emotion recognition task.
Method
Participants
Twenty children with ASD (19 boys and 1 girl) aged
4–15 years (M = 9.5, SD = 3.2) participated in this study.
1 This study included not only human but also non-human cartoon
faces in order to create a stimuli continuum, with decreasing human-
related features from photographs of real faces to human cartoon
faces and from human to non-human cartoon faces. Also, note that
previous studies have shown that individuals with ASD process
differently age and emotion as a function of the nature of cartoon
faces (human versus non-human; Gross 2002, 2004).
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They were diagnosed according to the DSM-IV (A.P.A.,
1994) and the ADI-R (Rutter et al. 2003) criteria for aut-
ism. ADI-R scores for all children were higher than cutoffs
(Social domain: M = 18, cutoff: 10; Communication
domain: M = 13.2, cutoff: 8; Stereotypy domain: M = 4.5,
cutoff: 3; Onset: M = 3.8, cutoff: 1). Intellectual func-
tioning was assessed using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children (WISC-III—Wechsler 1996; WPPSI-III—
Wechsler 1995) or the PEP-R (Schopler et al. 1990. Mean
IQ scores for children assessed with the WISC-III or the
WPPSI-III (N = 17), corresponded to 83 (SD = 21) on
verbal subtests and to 85.5 (SD = 15) on non-verbal sub-
tests. Mental age (MA), inferred from IQ measures ranged
from 3 to 16 years (M = 8.2; SD = 4.0).
Two groups of 20 typically developing children also
participated in this study. While children of the first control
group (CA-matched) were individually matched to the
autistic participants on gender and chronological age
(M = 9.6; SD = 3.3), children of the second control group
(MA-matched) were individually matched on gender and
mental age (M = 8; SD = 4). All control participants
attended normal classes corresponding to their age level.
Teachers were asked to select these children on the average
level of the class thus avoiding inclusion of advanced or
delayed children relative to their age. None of them had
failed a grade during his/her education.
Exposure to virtual faces (minutes per day watching TV,
reading comics or playing video games) was assessed
through a parental questionnaire. Note that mean exposure
time (ASD: M = 115.5; SD = 8.7; CA: M = 111; SD = 9;
MA: M = 114; SD = 8.5) did not differ across groups
(Main effect of Group: F (2, 57) = .06, p = 0.9). All chil-
dren were native French speakers and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, normal audition and no known
associated medical disorders. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee and written consent was
obtained from parents prior to participation.
Stimuli
Stimuli comprised three sets of black and white pictures of
faces (9 female, 9 male) depicting sad, happy or angry
expressions (see Fig. 1). Each set contained 18 pictures of
faces (6 photographs of human faces, 6 human cartoon
faces and 6 non-human cartoon faces), thus creating a total
of 54 images. Stimuli were presented in both upright and
inverted orientations. Human faces were taken from the AR
Face Database (Martinez and Benavente 1998). Human
and non-human cartoon faces were inspired from foreign
cartoon movies to assure that all subjects were presented
with the stimuli for the first time. All faces were presented
in full face presentation and were cropped at the neckline.
Pictures subtended approximately 14 · 11 when viewed
at 60 cm. Stimuli were displayed in the center of a 14 inch
computer screen using Microsoft Power Point Presentation
software.
Procedure
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room either
at a child day-care unit (Saint-Egre`ve Hospital, Grenoble;
Sainte-Marguerite Hospital, Marseille) or at their home.
They were seated in front of a portable computer screen on
which stimuli were presented and were asked to categorize
the emotion displayed. Twenty-one subjects (seven in each
group (ASD/MA-matched/CA-matched)) were asked to
categorize faces as happy/not happy, another 21 were asked
to categorize faces as sad/not sad and the remaining sub-
jects were asked to categorize faces as angry/not angry.
Children were randomly assigned to the happy/not happy,
sad/not sad or angry/not angry tasks. Note that each ASD
participant was individually matched with a CA- and a
MA-matched child considering the type of categorizing
task he/she performed.
In order to make sure instructions were understood, all
subjects were presented with 12 training trials (4 photo-
graphs of real faces, 4 human-cartoon faces and 4 non-
human cartoon faces, 2 upright and 2 inverted for each face
type). Following this, subjects were presented with 108 test
trials, corresponding to three blocks of 36 trials. Each block
comprised 18 upright and 18 inverted faces, each com-
prising 6 human faces, 6 faces of human cartoons and 6
faces of non-human cartoons. The order of block presen-
tation was randomized across subjects. When necessary, a
Fig. 1 Examples of happy
human face (a), human cartoon
face (b), and non-human
cartoon face (c) used in the
facial expression categorisation
task
J Autism Dev Disord
123
short pause was proposed between each block. Stimuli
remained displayed on the screen until the subject
responded. Participants were asked to respond verbally.
Note that this was possible because ASD participants were
found to have verbal level corresponding to their age (i.e.,
verbal IQ scores [ 80). Responses were recorded by the
experimenter and scored 1 if correct or 0 if incorrect.
Results
The number of errors was analyzed using a three-way
ANOVA including Group (ASD/CA-matched/MA-mat-
ched) as between-subject factor, and Face (Human/Human
Cartoon/Non-Human Cartoon) and Orientation (Upright/
Inverted) as within-subject factors.2 Results revealed a
significant main effect of Face (F(2–114) = 32.9,
p \ .001), with better performance with human faces
(M = 1.7, SD = 2.2) than with both human cartoons
(M = 3.4, SD = 2.9, Tukey HSD test: p \ .001) and non-
human cartoons (M = 3.4, SD = 3.1, Tukey HSD test:
p \ .001). There was no significant difference between
human and non-human cartoon faces (Tukey HSD test:
p [ .05). Moreover, the Orientation effect was also sig-
nificant (F(1–57) = 185.5, p \ .001). Children were more
accurate when faces were presented upright (M = 1.8,
SD = 2.3) than inverted (M = 3.9, SD = 3). Curiously, the
main effect of Group did not reach significance (p [ .05),
suggesting that ASD children (M = 2.7, SD = 2.5) were
able to recognize emotional facial expressions as well as
controls (CA: M = 2.5, SD = 2.6; MA: M = 3.4,
SD = 3.4).
In order to further explore possible differences on the
strategies used by each group, within-subject analyses were
conducted for ASD, MA- and CA-matched groups sepa-
rately. Two-way ANOVAs were computed on the number
of errors. Results showed that the main effect of Orienta-
tion was significant for all groups (ASD: F(1–19) = 51.3,
p \ .001; MA: F(1–19) = 75.4, p \ .001; CA: F(1–
19) = 67.3, p \ .001), with lower accuracy for inverted
than for upright faces. The main effects of Face were also
found to be significant (ASD: F(2–38) = 9.2, p \ .001;
MA: F (2–38) = 14.8, p \ .001; CA: F(2–38) = 11.4,
p \ .001). Greater accuracy scores were obtained for
photographs of human faces than for both human and non-
human cartoon faces (Tukey HSD test: all ps \ .01).
In addition, the Face by Orientation interaction was
significant for all groups (ASD: F(2–38) = 11.5, p \ .001;
MA F(2–38) = 6.1, p \ .01; CA: F(2–38) = 5.1, p \ .05).
Further analysis of these interactions found that controls
showed a clear inversion effect for all faces (Tukey HSD
test: all ps \ .01). This pattern differed in the ASD group
where children exhibited an inversion effect for human and
non-human cartoon faces (Tukey test: all ps \ .01), but not
for human faces (p [ .05) (see Table 1).
Finally, in order to determine the influence of age and
IQ on performance Spearman Rank Correlation tests were
computed for each group separately. Results revealed that
none of these correlations were significant (all ps [ .05).
Discussion
This study found that unlike typically developing children,
children with ASD did not exhibit a significant inversion
effect for human faces. However, both groups showed a
typical inversion effect to human and non-human cartoon
faces.
Indeed, the main findings of the current study concern
the fact that children with ASD did not use typical confi-
gural strategies to process emotional expressions displayed
on photographs of real faces to the same extend as controls.
In this condition, they presented no inversion effect, con-
trary to controls. This absence of an inversion effect for
faces in autism is in line with several previous studies
(Langdell 1978; Hobson et al. 1988a; Rondan and Deruelle
2004; Tantam et al. 1989). However, the current study
provides evidence that the use of atypical (local rather
configural) face processing strategies in autism affect not
only facial-identity but also facial-expression processing.
Interestingly, children with ASD only exhibited a sig-
nificant inversion effect for cartoon faces. This is evidence
for the use of typical configural processing strategies for
cartoons but not for real faces in autism. Interestingly, a
recent fMRI study found a similar unusual pattern with the
FFA being activated for cartoon but not for human faces in
an adolescent with ASD (Grelotti et al. 2005).
This disparity between human versus cartoon face pro-
cessing in autism is striking and not easily interpretable by
conservative approaches of face processing. One may
argue that the perceptual nature of cartoon faces per se,
such as its reduced complexity relative to real faces, may
favor configural processing. However, it is important to
note that both control and ASD groups showed greater
overall performance for human than for cartoon faces.
Also, cartoons clearly contained fewer and more distin-
guishable features than human faces, which should
2 The within-subject factor Emotion (sad/happy/angry) was not
included because preliminary analyses (two-way ANOVA using
Group as a between-subject factor and Emotion as a within-subject
factor) on the number of errors showed no significant main effect of
Group (F(2,15) = 1.17, p [ .05) nor of Emotion (F(2,30) = 3.2,
p [ .05). Also, the Group · Emotion interaction was not significant
(F(4,30) = .3, p [ .05). Data for the three conditions were thus pulled
together for all the following analyses.
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encourage part-based rather than configural strategies (e.g.,
Fallshore and Bartholow 2003). It seems thus unlikely that
the perceptual aspects of cartoon faces account for the use
of configural processing strategies in ASD participants for
cartoons but not for photographs of human faces.
Here, we suggest that a greater interest toward cartoons
(e.g., Van der Geest et al. 2002) compared to real faces in
autism may account for it. As underlined earlier, a great
deal of evidence suggests that human faces do not elicit the
same specific reactions in children with autism as they do
in typically developing children (e.g., Osterling and Daw-
son 1994). Several authors have postulated that the
difficulties encountered by ASD individuals with human
faces are closely related to impairments in social interac-
tions and particularly dealing with socially relevant stimuli
(e.g., Dawson et al. 2005). As experience is believed to
drive cortical specialization for faces (Nelson 2001),
reduced attention to faces may deprive the social brain of
the needed input for normal development and specializa-
tion. In line with this idea, it has been suggested that ASD
individuals do not develop cortical face specialization nor
perceptual expertise for faces because, already early in
development, they present reduced social interest for faces
(Grelotti et al. 2002). Consequently, both anatomical and
functional substrates of face processing appear to be under-
stimulated in autism, thus not reaching specialization as it
occurs in typical development (e.g., Schultz et al. 2000).
One may argue that the lack of inversion effect (used
here as an index of configural processing) for photographs
of real faces but not for cartoon faces reflects the influence
of expertise on facial-emotion processing in autism.
Because ASD children do not have the same level of
expertise with human faces as typically developing chil-
dren, they may not be able to use configural strategies to
process them. By contrast, because cartoons (both human
and non-human) are somehow relevant stimuli for them
(e.g., Van der Geest et al. 2002), they may use typical
configural strategies to process emotions expressed on
cartoon faces.
Interestingly, previous studies on autism provide support
to this hypothesis. For instance, Grelotti and colleagues
(2005) have recently suggested a putative link between
increased interest for cartoon faces and activation of FFA
by cartoon but not by real faces. These findings were
interpreted as due to acquired expertise with cartoon faces.
In line with this interpretation, familiarity has been found
to influence face-processing skills in individuals with ASD.
For instance, as typically developing individuals, they
show greater FFA activity in response to familiar faces
compared to strangers (Pierce et al. 2004).
Alternatively, one possible explanation for the differ-
ences found for real and cartoon faces in autism is that in
contrast to human faces, cartoons are stimuli with which no
social interaction is possible. In this case, it can be
hypothesized that children with ASD process cartoons in a
typical manner because their social impairments do not
interfere with this (less-sociable) type of stimuli. Yet, to be
validated, this hypothesis needs further investigation.
Finally, it is important to note that despite different
processing styles, children with ASD reached similar
accuracy levels as controls. In other words they decoded
sad, angry or happy facial expressions as well as typically
developing individuals, ruling out possible underlying
impairments in facial-emotion recognition. Our data thus
appear at odd with previous findings in the literature
showing that ASD individuals have selective deficits in
recognizing emotions compared to other face tasks (Celani
et al. 1999; Hobson et al. 1988b; Tantam et al. 1989) or in
recognizing specific expressions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1993;
Howard et al. 2000).
It could be argued that the ability to recognize emotions
may also depend on the complexity of the stimuli. In fact,
Table 1 Mean number of errors and standard deviations (SD) values for the three groups of participants in each condition
Group Conditions
Human face Human cartoon face Non-human cartoon face
Upright Inverted Upright Inverted Upright Inverted
ASD
Mean 1.5 2.1 1.9 4.6 1.5 4.7
SD 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.1 3.3
CA-matched
Mean 0.9 1.9 1.8 3.8 2 4.8
SD 1.5 2.4 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.6
MA-matched
Mean 1.5 2.5 3 5.4 2.5 5.3
SD 2.5 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.2 3
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the emotional expressions used in our study (happiness,
sadness and anger) are possibly not complex enough to
induce differences between ASD and controls groups. In
line with this idea, previous studies reported that ASD
children were able to recognize basic but not complex
emotional expressions (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 1997,
2001). Furthermore, studies focusing on face (e.g., Rondan
et al. 2003) and facial-expression processing (e.g., Hubert
et al. in press) also failed to show differences between
ASD and control groups. Yet, these reports revealed that
despite no group difference on overall performance, ASD
individuals differed from controls in terms of the percep-
tual strategies used to perform the task. Thus, similar
performance levels may sometimes mask atypical pro-
cessing strategies.
In summary, findings from this study revealed that while
children with ASD failed to show a significant inversion
effect (indexing the use of typical face-processing strate-
gies) for photographs of real faces, they nevertheless
processed cartoon faces in a typical configural manner.
Taken together, these findings may contribute to a better
understanding of the mechanisms underlying atypical
visual processing in ASD and should be taken into con-
sideration when designing intervention programs.
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1. Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by a triad of symptoms, including impairments
in communication and social interaction, and repetitive, stereotyped behaviours (APA, 1994). Emotion
processing has been the focus ofmuch attention in the condition, as a severe qualitative impairment in
the ability to decode and interpret other’s emotion is also one hallmark feature of ASD (e.g., Buitelaar,
van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999). Individuals with ASD have been found
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The aim of the present study was to determine whether children
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are able to recognize facial
expressions of emotion and objects missing on the basis of
contextual cues. While most of these studies focused on facial
emotion recognition, here we examined the ability to extract
emotional information on the basis contextual cues. Nineteen
children and adolescents with ASD were asked to recognize
emotions and objects (control condition) masked within visual
scenes and their performance was compared to that of 19 typically
developing controls matched on chronological age and gender.
Results revealed that children with ASDwere able to use contextual
cues to recognize objects but not emotions. Findings of this study
are discussed within the framework of specific emotional proces-
sing deficits in ASD.
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impaired in a wide range of emotion recognition tasks, including labelling, recognition and encoding
facial expressions of emotion (e.g., Bormann-Kischkel, Vilsmeier, & Baude, 1995; Tantam, Monaghan,
Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989). There is also evidence that children with ASD have difficulties in making
socio-emotional judgments about faces (e.g, Weeks & Hobson, 1987) and fail to associate facial
expression of emotion with verbal and pictorial labels (Lindner & Rosen, 2006). Interestingly, recent
neuroimaging studies have provided support to the assumption of poor facial emotion processing in
ASD by showing reduced activation of the fusiform gyrus in children with ASD relative to typically
developing controls during facial expression recognition tasks (Piggot et al., 2004; Wang, Dapretto,
Hariri, Sigman, & Bookheimer, 2004).
Another bulk of evidence, however, pleads in favour of normal emotion processing in ASD. For
instance, children with ASD often show normal levels of performance on standardized tasks of
emotional expression discrimination (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Castelli, 2005; Grossman, Klin, Carter, &
Volkmar, 2000; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990), such as the standardized Minnesota Test of
Affective Processing (Robel et al., 2004).
Several reasons may underlie the lack of consensus amongst previous findings. First, there is
considerable heterogeneity between the samples tested in these studies (e.g., different ages and IQ
levels). Second, these studies have used different tasks (e.g., labeling vs. discriminating emotions),
which may thus involve distinct processing mechanisms. Finally, an important factor to take into
accountwhen considering previous studies on emotion processing in ASD is the stimuli used—isolated
faces, in most cases. By the fact that these represent single cues, it has been suggested that some
adolescents with ASD may process it via abnormal compensatory strategies (e.g., associating faces in
which the lips are turned up to happiness), thusmasking underlying emotion recognition deficits (e.g.,
Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). In line with this hypothesis, several studies have shown that, relative to
controls, individuals with ASD not only use atypical behavioural strategies (e.g., Lindner & Rosen,
2006; Rosset et al., 2007), but also activate distinct physiological (Hubert et al., in press) and neuronal
brain regions (Ashwin, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005; Critchley et al., 2000; Wicker et al., in
press) when processing emotional face-stimuli, though reaching near-normal performance.
The present study aims at further examining emotion recognition in ASD by using stimuli more
complex, and thus more impervious to the use of compensatory processing strategies, than faces—
visual scenes. Children and adolescents with ASD were asked to recognize emotions masked within
visual scenes on the basis of contextual cues and their performance was compared to that of typically
developing controls. This should therefore enable us to determine if they reach normal emotion
recognition performance using more ecologically valid stimuli. If this is the case, it might help
clarifying the existing paradox between the empirical evidence for adapted facial emotion processing
(e.g. Castelli, 2005; Ozonoff et al., 1990) in individuals with ASD and their severe difficulties on
reciprocal social interactions and emotion decoding in daily life (e.g., Fein, Lucci, Braverman, &
Waterhouse, 1992). Indeed, in daily life, emotions are rarely encountered in isolated faces and rather
appear within rich and complex contexts (e.g., postures, gestures, situational elements). Importantly,
recent studies on typically developing individuals have shown that some cues provided by the context
in which a face appears (e.g., congruent emotional scenes, body and voice contexts) improve facial
expression recognition (for a review see de Gelder et al., 2006).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Two experimental groups participated in this study. The first group included 19 high-functioning
children and adolescents with autism or Asperger syndrome (17 boys and 2 girls) aged 7–18 years
(M = 12.8; S.D. = 3.6). They were recruited via the Department of Child Psychiatry at the local hospital
(Sainte-Marguerite Hospital, Marseille). They will hereby be designated as the group with autistic
spectrum disorders (ASD). Children were diagnosed according to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), the Gillberg
scale (Ehlers, Gillberg, & Wing, 1999) and/or the ADI-R (Rutter, Lord, & Le Couteur, 1995) criteria for
autism by a trained psychiatrist. They all attended normal classes at local schools. At the time of
testing, none of them had known associatedmedical disorders or overt physical handicap. Intellectual
D. Da Fonseca et al. / Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders xxx (2008) xxx–xxx2
RASD-95; No of Pages 7
Please cite this article in press as: Da Fonseca, D, et al., Can children with autistic spectrum disorders
extract emotions out of contextual cues?, Res Autism Spectr Disord (2008),
doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2008.04.001
abilities were assessed by a chartered neuropsychologist using theWAIS-R or theWISC-III (Wechsler,
1981, 1991) according to subjects’ age. IQ scores ranged from 75 to 130 (M = 93.7; S.D. = 15.4).
Since mean IQ scores were found to be within the normal range, participants with ASD were
individually matched to typically developing controls on the basis of gender and chronological age.
This control group included 19 children and adolescents (17 boys and 2 girls) aged 7–18 years
(M = 12.7; S.D. = 3.4). They were recruited via local schools and they all attended normal classes
corresponding to their age level. Teachers were asked to select these children on the average level of
the class thus avoiding inclusion of advanced or delayed children relative to their age. None of control
participants had overt physical handicap or known neurological/psychiatric deficits.
All participants were native French speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal audition and
vision. Informed consent was obtained for all subjects and the experimental procedure was approved
by the local ethics committee.
2.2. Stimuli and procedure
The task used in the present study was previously validated in typically developing children
(Santos et al., in press) and included two conditions, one requiring emotion recognition (see Fig. 1a),
and the other requiring object recognition (see Fig. 1b).
Stimuli comprised 60 coloured photographs taken from popular French media magazines and
chosen by two independent researchers. These photographs were scanned and were used as visual
scenes in which either a face expressing an emotion or an object wasmasked. Visual scenes inwhich a
face or an object was masked were carefully matched in terms of complexity (e.g., the number of
characters and objects contained in a scene). The same masking procedure was used for both
conditions. Both target faces and target objects were masked by a white circle (about 2 cm of
diameter). Also, visual scenes in which a facial expression or an object was missing were carefully
matched in terms of complexity and the number of characters and objects contained in the scene. In
order to verify that target facial expressions and target objects were judged consistently, a pilot study
was conducted on 16 typically developing individuals (not included in the control groups). No
significant performance differences between the facial expression and the object conditions (p > .05).
Only visual sceneswith reliable judgements of the target facial expressions and objectswere included.
Missing facial expressions (see Fig. 1a) displayed four basic emotions: fear, sadness, anger, and
happiness (N = 10 for each emotion). Missing objects corresponded to familiar objects belonging to
one of the following four categories: tools (e.g., screwdriver), toys (e.g., soccer ball), daily objects (e.g.,
toothbrush) and food (e.g., icecream). Note that previous studies using pictures of objects have shown
that at age 4 French children can accurately (more than 75% response accuracy) name similar objects
to those presented here (Cannard, Blaye, Scheuner, & Bonthoux, 2005). All photographs subtended
158 ! 158 of visual angle.
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room at the INCM (CNRS, Marseille, France). They
were seated in front of a computer screen placed at a viewing distance of 60 cm and were told that
photographs were going to be presented on the screen. Moreover, they were informed that in each
photograph there would be either a facial expression or an object missing and that they were to
recognize it among three options, i.e., among either three facial expressions or three objects.
Participants were asked to choose the missing facial expression or object (within the three response-
options) as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Stimuli were presented for 750 ms in the center of a computer screen and were followed by three
response-options. In the facial expression recognition task (see Fig. 1b), response-options consisted of
three emotional icon faces (‘‘emoticons’’, taken from Attwood, 2003), one expressing the same
emotion as the target and two expressing a different emotion (either fear, sadness, anger, or
happiness). In the object recognition task (see Fig. 1d), response-options consisted of three objects,
one representing the target object and two objects of the same category served as distracters. Each
response-option was associated with a number (1, 2 or 3) corresponding to coloured response-keys
(1 = ‘‘A’’, 2 = ‘‘Y’’ and 3 = ‘‘P’’ keys of a French keyboard).
To ensure participants understood the task, they were all presented with eight training trials (four
trials for facial expression of emotion (one for each emotion) and four trials for objects). Following this,
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they were presented with 60 experimental trials (40 trials requiring facial expression recognition and
20 trials requiring object recognition. The experimental session only began once participants knew the
meaning of the icons and were at ease with the task procedure.
The position of the response-options (including the correct response) and the order of trials
presentation were randomly assigned across subjects. The percentage of correct responses was
recorded for each task and for each subject.
3. Results
Data (percentage of correct responses) were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA (analyses of
variance) including Group as between-subjects factor (ASD vs. CTR) and Task (Emotion vs. Object) as
Fig. 1. example of picture of masked child face displaying fear (a) and the three emotions proposed as response choices (b), and
of masked object (c) and the three objects proposed as response choices (d).
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within-subjects factor. Results revealed a significantmain effect of Group (F (1, 36) = 6.2, p = .01), with
control children (M = 85.7; S.D. = 8.23) outperforming children with ASD (M = 79.1; S.D. = 10.6). The
main effect of Task was also significant (F (1, 36) = 83.9, p < .001), with all participants being more
accurate on the Object (M = 89.7; S.D. = 1.44) than on the Emotion recognition task (M = 75.0;
S.D. = 1.65). Most importantly, the Group ! Task interaction also reached significance (F (1, 36) = 14.1,
p < .001). Further post hoc comparisons using Tukey tests revealed that children with ASD only
differed from controls when they were to recognize the Emotion masked in the visual scenes (ASD:
M = 68.7; S.D. = 2.32; CTR: M = 81.3, S.D. = 2.33, p = .009).
In order to verify if the performance patterns found for children with ASD were unrelated to their
intellectual level we conducted additional correlation analyses using Pearson r tests. Results revealed
no significant correlation between performance and IQ scores (Emotion task: r = ".03, p = .88; Object
task: r = ".07, p = .74). By contrast, similar correlation analyses including performance and age as
factors revealed a significant increase of performance (Emotion task: r = .50, p = .02; Object task:
r = .63, p = .004) with age, suggesting that recognition skills in children with ASD improve along
development.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to determine whether children with ASD are able to recognize
emotions on the basis of contextual cues. This study comprised two experimental conditions requiring
Emotion or Object recognition. Children with ASD differ from controls only when they are to use
contextual cues to extract emotional information. These difficulties were unrelated to the ability to
process visual indexes in a scene since children with ASD performed as accurately as controls on the
object recognition task. What can thus explain the finding that children with ASD fail to recognize
emotions even when several cues are provided by a visual context?
First, one may argue that the Emotion recognition condition was more difficult than the Object
recognition condition. However, several reasons render this hypothesis unlikely. First, the two
conditions were closely matched in terms of complexity (i.e., the number of characters in the visual
scene for instance), and in terms of attentional, perceptual, and executive demands. Moreover, both
conditions required participants: (1) to process visual scenes as a whole, (2) to attend to critical
elements (contextual cues) of the scene, and (3) to recognize, within three related stimuli (objects or
emotions) and on the basis of their contextual knowledge only, the most plausibly missing (masked)
part of the scene.
Second, correlational analyses revealed that performance of the ASD group on both conditions was
unrelated to overall intellectual level. Finally, and most importantly, evidence from a recent study
using the same paradigm as that used in the present study revealed that children with mental
retardation (Williams syndrome) are able to perform the Emotion recognition condition at the same
level as typically developing controls matched on chronological age (Santos et al., in press).
An alternative explanation may concern atypical perceptual processing extensively reported in
ASD. Numerous studies have indeed shown that childrenwith ASD are biased towards local processing
(i.e., they focus on the components of figures at the expense of its whole; Brosnan, Scott, Fox, & Pye,
2004; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2000). While typically developing children
process visual information as awhole via global perceptual strategies.Within this framework, it can be
hypothesized that childrenwith ASD showed a different pattern of performance than controls because
theywere not able to integrate the elements displayed in the visual scenes as a whole. In line with this
hypothesis it has been found, for instance, that children with ASD have difficulties performing visual
search tasks involving the detection of an intruder item (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). However, the
finding of a distinctive pattern of performance on the Emotion and the Object recognition conditions
counters this hypothesis. Though a whole-scene process was required in both conditions, children
with ASD only had difficulty in the condition requiring emotional information processing.
Recently, it has been proposed that the ability to attribute meaning to visual displays in children
with ASDmay depend on the nature of stimuli (Klin & Jones, 2006). More precisely, a dissociation has
been found between attribution of (spared) physical and (impaired) social meaning to ambiguous
displays. This suggests that in ASD the ability tomakemeaningful connections between itemsmay not
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be domain-independent, but rather specifically affected when social stimuli processing is needed. In
line with this idea, our findings revealed that, in the case of non-social stimuli processing (Object
condition), children with ASD could integrate contextual cues to accurately recognize the masked
element. Further support for this idea also comes from studies showing that children with ASD
perform at normal levels when they use contextual information to identify objects (Lopez & Leekam,
2003).
Another explanation for our findingsmight be that of an overall emotion recognition deficit in ASD.
Emotion deficit is indeed one hallmark feature in ASD (e.g., Tantam et al., 1989). However, as
mentioned above, several studies failed to find emotion recognition deficits in children with ASD
(Grossman et al., 2000), thus questioning the existence of an overall impairment in this domain. It is
important to note, however, that most of these studies focused on facial emotion processing. For
methodological reasons, these studies are hardly comparable with the present one. One major
difference concerns the type of stimuli. Visual scenes certainly present greater complexity than faces,
whichmay, in turn, accentuate the difficulties in decoding emotions in children with ASD. In addition,
increased variability between visual scenes may lessen the possibility that children with ASD process
it via compensatory strategies. In fact, the use of such strategiesmay lie beneath accurate processing of
facial expressions of emotion and mask an underlying emotion recognition deficit in children with
ASD (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003).
The present study provides further evidence concerning this so-called emotion recognition deficit
in ASD by showing that, when presented with multiple contextual cues, children with ASD fail to
decode emotional information efficiently. This evidence is, to some extent, consistent with that of
Adolphs, Sears, and Piven (2001) showing impairments in higher-level social judgments of facial
expressions but spared facial emotion recognition in adults with ASD. More recently, Speer, Cook,
McMahon, and Clark (2007) have also found that individuals with ASD perform face-processing tasks
as accurately as normal controlswhen faces are displayed in isolation, but are impairedwhen faces are
displayed in the context of a visual scene containing several characters.
Finally, findings of this study revealed that the ability to interpret contextual cues in children with
ASD increases along development, independently of the nature of the stimuli (social vs. non-social).
This result is consistent with previous studies showing a correlation between increasing global
processing performance and age, even when facial (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; Rondan
& Deruelle, 2004, 2005) and emotional stimuli (Lindner & Rosen, 2006) are used. This data also
suggests that the influence of age on performance should be systematically taken into account when
studying ASD.
In summary, current findings indicate that children with ASD have difficulties interpreting
emotions from contextual cues and that these difficulties do not rely on overall deficits of context
processing. Such pivotal dysfunction could stymie the development of more sophisticated social skills
(e.g., Dawson et al., 2002), and underlie severe difficulties in emotional and social interaction in
everyday life situations that characterize ASD (e.g., Fein et al., 1992). This studymay have a number of
implications for the development of treatment programs for children with ASD focusing on the
integration of emotional information in social contexts.
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Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetically based neurodevelopmental disorder that 
holds the promise of uncovering the underlying mechanisms of atypical social behaviour. In 
recent years, great interest has been directed at the unique socio-behavioural phenotype, 
high sociability and empathy, found in individuals with WS, who eagerly, often impulsively, 
engage in social interaction, even with strangers. To date, the question of whether this 
hypersociability in WS actually goes along with intact social cognition remains, however, an 
enigma. This question, at the heart of the studies reported here, is of major interest as socio-
cognitive skills are mandatory for one to behave socially in an adapted fashion. 
The current thesis brings together findings of a series of studies on social cognition in WS. 
These studies aimed at investigating whether three main ingredients of social cognition – the 
ability 1) to process faces, 2) to decode emotions, and 3) to attribute intentions and beliefs to 
others – follow the atypical pattern of social behaviour in WS.  
Findings of these studies converge to show dissociated abilities when processing 
human vs. non-human faces (study 1), emotional vs. non-emotional contextual cues (study 
2), and verbal vs. visual mental-state cues (study 3) in individuals with WS relative to 
typically developing controls. Taken together these findings provide evidence for atypical 
social cognition in WS and question its relationship with atypical social behaviour 
characterizing the disorder. In addition, these findings challenge the initial notion of an 
intact social module in WS and provide support to a neuroconstructiviste approach of 
developmental disorders. Finally, the current thesis considers the advances emerging from 
these studies, as well as its theoretical implications for understanding the journey from genes 
to cognition and behaviour. 
 
Keywords: Williams syndrome, social cognition, face processing, emotion processing, 
theory of mind, hypersociability. 
